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Abstract
This thesis consists of a collection of five papers on naturalized formal epis-
temology of uncertain reasoning. In all papers I apply coherence based prob-
ability logic to make fundamental epistemological questions precise and
propose new solutions to old problems. I investigate the rational evalua-
tion of uncertain arguments, develop a new measure of argument strength,
and explore the semantics of uncertain indicative conditionals. Specifically,
I study formally and empirically the semantics of negated apparently self-
contradictory conditionals (Aristotle’s theses), resolve a number of para-
doxes of the material conditional in a purely semantical way without em-
ploying pragmatics and investigate the psychological plausibility of the
proposed semantics. Moreover, I defend the formalization of defeasible in-
ferences within a probabilistic framework of nonmonotonic reasoning and
empirically justify the formalizations by a series of psychological experi-
ments. I investigate general properties of uncertain argument forms and
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Naturalized epistemology was most prominently popularized by Quine
(1969). It denotes a class of views that advocates empirical work to solve
epistemological problems (Feldman, 2008). It is my firm belief that cog-
nitive science and experimental psychology have a lot to say about cen-
tral epistemological problems of reasoning under uncertainty. I will argue
that formal work on central epistemological questions makes philosophi-
cal problems precise and allows for solutions that are at least hard to find
by traditional (informal) epistemological methods. The use of conceptual
analyses, which is common in traditional (informal) epistemology, brings
the danger of “sometimes [employing] exorbitantly speculative examples or
counterexamples” as philosophical arguments (Hendricks, 2006, p. ix; my
emphasis). Psychological experiments on how people reason have a strong
potential to empirically justify (counter)examples and thereby reduce sub-
stantially speculative elements of traditional conceptual analyses. I am
therefore not claiming to replace traditional epistemology by formal episte-
mology, but rather advocate the use of formal tools wherever they fruitfully
help to clarify the problem at hand.
The collection of papers in the present thesis attempts to provide new
clarifications and solutions to a number of central epistemological ques-
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tions. Specifically, in this thesis I
• elaborate a new measure of argument strength and rationally evalu-
ate uncertain arguments w.r.t. the strength of arguments and the co-
herent probability propagation from the premises to the conclusion;
• investigate the semantics of uncertain indicative conditionals;
• analyze formally and empirically the semantics of negated appar-
ently self-contradictory conditionals (Aristotle’s theses);
• resolve a number of paradoxes of the material conditional in a purely
semantical way without employing pragmatics and investigate the
psychological plausibility of the proposed semantics;
• formalize defeasible inferences within a probabilistic framework of
nonmonotonic reasoning and additionally justify empirically the for-
malizations; and
• investigate general properties of uncertain argument forms and the
interrelations among logical validity, Adams’ p-validity (1975, 1998)
and probabilistic informativeness.
The normative elements described in the list above belong to the do-
main of formal epistemology. The descriptive or empirical elements are
relevant for naturalized epistemologists. Moreover, the list points to ex-
perimental investigations on the underlying philosophical intuitions of the
formal analyses. We recently argued that topics of the list above are can-
didates to extend the current domain of experimental philosophy (Pfeifer
& Douven, submitted). Experimental philosophers investigated people’s
intuitions on a wide variety of philosophical topics, including causation,
consciousness, cross-cultural intuitions, epistemology, folk morality, folk
psychology, free will, and intentional action (see, e.g., Feltz, 2009; Knobe
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& Nichols, 2008; Phillips, 2011). Uncertain reasoning, however, has been
neglected so far. My thesis contributes to filling this gap.
There is a recent trend in formal epistemology (e.g., Bovens & Hart-
mann, 2003; Douven, 2008; Huber & Schmidt-Petri, 2009; Spohn, 2009)
to use uncertainty measures for investigating conditionals and reasoning
about uncertainty. There is a similar trend in the cognitive psychology and
cognitive science of reasoning (e.g., Evans, in press; Oaksford & Chater,
2009; Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007; Pfeifer &
Kleiter, 2009) to use probabilistic models for investigating human infer-
ence. Although both fields have different foci of interest I am convinced
that the results and methodologies can be fruitfully applied in epistemol-
ogy. The focus of the cognitive psychology of reasoning is on how peo-
ple form representations of the premises and the conclusion and how they
manipulate representations in order to draw inferences. The focus of the
cognitive science of reasoning is on how to model human inferences. Both,
how people reason and the computational modeling of human inference
provide an empirical foundation for a naturalized epistemology of reason-
ing. My thesis elaborates a series of paradigmatic examples.
The present work consists of a collection of five full papers. One is
accepted for publication and four are published. Among the various ap-
proaches to probability (Hájek, 2011), I have chosen coherence based probabil-
ity theory as the common normative framework in each paper. The coher-
ence approach to probability goes back to De Finetti (1980, 1974). More re-
cent work includes, e.g., Walley (1991), Lad (1996), Biazzo and Gilio (2000),
Coletti and Scozzafava (2002), and Galavotti (2008). The formal charac-
terization of coherence is technically demanding. I therefore focus on the
underlying philosophical intuitions in an informal way.1 Intuitively, coher-
1Formally, coherence is characterized for example by Theorem 4 given by Coletti and
Scozzafava (2002, p. 81), which is reproduced in the Appendix A (p. 132) below.
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ence is in the tradition of subjective probability theory in which probabili-
ties are conceived as degrees of belief. Degrees of belief are not only suitable
for investigating epistemological problems but also for investigating em-
pirical questions.
One key feature of coherence based probability theory is that the proba-
bility function is defined on an arbitrary family of conditional events. There-
fore, a complete algebra is not required, which contrasts to the standard
approach to probability. Conditional probability, P(B | A), is a primitive no-
tion. The probability value is assigned directly to the conditional event,
B | A, as a whole (and not by definition via the fraction of the joint and the
marginal probability, P(A ∧ B)/P(A) if P(A) > 0). The conditional event
B | A is true if B is true and A is true, B | A is false if B is false and A is true
and B | A is undetermined if A is false.
The probability axioms are formulated for conditional probabilities in
the framework of coherence and not for absolute probabilities (as it is done
in the standard approach to probability). Thus, “coherence” refers here to
a foundation of probability theory. This meaning of “coherence” should
not be confused with the epistemological problem of characterizing for-
mally “how sentences hang together”, which is also denoted by “coher-
ence” (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Douven & Meijs, 2007).
Probability logical approaches became popular in formal epistemol-
ogy (e. g., Adams, 1998; Haenni, Romeijn, Wheeler, & Williamson, 2011;
Hailperin, 2000, 2011). Haenni et al. (2011, p. 3) point out that the funda-
mental problem of non-probabilistic logics consists in determining if a con-
clusion C is entailed by a premise set {P1,P2, . . . ,Pn}. In contrast, proba-
bilistic logics attach probabilities to the premises and the inference problem
consists of determining what (set of) probabilities should be attached to the
conclusion. For an example see Table 1.1. The books by Haenni et al. and
by Hailperin focus on the fundamental problem of probability logic from
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(1) P(A) = x A
(2) P(B | A) = y If A, then B
(3) xy ≤ P(B) ≤ xy + 1− x B
Table 1.1: Probabilistic and non-probabilistic version of the modus ponens.
a normative point of view: what (set of) probabilities should be attached to
the conclusion. This is also one of the central goals accomplished in my
thesis. However, my thesis differs in two respects. Firstly, I use coher-
ence based probability theory as a foundation of the proposed probability
logic. Secondly, I study not only normatively the tightest coherent proba-
bility bounds2 on the conclusion but also descriptively how people evaluate
the probability bounds on the conclusion. The main goal of my work is
to provide a new approach to uncertain reasoning that is normatively and
descriptively adequate.
In my thesis, I propose coherence based probability theory as a nor-
mative framework for investigating probabilistic versions of propositional-
logical argument forms (see Section 3.2–Section 3.5). Coherence based prob-
ability logic defines the consequence relation as a deductive one. The prob-
abilistic inference problem consists of how to transmit the probabilities of
the premises to the conclusion. Usually, the coherent probability of the con-
clusion is constrained by a lower and an upper probability.
As an example, consider the modus ponens argument form in Table 1.1.
As only two probabilities are given in the premises (1) and (2), the coherent
probability of the conclusion (3) is constrained by a lower and an upper
probability bound.3 Therefore, the conclusion of the probabilistic modus
2Coherent lower (l) and upper (u) probability bounds on conclusion C are tight if, and
only if, they are the best possible coherent probability bounds on C, i.e., there is no coherent
probability less than l and greater than u.
3The law of total probability states that P(B) = P(B|A) × P(A) + P(B|¬A) × P(¬A).
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ponens is imprecise. If P(B|¬A) = z is added to the premise set of the prob-
abilistic modus ponens, then the resulting argument form allows for infer-
ring a precise probability value of the conclusion: P(B) = xy + (1 − x)z.
The premises are not restricted to point probabilities but may also include
imprecise probabilities and logical constraints. The former is important
to formalize situations of incomplete probabilistic knowledge: The impre-
cise conclusion probability of a modus ponens inference may be used as
a premise in a further argument. Moreover, if precise knowledge is not
available to the reasoner during the initial probabilistic assessment of the
premises, imprecise probabilities express a much more realistic state of
knowledge compared with artificially forcing to guess precise values. Log-
ical constraints may not only further constrain the tightest coherent prob-
ability bounds on the conclusion, they can also be used to express analytic
truths, like “blue light is blue”.
Coherence based probability logic (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2006a, 2009) has
received strong empirical support in a series of experiments on the rules of
the nonmonotonic System P (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2003, 2005, 2006b), indica-
tive conditionals (Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2009, 2011; Fu-
gard, Pfeifer, & Mayerhofer, 2011), and the conditional syllogisms (Pfeifer
& Kleiter, 2007). My thesis substantially extends this work by formal and
empirical investigations on Aristotle’s Thesis (Section 3.2 p. 41), the para-
doxes of the material conditional (Section 3.3 on p. 59), and on nonmono-
tonic argument forms (Section 3.4 on p. 76). Thus, my empirical work sup-
ports coherence based probability logic by external quality criteria which
are beyond the purely formal ones (i.e., soundness and completeness).
All papers in this collection contribute to a naturalized formal epis-
As P(¬A) = 1− P(A), the only unknown value is P(B|¬A). If P(B|¬A) = 0, then P(B) =
P(B|A)× P(A) (which is the tightest coherent lower probability bound of the conclusion).
If P(B|¬A) = 1, then P(B) = P(B|A) × P(A) + 1− P(A) (which is the tightest coherent
upper probability bound of the conclusion).
INTRODUCTION 13
temology of uncertain reasoning. They are located in the intersection of
formal epistemology, psychology and cognitive science of reasoning, and
carefully extend the current domain of experimental philosophy to uncer-
tain reasoning. The solid experimental work aims to avoid shallow empir-
ical methodologies which—unfortunately—are still present in the recently
emerged experimental philosophy movement. The next sections introduce
the philosophical topics. Furthermore, they summarize and discuss se-
lected main results in the light of their epistemological relevance.
Chapter 2
Summary of papers and outline
of topics
2.1 Argument strength
An argument is an ordered triple consisting of (1) a (possibly empty)
premise set, (2) a conclusion indicator1, and (3) a conclusion. Classical logic
tells us that if all premises are assumed to be true, then the conclusion is
necessarily true if, and only if, the argument is logically valid. Logical va-
lidity guarantees truth preservation. Classical logic, however, does not tell
us how to formalize uncertainty. The premises of everyday life arguments
are usually uncertain and the conclusions are typically defeasible. Thus, a
richer formal theory is needed for the rational evaluation of everyday life
arguments.
In Section 3.1 (p. 25) I explore a new measure of argument strength that
serves to rationally evaluate uncertain everyday life arguments. Let x de-
note the tightest coherent lower and y denote the tightest coherent upper
bound on the conclusion of an argumentA. Then the argument strength of
1“Therefore”, “hence”, and “it follows that” are examples of conclusion indicators fre-
quently used in commonsense arguments.
14
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A is equal to
[1− (y− x)]× x + y
2
.
The measure maps onto the real interval of zero and one, where zero is the
lowest value and one is the highest value of the argument strength.
The strength ofA increases if the precision of the probability is high and
the tightest coherent probability interval approaches 1. Thus, instead of re-
quiring the assumption of unconditional truth of the premises, the premises
are evaluated probabilistically and the tightest coherent probability bounds
on the conclusion are used to assess the rationality of the argument.
This measure contrasts with traditional measures of confirmation (see,
e. g. Crupi, Tentori, & Gonzales, 2007) and intuitions on argument strength
discussed in the cognitive science literature (e. g., Rips, 2001; Hahn &
Oaksford, 2006). In my proposal, the consequence relation remains de-
ductive, while alternative proposals assume an uncertain relation between
the premises and the conclusion. The advantage of my measure is that it
does justice to the logical structure of the premise set: it is easy to repre-
sent conditionals. If a measure of argument strength requires to calculate
the conditional probability of the conclusion given some combination of
the premises, P(conclusion |premise set), then the severe problem arises
of how to combine non-truth functional conditionals. While it is straight-
forward to formulate conjunctions of material conditionals or embedded
material conditionals, it is not clear how to combine or conditionalize on
conditional events (for a proposal see, e.g., Douven, 2012). It is hard to im-
pose a satisfactory semantics on expressions like “B | [A ∧ (B|A)]” (i. e.,
a form of modus ponens, consisting of the conclusion B and the premise set
{A, B|A}). In my proposal this problem is avoided, as probability logic tells
us how to infer the tightest coherent probability bounds of the conclusion
from the premises, which are in turn exploited for calculating the argument
strength.
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The fundamental problem of conditionalizing on conditionals is often
ignored but virulent in current debates of establishing measures of “coher-
ence among sentences” in the sense of “sentences that hang together” (for
an overview on coherence measures see Douven & Meijs, 2007). Future
work is needed to explore if coherence based probability logic provides the
appropriate tools to come up with a new and satisfactory measure of co-
herence among sentences.
2.2 Aristotle’s theses
One version of Aristotle’s Thesis consists of the following negated condi-
tional:
It is not the case that: If A, then not-A.
The other version of Aristotle’s Thesis is obtained by replacing the condi-
tional by “If not-A, then A”.
Both versions are logically contingent if the conditional is interpreted
as a material one, A ⊃ ¬A and ¬A ⊃ A, respectively. Therefore, if the
reasoner is completely uncertain about A, then both formulæ are evaluated
by probabilistically non-informative intervals, P(¬(A ⊃ ¬A)) ∈ [0, 1] and
P(¬(¬A ⊃ A)) ∈ [0, 1], respectively. However, if the conditionals are in-
terpreted as conditional events—¬A|A and A|¬A, respectively—then co-
herence requires that the corresponding formulæ should necessarily obtain
probability one. The material conditional interpretation seems counterintu-
itive, whereas the conditional event interpretation matches with common-
sense intuitions.
This probability logical analysis is elaborated in Section 3.2 (p. 41). Fur-
thermore, this section reports for the first time experiments on both forms
of Aristotle’s theses. I rationally reconstruct how people interpret and
negate indicative conditionals. One main result consists in the empiri-
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cal observation that people interpret indicative conditionals as conditional
events. Another main result is that people negate conditionals by the nar-
row scope reading of the negation of conditionals (i.e., by negating the con-
sequent of the conditional). Neither wide (¬(A ⊃ C)) nor narrow scope
((A ⊃ ¬C)) readings of the negated material conditional are empirically
supported. I argue for extending the domain of experimental philosophy
to uncertain conditionals in Section 3.2.
In Pfeifer (2011b) I make a case for normative models by pointing out
that they are necessary for the study of reasoning and furthermore, that sys-
tematic rationality norms provide research roadmaps and clarity. Formal
work makes psychological theories precise and stimulates new psycholog-
ical hypotheses. The fine-graded differences between the narrow and wide
scope readings and the semantical implications of negating conditionals are
hard to see without a formal background theory. Empirical work provides
extra quality criteria of formal theories and thereby helps to arbitrate be-
tween formal theories beyond purely formal quality criteria like soundness
and completeness. Section 3.2 and the subsequent sections make a strong
case for the fruitful interactions of formal and empirical work.
Section 3.2 shows that Aristotle’s theses provide formal and empiri-
cal litmus tests for contrasting the material conditional with the condi-
tional event interpretation of indicative conditionals. Moreover, Section 3.2
sheds new light on how conditionals should be negated and on how people
negate conditionals.
2.3 Paradoxes of the material conditional
The conditional event interpretation of indicative conditionals matches in
numerous scenarios with commonsense intuitions, whereas the material
conditional interpretation fails. Aristotle’s theses is one class of examples
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(see the previous Section 2.2). Another class of examples consists of the
so-called “paradoxes of the material conditionals”. The paradoxes arise if
natural language versions of indicative conditionals are formalized by the
material conditional. “(Bill Gates is bankrupt)⊃ (Bill Gates is a billionaire)”
follows logically from “Bill Gates is a billionaire”, which is intuitively im-
plausible.
Section 3.3 (p. 59) investigates conditional introduction inferences from
affirmed consequents (Paradox 1)2 and negated antecedents (Paradox 2) in
a probabilistic setting. If conditionals are interpreted as material condition-
als, then high premise probabilities guarantee high conclusion probabilities
in both paradoxes. If, however, conditionals are interpreted as conditional
events, then the unit interval is a coherent probability assessment of the
conclusion. If it is the case that logical or probabilistic relations between
the involved sentences are known (e. g., that bankruptcy logically excludes
being a billionaire), then such information needs to be made explicit by ac-
cordingly augmenting the premise set. Such strengthening of the premises
can lead to probabilistically informative arguments (Pfeifer & Douven, sub-
mitted). If, however, the logical and probabilistic relations between the
involved sentences are unknown, then coherence requires that the prob-
ability of the conclusion of the paradoxes is necessarily the unit interval.
Therefore, the paradoxes are blocked by the conditional event interpreta-
tion. This situation is investigated empirically in Section 3.3 for the first
time. The data suggest, that the clear majority of people neither endorse
Paradox 1 nor Paradox 2. Psychologically, this speaks for the conditional
event interpretation of indicative conditionals. Future empirical research
is needed to clarify the case of the paradoxes in the context of additional
probabilistic or logical knowledge.
The conditional introduction inference from the affirmed consequent
2Cf., e. g., the Bill Gates example.
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(Paradox 1) deserves special attention. Bonnefon and Politzer (2010, p. 154)
note that
“[. . . ] a case of interest is that in which the premise y is certain.
In that case, ‘If x, y’ must also be certain, and the inference is
valid. This specific case remained to be accounted for by prob-
abilistic approaches to conditionals; they can now rely on our
pragmatic account.”
This remark is true for the standard approach to probability, where P(B) =
1 implies P(B|A) = 1 (provided that P(A) > 0, otherwise P(B|A) is un-
defined).3 However, this is not true in the coherence approach to probabil-
ity. I include a proof in Appendix B (see p. 134) which demonstrates that
P(B|A) ∈ [0, 1] is coherent even in the very special case when P(B) = 1.
Thus, coherence based probability logic provides a purely semantical ra-
tional reconstruction of the paradoxes without the need of superimposing
pragmatic considerations.
2.4 Nonmonotonic inference
Section 3.4 (p. 76) investigates nonmonotonic reasoning from a formal and
an empirical point of view. Nonmonotonic reasoning investigates formal
structures governing the rational retraction of conclusions in the light of
new evidence. The paradigm example is the Tweety case. From the two
premises Tweety is a bird and birds can fly it seems valid to conclude that
Tweety can fly. If the premise set is augmented by the further premise
Tweety is a penguin, common sense tells us to retract the conclusion that
Tweety can fly, as penguins usually cannot fly. In the framework of classical
logic, however, augmenting the premise set of a logically valid argument
3In the standard approach to probability P(B|A) =de f . P(A∧B)P(A) , if P(A) > 0. If P(B) = 1,
then P(B|A) = 1 (if P(A) 6= 0, otherwise P(B|A) is undefined).
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cannot lead to a not logically valid argument, i. e., classical logic is mono-
tonic. Nonmonotonic formalisms were developed to account for situations
like the Tweety case.
Much of the formal work in nonmonotonic reasoning is motivated by
appealing to the intuition that people reason nonmonotonically, as the fol-
lowing selected quotes illustrate:
“In everyday life, however, it seems clear that we, human be-
ings, draw sensible conclusions from what we know and that,
on the face of new information, we often have to take back pre-
vious conclusions, even when the new information we gathered
in no way made us want to take back our previous assump-
tions” (Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor, 1990, p. 167).
“We will argue that humans often use circumscription, and
robots must too. [. . . ] We think circumscription accounts for
some of the successes and some of the errors of human reason-
ing” (McCarthy, 1977, p. 1040).
“To formalize human commonsense reasoning something dif-
ferent [than classical logic] is needed. Commonsense reason-
ing is frequently not monotonic” (Brewka, 1991, p. 2). More-
over, “[n]onmonotonicity seems to be a fundamental aspect of
human commonsense reasoning in all kinds of areas” (Brewka,
1991, p. 13).
Based on similar quotes, Pelletier and Elio (1997) argue that nonmonotonic
reasoning is a genuinely psychologistic endeavor:
“. . . considering how people actually do default reasoning is an
important and necessary grounding for the entire enterprise of
formalizing default reasoning” (Pelletier & Elio, 1997, p. 165).
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“We have claimed in this paper that, unlike classical logic,
default reasoning is basically a psychologistic enterprise”
(Pelletier & Elio, 1997, p. 177).
I disagree that nonmonotonic reasoning is a genuinely psychologistic en-
deavor. Nonmonotonic formalisms provide many psychologically fruit-
ful intuitions and numerous empirically testable hypotheses are derivable,
but this does not mean that nonmonotonic formalisms need to be justified
solely on empirical grounds. There are a priori rationality norms for non-
monotonic reasoning. System P, for example, is a set of basic rationality
postulates any system of nonmonotonic reasoning should satisfy (Kraus
et al., 1990). Moreover, Gilio (2002) proposed a coherence based probabil-
ity semantics for just this system. I argued that the relation between for-
mal and empirical work is a genuinely interactive one (Pfeifer, 2011b). On
the one hand, how people reason nonmonotonically can stimulate new for-
malisms, like System LS (Ford, 2004). On the other hand, empirical work
can provide quality criteria to evaluate formal work.
Compared to the vast literature on nonmonotonic formalisms and
the vast literature on the psychology of reasoning, only a few stud-
ies investigated human nonmonotonic reasoning (Benferhat, Bonnefon, &
Da Silva Neves, 2005; Elio & Pelletier, 1993; Ford & Billington, 2000; Pfeifer,
2002, 2006b; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006b; Schurz, 2005; Vogel,
1996). Section 3.4 further extends the empirical work. Moreover, I investi-
gate key inference rules of System P and contrast them with their respective
monotonic counterparts within the coherence based probability semantics
in Section 3.4. The experimental studies suggest that people endorse the
System P rules and understand that the monotonic counterparts are prob-
abilistically non-informative.
Section 3.4 shows how the above described paradigmatic Tweety case
can be interpreted probabilistically. The formalization has been criticized
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by Schurz (2011), who argues that the Tweety case calls for the need of two
measures of probability, an objective and an evidential (subjective) one.
Schurz obtains a probabilistic incoherence in the formalization by proba-
bilizing the known facts that Tweety is a bird and a penguin: P(Tweety is
a bird ∧ Tweety is a penguin) = 1 (or at least greater than some threshold).
This conjunction probability is the key to his incoherence result. I defend
my formalization by arguing that if it is known that Tweety is a bird and a
penguin, then it should be represented as a fact and not by a conjunction
probability. This strategy is used in premises 2 and 3 in the formalization
presented in Section 3.3 (see Section 4 in this paper). Thus, it is free of prob-
abilistic incoherences. Moreover, my proposed distinction between factual
premises and probabilistic premises allows for a clear distinction between
the ontic and the epistemic dimension, respectively, in the analysis of argu-
ments.
2.5 Properties of uncertain argument forms
A central topic in epistemology is the justification of beliefs. An important
way to understand belief justification is the formalization of justifications
in terms of premises and conclusions. As soon as a formalization is estab-
lished, one can work out in what sense the conclusion (i. e., the justifican-
dum) is warranted by the premise set (i. e., the justificans). As explained
above (Section 2.1, p. 14), logical validity is not applicable for the rational
evaluation of everyday life arguments as it neither accounts for the uncer-
tainty of the premises nor for the defeasibility of the conclusion. Coherence
based probability logic provides the necessary tools: attaching uncertainty
to the premises, expressing the imprecision of the probabilistic assessment,
and dealing adequately with the defeasibility of conclusions (cf., e. g., the
Tweety case discussed in the previous section).
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Section 3.5 contributes to the formalization of arguments and inves-
tigates interrelations among general properties of probabilistic argument
forms: logical validity, probabilistic informativeness, and Adams’ (1975)
p-validity4. All three properties classify argument forms (see Figure 1 in
Section 3.5). The conjunction of logical validity and probabilistic informa-
tiveness is necessary and sufficient for p-validity. p-validity is a probabilis-
tic analog of logical validity. p-validity preserves high probabilities and
logical validity preserves truth.
Probability logic determines the tightest coherent lower and upper
probability bounds of the conclusion (see Table 2 in Section 3.5). I argue
that it is more natural and informative for the justification of beliefs to fo-
cus on the conclusion probability than just on p-validity. Since p-validity
of an argumentA presupposes logical validity of the non-probabilistic ver-
sion A, p-validity excludes an important class of arguments that are prob-
abilistically informative but not logically valid. This is illustrated in the
following example.
The LD50 value of Dioxin is .02 milligrams per one kilogram body-
weight (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011, p. 48). This means that if a rat (call
it Petra) with a bodyweight of half a kilogram ingests .018 milligrams of
Dioxin, then the probability that the rat will die (within a specified period
of time) is .9. Assume that the probability that Petra does not intake Dioxin
is low. Based on these premises, consider the following instance of the
probabilistic denying of the antecedent:
(1) P(Petra dies |Petra ingests .018 milligrams of Dioxin) = .9
(2) P(Petra does not ingest .018 milligrams of Dioxin) = .1
(3) P(Petra does not die) ∈ [.09, .19]
4An argument is p-valid if, and only if, the uncertainty of the conclusion of a valid infer-
ence cannot exceed the sum of the uncertainties of its premises, where “uncertainty of X”
means 1− P(X).
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Intuitively, it is plausible that Petra dies (within a specified period of time),
if the probability that it did not ingest Dioxin is low. Denying of the an-
tecedent is not logically valid, but the probabilistic versions can provide in-
formative conclusion probabilities. Such cases are missed by considering
only p-valid arguments.
Note that the conclusion probability of the Denying of the antecedent be-
comes non-informative if the premise probabilities approach one. This re-
flects that this argument form is not logically valid.
Applying the measure of argument strength presented above (Sec-
tion 2.1, p. 15), the strength of the argument in the Petra example obtains
value .045, which is rather low (recall that the strongest arguments obtain
value one and the weakest arguments obtain value zero). The above Pe-
tra example shows that even weak and not logically valid arguments can
provide rational reasons to justify beliefs.
Finally I stress that the formalization of arguments requires cautious-
ness. While coherence based probability logic provides tools to represent
fine grained differences, it is the job of the epistemologists to find out what
and how it is to be formalized. Consider the following example that may
be formalized in at least two completely different ways:
(A) Consider if A then B. Will ¬A, if ¬B?
One way of formalizing (A) is in terms of a probabilistic modus tollens; an al-
ternative way is in terms of a probabilistic contraposition. Section 3.5 points
out that: While both argument forms are logically valid in classical logic,
they need to be distinguished sharply in probability logic: modus tollens
is probabilistically informative but contraposition is probabilistically non-
informative. In some psychological investigations this difference seems to
remain undetected which has disastrous consequences not only for the in-
terpretation of the data. It is also obvious that one should be aware of this
difference in epistemological discourses.
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Abstract
Everyday life reasoning and argumentation is defeasible and un-
certain. I present a probability logic framework to rationally recon-
struct everyday life reasoning and argumentation. Coherence in the
sense of De Finetti is used as the basic rationality norm. I discuss
two basic classes of approaches to construct measures of argument
strength. The first class imposes a probabilistic relation between the
premises and the conclusion. The second class imposes a deductive
relation. I argue for the second class, as the first class is problematic if
the arguments involve conditionals. I present a measure of argument
strength that allows for dealing explicitly with uncertain conditionals
in the premise set.
Probabilistic approaches to argumentation became popular in various
fields including argumentation theory (e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2006), for-
mal epistemology (e.g., Pfeifer, 2007, 2008), the psychology of reasoning
(e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007), and computer science (e.g., Haenni, 2009).
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Probabilistic approaches allow for dealing with the uncertainty and defea-
sibility of everyday life arguments. This paper presents a procedure to for-
malize everyday life arguments in probability logical terms and to measure
its strength.
“Argument” denotes an ordered triple consisting of (i) a (possibly
empty) premise set, (ii) a conclusion indicator (usually denoted by “there-
fore” or “hence”), and (iii) a conclusion. As an example consider the fol-
lowing argument A:
(1) If Tweety is a bird, then Tweety can fly.
(2) Tweety is a bird.
(3) Therefore, Tweety can fly.
In terms of the propositional calculus, A can be represented by A1:
(1) B ⊃ F
(2) B
(3) ∴ F
where “B” denotes “Tweety is a bird.”, “F” denotes “Tweety can fly.”, “∴”
denotes the conclusion indicator, and “⊃” denotes the material conditional.
The material conditional (A ⊃ B) is false if the antecedent (A) is true and
the consequent (B) is false, and true otherwise.1
Argument A1 is an instance of the logically valid modus ponens. An ar-
gument is logically valid if, and only if, it is impossible that all premises
1Note that the propositional-logically atomic formulae B and F in argument A1 can be
represented in predicate logic by Bird(Tweety) and Can Fly(Tweety), respectively. More-
over, F may be represented even more fine-grained in modal logical terms by ⋄F, where
“⋄” denotes a possibility operator. However, for the sake of sketching a theory of argument
strength, it is sufficient to formalize atomic propositions by propositional variables.
2
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are true and the conclusion is false. In everyday life, however, premises
are often uncertain and conditionals allow for exceptions. Not all birds fly:
penguins, for example, are birds that do not fly. Also the second premise
may be uncertain: Tweety could be a non-flying bird or not even a bird.
This uncertainty and defeasibility cannot be properly expressed in the lan-
guage of the propositional calculus. Nevertheless, as long as there is no
evidence that Tweety is a bird that cannot fly (e.g., that Tweety is a pen-
guin), the conclusion of A is rational.
Probability logic allows for dealing with exception and uncertainty
(e.g., Adams, 1975; Hailperin, 1996; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002). It provides
tools to reconstruct the rationality of reasoning and argumentation in the
context of arguments like A1. Among the various approaches to probabil-
ity logic, I advocate coherence based probability logic for formalizing everyday
life arguments (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2006a, 2009). Coherence based probabil-
ity logic combines coherence based probability theory with propositional
logic. It received strong empirical support in a series of experiments on
the basic nonmonotonic reasoning System P (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2003, 2005,
2006b), the paradoxes of the material conditional (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2011),
the conditional syllogisms (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2007), and on how people in-
terpret (Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011) and negate condition-
als (Pfeifer, 2012).
Coherence based probability theory was originated by De Finetti (1980,
1974). Among others, it has been further developed by Walley (1991), Lad
(1996), Biazzo and Gilio (2000), and Coletti and Scozzafava (2002). In the
framework of coherence, probabilities are (subjective) degrees of belief and
not objective quantities. It seems natural that different people may assign
different degrees of belief to the premises of one and the same argument.
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This does not mean, however, that everything is subjective and therefore
no general rationality norms are available. Coherence requires to avoid bets
that lead to sure loss, which in turn guarantees that the axioms of proba-
bility theory are satisfied.2 Another characteristic feature of coherence is
that conditional probability, P(B |A), is a primitive notion. Consequently,
the probability value is assigned directly to the conditional event, B |A, as a
whole. This contrasts with the standard approaches to probability, where
conditional probability (P(B |A)) is defined by the fraction of the joint and
the marginal probability (P(A∧ B)/Pr(A)). The probability axioms are for-
mulated for conditional probabilities and not for absolute probabilities (the
latter is done in the standard approach to probability and is problematic if
P(A) = 0). Coherence based probability logic tells us how to propagate the
uncertainty of the premises to the conclusion. As an example consider a
probability logical version of the above argument, A2:
(1) P(F|B) = x
(2) P(B) = y
(3) ∴ xy ≤ P(F) ≤ xy + 1 − y
where xy and xy + 1 − y are the tightest coherent lower and upper prob-
ability bounds, respectively, of the conclusion. A2 is an instance of the
probabilistic modus ponens (see, e.g., Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2006a). If premise
(1) had been replaced by the probability of the material conditional, then
the tightest coherent lower and upper probability bounds of the conclusion
would have been different ones. However, paradoxes and experimental re-
sults suggest that uncertain conditionals should not be represented by the
2I argued elsewhere (Pfeifer, 2008) that violation of coherence is a necessary condition
for an argument to be fallacious.
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probability of the material conditional (P(A ⊃ B)), but rather by the condi-
tional probability (P(B|A); Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2010, 2011).
The consequence relation between the premises and the conclusion is
deductive in the framework of coherence based probability logic. The
probabilities of the premises are transmitted deductively to the conclusion.
Depending on the logical and probabilistic structure of the argument, the
best possible coherent probability bounds of the conclusion can be a pre-
cise (point) probability value or an imprecise (interval) probability. Interval
probabilities are constrained by a lower and an upper probability bound
(see the conclusion of A2). In the worst case, the unit interval is a coherent
assessment of the probability of the conclusion. In this case the argument
form is probabilistically non-informative: zero and one are the tightest co-
herent probability bounds (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009, 2006a).
The tightest coherent probability bounds of the conclusion provide
useful building blocks for a measure of argument strength. Averages
of the tightest coherent lower and upper probabilities of the conclusion
given some threshold probabilities of the premises allow for measuring the
strength of argument forms (like the modus ponens; see Pfeifer & Kleiter,
2006a). In the following I focus on measuring the strength of concrete argu-
ments (like argument A).
There are at least two alternative ways to construct measures of argu-
ment strength: one presupposes a deductive consequence relation, whereas
the other one presupposes an uncertain consequence relation. As explained
above, coherence based probability logic involves a deductive consequence
relation. Theories of confirmation assume that there is an uncertain relation
between the evidence and the hypothesis. “Theories of confirmation may
be cast in the terminology of argument strength, because P1 . . . Pn confirm C
5
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Sd(P ,C) = P(C|P)− P(C) (Carnap, 1962)
Ss(P ,C) = P(C|P)− P(C|¬P) (Christensen, 1999)
Sm(P ,C) = P(P|C)− P(P) (Mortimer, 1988)
Sn(P ,C) = P(P|C)− P(P|¬C) (Nozick, 1981)
Sc(P ,C) = P(P ∧ C)− P(P)× P(C) (Carnap, 1962)
Sr(P ,C) =
P(C|P)
P(C) − 1 (Finch, 1960)





P(P|C) + P(P|¬C) (Kemeny & Oppenheim, 1952)
Table 1: Measures of confirmation presented in the literature (adapted from
Crupi et al., 2007).
only to the extend that P1 . . . Pn/C is a strong argument.” (Osherson, Smith,
Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990, p. 185). Table 1 casts a number of prominent
measures of confirmation in terms of argument strength.
The underlying intuition of measures of confirmation is that premise
set P confirms conclusion C, if the conditional probability of the conclusion
given the premises is higher than the absolute probability of the conclusion,
P(C|P) > P(C). P disconfirms C, if P(C|P) < P(C). If C is stochastically in-
dependent of P , i.e. P(C|P) = P(C), then the premises are neutral w.r.t. the
confirmation of the conclusion. As pointed out by Fitelson (1999), these
three conditions do not impose restrictions on the choice of the measures
in Table 1, i.e., they are satisfied in the context of the listed measures.
Measures of confirmation may be appropriate for measuring the
strength of arguments if we do not want to formalize explicitly the struc-
ture of the premise set. However, if the premise set includes conditionals
(like argument A), then these measures require a theory of how to com-
6
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bine conditionals and how to conditionalize on conditionals. Consider, for
example argument A and the general requirement that a strong argument
should satisfy the inequality P(C|P) > P(C). It is easy to instantiate the
conclusion of A: P(B|P) > P(B). There are at least two options to instan-
tiate the premise set P . Both options depend on how the conditional in
premise 1 is interpreted.
The first option consists in the interpretation of the conditional in
terms of a conditional event, B|A. In this case at least two problems
need to be solved. The first one is the combination of the conditional
premise(s) with the other premise(s): “(B|A)& A” is not defined.3 The sec-
ond problem concerns the conditionalization on conditionals: the meaning
of “P(B | (B|A) . . .)” needs to be explicated. This is a deep problem and
an uncontroversial general theory is still missing (for a proposal of how to
conditionalize on conditionals see, e.g., Douven, 2012).
The second option consists in the interpretation of the conditional in
terms of the material conditional, A ⊃ B. Here, it is straightforward to com-
bine the material conditionals and to conditionalize on the material condi-
tional. Argument A is instantiated in the general requirement of strong
arguments as follows: P(B | A ∧ (A ⊃ B)) > P(B). However, coherence re-
quires that P(B | A∧ (A ⊃ B)) = 1. Thus, the inequality is trivially satisfied
(if P(C) < 1). It is counterintuitive that any instance—including those with
low premise probabilities—of A are strong arguments. Therefore, mea-
sures of confirmation are not appropriate measures of argument strength if
3Since the conditional event is non-propositional, it cannot be combined by classical
logical conjunction. Conditional events can be combined by so-called “quasi-conjunctions”
(Adams, 1975, p. 46 f). As Adams notes, however, quasi-conjunctions lack some important
logical features of conjunctions.
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we want to explicitly formalize arguments that include conditionals.
I will now turn to a measure of argument strength and show how it
allows for formalizing arguments that involve conditionals. The crucial
idea is that (i) the precision of a strong argument is high and that (ii) the
location of the coherent probability (interval) is close to 1 (Pfeifer, 2007).
The imprecision is measured by the size of the tightest coherent probability
bounds of the conclusion. Let z′ and z′′ denote the tightest coherent lower
and upper bounds, respectively, of an argument Ax. The imprecision of Ax
is measured by z′′− z′. Consequently, the precision of Ax is measured by 1−
(z′′ − z′). The location of the coherent conclusion probability is measured




The argument strength s of Ax is equal to the product of the precision and
the location of the tightest coherent probability bounds of the conclusion:




where 0 ≤ s(Ax) ≤ 1, since 0 ≤ z′ ≤ z′′ ≤ 1. The values 0 and 1 denote the
weakest and the strongest value, respectively.
As an example of the evaluation procedure of the strength of an argu-
ment, consider the following instance of argument A2:
(1) P(F|B) = .8
(2) P(B) = .9
(3) ∴ .72 ≤ P(F) ≤ .82
The strength of this argument is .69. In the special case where the premises
are certain (i.e., probabilities equal to 1) the strength of the argument ob-
tains its maximum value 1.
Figure 1 presents the behavior of the measure in general. According to
the measure, the argument strength increases if the location of the tightest
8
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Figure 1: Let z′ denote the tightest coherent lower and z′′ denote the tight-
est coherent upper bound of an argument A. The argument strength of
A is equal to [1 − (z′′ − z′)] × z
′ + z′′
2
. The strength of A increases if the
precision of the conclusion is high and the location of the tightest coherent
probability interval is close to 1.
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coherent bounds of the conclusion approaches 1. The argument strength
decreases if the imprecision increases. Moreover, an argument is weak if
the conclusion probability is low. Maximum imprecision implies minimum
argument strength. It follows that all probabilistically non-informative ar-
guments are also weak arguments (with s = 0). Figure 2 shows the behavior
of the measure for coherent lower conclusion probabilities of at least .5. If
the conclusion probability is at least .5, then the argument strength varies
between .375 and .500. The higher the precision the higher the strength of
the argument.
The proposed measure contrasts with the traditional measures of con-
firmation presented in Table 1. The consequence relation remains de-
ductive, while measures of confirmation assume an uncertain relation be-
tween the premises and the conclusion. Using probability logic to for-
malize arguments is advantageous as it does justice to the logical struc-
ture: premise sets that include conditionals can be represented explicitly.
If a measure of argument strength requires to calculate the conditional
probability of the conclusion given some combination of the premises,
P(conclusion |premise set), then severe problems arise of how to connect
premises containing conditionals with each other and how to condition-
alize on conditionals. In the proposed measure this problem is avoided,
as probability logic tells us how to infer the tightest coherent probability
bounds of the conclusion from the premises, which are in turn exploited
for calculating the argument strength.
The proposed measure s has not only attractive theoretical conse-
quences (as explained above), it also implies at least two psychologically
plausible hypothesis. People judge arguments as strong, if the premises
imply high conclusion probabilities (i) and if the conclusion probability
10
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Figure 2: Detail of Figure 1, showing the behavior of measure s for coherent
lower conclusion probabilities of at least .5.
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is—at the same time—precise (ii). The empirical test of these hypothesis
is a challenge for future research.
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EXPERIMENTS ON ARISTOTLE’S THESIS:
TOWARDS AN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
OF CONDITIONALS
ABSTRACT
Two experiments (N1 = 141, N2 = 40) investigate two versions of
Aristotle’s Thesis for the first time. Aristotle’s Thesis is a negated con-
ditional, which consists of one propositional variable with a negation
either in the antecedent (version 1) or in the consequent (version 2). This
task allows us to infer if people interpret indicative conditionals as
material conditionals or as conditional events. In the first experiment I
investigate between-participants the two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis
crossed with abstract versus concrete task material. The modal response
for all four groups is consistent with the conditional event and inconsis-
tent with the material conditional interpretation. This observation is
replicated in the second experiment. Moreover, the second experiment
rules out scope ambiguities of the negation of conditionals. Both exper-
iments provide new evidence against the material conditional interpretation
of conditionals and support the conditional event interpretation. Finally,
I discuss implications for modeling indicative conditionals and the relevance
of this work for experimental philosophy.
1. Introduction
Experimental philosophers have investigated people’s intuitions on a
wide variety of philosophical topics, including causation, consciousness,
cross-cultural intuitions, epistemology, morality, free will, and intentional
action (see, e.g., Phillips 2011, Knobe and Nichols 2008, Feltz 2009).
Conditionals, however, have not yet been discussed by experimental
philosophers. This paper aims to extend the domain of experimental phi-
losophy to conditionals. After a brief review of philosophical and psycho-
logical intuitions on probabilistic interpretation of indicative conditionals,
“Experiments on Aristotle’s Thesis:
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I report two new experiments on reasoning about conditionals to clarify
the interpretation and negation of indicative conditionals.
There is a long tradition of psychological investigations of conditionals.
Standard tasks include Wason’s selection task, truth table tasks, and con-
ditional elimination tasks (like modus ponens; see, e.g., Evans, Newstead,
and Byrne 1993). The propositional calculus was taken for granted as the
rationality norm: rational inferences are consistent with the laws of logic
and indicative conditionals (of the form “If A, then B”) should be inter-
preted as material conditionals (denoted by A ⊃ B). People’s inferences,
however, diverged from the rationality postulates of classical logic.
Philosophers argued for probabilistic interpretations of indicative con-
ditionals by relating conditionals to conditional probability, P(B|A) (e.g.,
Adams 1975, Bennett 2003, Douven 2008, Ramsey 1978). The argument of
the conditional probability function is the conditional event B|A. The con-
ditional event cannot be captured within the framework of classical logic.
Contrary to the material conditional (A ⊃ B) and the conjunction (A ∧ B),
the conditional event cannot be expressed by any Boolean function: the
conditional event is void, if the antecedent (A) is false (see Table 1)
Table 1: The three most prominent psychological predictions of the interpretation of in-
dicative conditionals. They differ only in the last two lines, where the antecedent (A) is false.
The conditional event is partially truth-functional, as it is void, if the antecedence is false.
There are striking a priori reasons for why indicative conditionals are
not material ones. As an example, imagine that Jones “is about to be dealt





A B A ⊃ B A ∧ B B|A
true true true true true
true false false false false
false true true false void
false false true false void
If Jones’s first card is an ace, then Jones’s second card is an ace.
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How sure can you be, that the sentence in the box holds? If you interpret the
sentence as a conditional event and assign a conditional probability, you
obtain a very low probability value,1 which is intuitively plausible,
P(Jones’s second card is an ace | Jones’s first card is an ace) = 3/51 ≅ 0.06.
If you interpret the sentence in the box as a material conditional, you obtain
in this scenario an intuitively implausible high probability value,2
P(Jones’s first card is an ace ⊃ Jones’s second card is an ace) =
205/221 ≅ 0.93.
Some of the arguments in favor of the conditional event interpreta-
tion have been confirmed empirically. Contrary to the material conditional,
the conditional event interpretation avoids the paradoxes of the material
conditional and people do not endorse these paradoxes (Pfeifer and Kleiter
2011). Premise strengthening and contraposition do not hold under the
conditional event interpretation and people do not endorse these argument
forms (Pfeifer and Kleiter 2010).
In recent years, probabilistic rationality norms emerged in the psy-
chology of reasoning to better deal with the defeasibility and uncertainty and
to match closer everyday inference (e.g., Evans and Over 2004, Oaksford
and Chater 2009, Pfeifer and Kleiter 2005b; 2009). Within these proba-
bilistic approaches, a new hypothesis concerning the interpretation of con-
ditionals emerged: people interpret indicative conditionals (If A, then B)
as conditional events (B|A). Recent studies (e.g., Fugard, Pfeifer, and May-
erhofer 2011, Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, and Kleiter 2011, Oberauer 2006,
Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, and Sloman 2007) provide strong
empirical evidence for this hypothesis.
The present paper further investigates the conditional event hypothesis.
Specifically, it investigates two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis for the first
time. Aristotle’s Thesis is a negated conditional, which consists of one
propositional variable with a negation either in the antecedent (version 1)
or in the consequent (version 2):
(AT #1) ¬(¬A→A)
(AT #2) ¬(A→¬A)
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“¬” denotes negation.3 “A → B” denotes the indicative conditional If
A, then B, where the semantics of → is not specified. AT #1 and AT #2 are
intuitively plausible. Consider an instance in natural language:
It is not the case that: If I do not win the lottery, then I win the lottery.
Likewise, it is plausible to assert
It is not the case that: If I win the lottery, then I do not win the lottery.
In classical logic, where “→” is interpreted as a material conditional,
(AT #1) and (AT #2) are not theorems. Both formulas are contingent (“≡”
denotes equivalence):
¬(¬A ⊃ A) ≡ ¬A ∧ ¬A ≡ ¬A
¬(A ⊃ ¬A) ≡ A ∧ A ≡ A
In this paper, I propose an interpretation that justifies the rationality
of high beliefs in AT #1 and AT #2. Specifically, I formalize AT in terms
of coherence based probability logic (Pfeifer and Kleiter 2006a; 2009).
In the psychology of reasoning three interpretations of indicative
conditionals (If A, then B) are currently debated: the conditional event in-
terpretation (P(B|A)), the material conditional interpretation (P(A ⊃ B)),
and the conjunction interpretation (P(A ∧ B)). The conjunction interpreta-
tion is discussed in the theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird and Byrne
2002) and the suppositional theory of conditional reasoning (Evans and
Over 2004). Both theories predict, roughly speaking, that if people process
conditionals superficially, then they use the conjunction interpretation.
The coherence approach to probability goes back to De Finetti (1980,
1974) and more recent work includes, e.g., Walley (1991), Lad (1996), Biazzo
and Gilio (2000), and Coletti and Scozzafava (2002). Coherence is in the
tradition of subjective probability theory in which probabilities are conceived
as degrees of belief. Degrees of belief are coherent descriptions of incom-
plete knowledge states. One key feature is that the coherence approach defines
the probability function on an arbitrary family of conditional events. There-
fore, it does not require a complete algebra as in the standard approach to
probability. Conditional probability, P(B|A), is a primitive notion. The prob-
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ability value is assigned directly to the conditional event, B|A, as a whole
(and not by definition via the fraction of the joint and the mar- ginal proba-
bility, P(A ∧ B)/P(A)). Therefore, the probability axioms are formulated for
conditional probabilities in the framework of coherence and not for absolute
probabilities (as it is done in the standard approach to probability).
Coherence based probability logic defines the consequence relation as
a deductive one. The probabilistic inference problem consists of how to trans-
mit the probabilities of the premises to the probability of the conclusion.
Usually, the coherent probability of the conclusion is constrained by a lower
and an upper probability. The coherent conclusion of the modus ponens,
for example, is in the interval xy ≤ P(B) ≤ xy + 1 − x, where the two
premises are P(A) = x and P(B|A) = y, respectively.4 As only two proba-
bilities are given, the coherent probability of the conclusion is imprecise.
If P(B|¬A) = z is added to the premise set of the probabilistic modus
ponens, then the resulting argument form allows for inferring a precise
probability value of the conclusion: P(B) = xy + (1 − x)z.
Coherence based probability logic (Pfeifer and Kleiter 2006a; 2009) has
received strong empirical support in a series of experiments on the rules of
the nonmonotonic System P (Pfeifer and Kleiter 2003; 2005a; 2006b), the
paradoxes of the material conditional (Pfeifer and Kleiter 2011), the con-
ditional syllogisms (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2007), and on how people interpret
conditionals (Fugard, Pfeifer, and Mayerhofer 2011; Fugard, Pfeifer,
Mayerhofer, and Kleitner 2011).
Table 2 lists the probability logical predictions according to the
different interpretations of indicative conditionals. The conditional event
and the conjunction interpretation predict that people should hold a strong
belief in both versions of AT: the probability value 1 is the only coherent
assessment. The material conditional interpretation predicts that people
cannot tell whether AT holds: any (point or interval) value from zero to
one is coherent. Experiment 1 investigates these predictions empirically.
Table 2: Probability logical interpretations of the two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis (AT)
in terms of the material conditional (P(⋅⊃⋅)), the conjunction (P(⋅∧⋅)), and the conditional
event (P(⋅|⋅)).
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AT P(⋅⊃⋅) P(⋅∧⋅) P(⋅|⋅)
¬(¬A→A) 0≤P(¬A)≤1 P(¬(¬A∧A))=1 P(¬A|¬A)=1
¬(A→¬A) 0≤P(A)≤1 P(¬(A⊃¬A))=1 P(¬¬A|A)=1
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2. Experiment 1
2.1 Method and design
The sample consists of 141 psychology students (110 females and 31
males). The median age of the sample is 21 (1st Qu. = 20, 3rd Qu. = 23).
91% of the participants were in their third semester.
The data were collected in a lecture hall during an introductory
course on cognitive neuroscience. One week before the experiment, the
students learned classical truth tables, including the material conditional
and the concepts of logical truth, logical falsehood and logical contin-
gency. At the very beginning of the unit, in which the experiment took
place, the truth tables as well as related concepts were repeated. Then the
lecture continued with an unrelated topic. In the middle of the lecture unit,
the experiment started.
Four versions of the task material were distributed in such a way that
the seating-distance between the participants of each condition was
maximized. The four conditions consisted in an abstract and in a concrete
version of AT #1 and AT #2.
The abstract version of AT #1 was formulated as follows:
The letter “A” denotes a sentence, like “It is raining.”
There are sentences, where you can infer only on the basis of their logical
form, whether they are guaranteed to be false or guaranteed to be true.
For example:
“A and not-A” is guaranteed to be false.
“A or not-A” is guaranteed to be true.
There are sentences, where you cannot infer only on the basis of their
logical form, whether they are true or false. The sentence “A” (“It is
raining.”), for example, can be true but it can just as well be false: this
depends upon whether it is actually raining.
In this part of the instruction the concepts “logical truth,” “logical falsehood,”
and “logical contingency” are explained once again to the participants,
without mentioning these technical terms explicitly. To make it clear that the
task concerns the natural language version of AT as a whole and to avoid
ambiguities of the scope of the question, AT was put into a box:
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The abstract version of AT #2 was identical to the abstract version of AT
#1 except for the sentence in the box: the conditional “If not-A, then A”
was replaced by “If A, then not-A.”
The concrete version of AT was formulated by replacing the abstract
letters by concrete objects. A further difference to the abstract version was
the use of an implicit negation in the conditional. Negations are hard to
process in general. Moreover, concrete task material is easier to process
than abstract material. Thus, the concrete versions were hypothesized to
be easier to process for the participants than the abstract versions.
In the concrete versions of AT, the participants were asked to imagine
that there is either a dog or a cat behind a door, but not both. As in the
abstract version of the task, the concepts “logical truth,” “logical
falsehood,” and “logical contingency” were introduced informally. Then,
the participants were asked to
The response format was the same as in the abstract versions. The other
concrete version of AT differed only in one respect: the words “cat” and
“dog” changed their positions in the conditional in the box.
Strictly speaking, there is no difference between AT #1 and AT #2 in
the concrete version of the task. The vignette makes clear that “cat” means
“not-dog” and “dog” means “not-cat.”
In all versions of the task, the task was presented together with the
instructions on one page. This helps to minimize working memory demands.
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Evaluate the following sentence (Please tick exactly one alternative):
The sentence in the box is guaranteed to be false  
The sentence in the box is guaranteed to be true  
One cannot infer whether the sentence is true or false  
Evaluate the following sentence (Please tick exactly one alternative):
It is not the case, that: If there is a cat behind the door, then there is
a dog behind the door.
It is not the case, that: If not-A, then A.
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2.2 Results and discussion
In all four conditions of the experiment the participants were asked to rank
on a scale how clear and comprehensible the task was to them. Furthermore, the
participants evaluated the confidence in the correctness of their solution and
the task difficulty. Figure 1 presents the results of the participants’ task evalu-
ations. The mean rating of the task comprehensibility is close to “very clear,”
which indicates that the participants were not swamped by processing the con-
ditional and the two negations. Moreover, the mean subjective confidence in
the correctness of the participants’ responses and the task difficulty were in
the middle regions of the respective scales. This suggests that the participants
did not opt out of the task. If a task is obscure or if it is perceived to be too
easy or too hard, then there is a danger that the participants do not engage
themselves properly in the task, and—in the worst case—opt out of doing the
task. In sum, the results suggest that the task and the vignette stories are
not obscure, and are perceived as being neither too easy nor too difficult.
Figure 1: Mean ratings of the task comprehensibility, confidence in correctness, and dif-
ficulty (Experiment 1, N1=141).
There are also no statistically significant differences between the re-
sponses in AT #1 and AT #2. Therefore, the data of AT #1 and AT #2 are
pooled. Figure 2 summarizes the main results of Experiment 1. The modal
response is consistent with the conditional event interpretation and inconsis-
tent with the material conditional interpretation of conditionals. There is a
slightly higher proportion of participants in the concrete than in the abstract
condition who hold a strong belief in AT. However, this difference is sta-
tistically not significant.
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Figure 2: Response frequencies in Experiment 1 (pooled data of AT #1 and #2; N1=141).
A minority of the participants expressed a strong belief that the sentence
in the box is false. Exploration questions5 after the experiment revealed that
some participants reasoned about the conditional only. These participants
overlooked that the conditional is negated. If this negation is ignored,
these ratings are perfectly rational under the conditional event interpreta-
tion: coherence requires P(A|¬A) = 0 and P(¬A|A) = 0.
One key result of Experiment 1 is that the conditional event interpretation
predicts the modal response of the participants. Another key result indicates
that the literal formalization of AT by the material conditional interpretation
does not predict the modal response of the participants. The data suggest
that people do not interpret AT #1 as ¬(¬A ⊃ A) and that they do not
interpret AT #2 as ¬(A ⊃ ¬A). Thus, AT provides a watershed to experimen-
tally differentiate between the material conditional and the conditional event
interpretations of indicative conditionals. However, as noted above, AT alone
does not distinguish between the conditional event and the conjunction in-
terpretation: both predict that AT is guaranteed to be true. Experiment 2 will
address this issue.
Proponents of the material conditional interpretation may argue that
the results of Experiment 1 provide evidence against the wide scope reading
of the negation of conditionals,
EXPERIMENTS ON ARISTOTLE’S THESIS 231
PAPER 2: ARISTOTLE’S THESIS 49
¬(A → ¬A).
wide scope
They may further argue that people interpret indicative conditionals as




Consequently, AT #1 reduces to ¬A ⊃ ¬A and AT #2 reduces to A ⊃ A,
which leads to the same predictions as given by the conditional event in-
terpretation.6
Experiment 2 is designed to (i) clarify this scope ambiguity, (ii) dif-
ferentiate between the conjunction and the conditional event interpretation
of indicative conditionals, and to (iii) improve the experimental conditions.
3. Experiment 2
3.1 Method and design
Forty students (20 females and 20 males) of the University of
Salzburg were tested individually in experimental rooms of the Psychology
Department. Psychology students and students with a formal background
were not included in the sample. The participants received 5 € for partic-
ipation. Between participant explicit (n1 = 20) versus implicit negation (n1
= 20) conditions were varied and each participant had to solve 12 tasks
(see Table 3). All tasks were concrete.
As in Experiment 1, the first part of the instruction explains the
concepts “logical truth,” “logical falsehood,” and “logical contingency”
without mentioning technical terms. In the explicit negation condition, the
participants were asked to imagine the following situation:
Hans expects to be visited by Thea and Ida. He is sitting in his room.
Suddenly someone knocks at the door. Hans is absolutely certain,
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Evaluate the following sentence (please tick exactly one alternative):
The response format was identical to the one used in Experiment 1. The logical
structure of the sentence in the box was formatted in boldface to reduce
the probability that participants overlook the negation in front of the con-
ditional. Since the aim of the experiment is to investigate intuitions about the
degrees of belief in (negated) conditionals, an epistemic component (“Hans
is absolutely certain…”) is added in Experiment 2. In the implicit versions
of AT, “Ida does not knock” was replaced by “Thea knocks.”
The vignette stories were adapted to other argument forms to differ-
entiate between the conditional event and the conjunction interpretation.
Table 3 lists the order of the task items in both conditions. Items #1 and
#3 are designed to replicate the findings of AT #2 and AT #1, respectively,
of Experiment 1. Item #2 may be called “negated reflexivity.” It differen-
tiates between the narrow and the wide scope reading of the negation of
the material conditional. Item #4 (“reflexivity”) differentiates between the
conditional event interpretation and the conjunction interpretation of in-
dicative conditionals. Items #5 and #6 are control items.
Table 3: Results (N2 = 40) of Experiment 2. WS = wide and NS = narrow scope reading of
negated material conditionals, CT = can’t tell, T = true, F = false, U = uninformative con-
clusion probability, H = high conclusion probability, L = low conclusion probability. Items
#7–#10 are part of the probabilistic truth table task (see text and Figure 3). Conditional
event is the best predictor (bold).
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It is not the case, that: If Ida knocks, then Ida does not knock.
Item Argument form Prediction Responses
WS NS
in percent
⋅|⋅ ⋅⊃⋅ ⋅⊃⋅ ⋅∧⋅ T F CT/U
#1 ¬(A→¬A) T CT T T 78 18 5
#2 ¬(A→A) F F CT CT 10 88 2
#3 ¬(¬A→A) T CT T T 80 13 8
#4 A→A T T T CT 93 3 5
#5 A→B CT CT CT CT 0 13 88
#6 ¬(A→B) CT CT CT CT 20 3 78
#11 from B infer A→B U H U 40 0 60
#12 from B infer A→¬B U H L 5 30 65
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The items #7–#10 are adapted from Pfeifer and Kleiter (2011). They
serve (i) to replicate findings and (ii) to provide further possibilities to dif-
ferentiate among the material conditional, conditional event, and
conjunction interpretation. Items #7–#10 correspond to a version of the
probabilistic truth table task, where the participants are instructed to
imagine a pack of 120 cards. On each card, there is either a circle or a
square, either in red or in blue. The pack consists of 40 red circle cards,
40 red square cards, 20 blue circle cards and 20 blue square cards. The
pack is shuffled and then one card is randomly chosen. One cannot see
what is printed on this card. The task consists in evaluating four condi-
tionals on a scale with the labels “does not hold for sure” and “holds for
sure.” The four conditionals and the probability logical predictions are
contained in Figure 3. The participants’ interpretation can be inferred from
their degree of belief in the conditional. Item #11 and #12 correspond to
two paradoxes of the material conditional.
Figure 3: Results of the probabilistic truth table task (Experiment 2, N2 = 40). The boxes
contain 50% of the responses, and the thick line indicates the median. The whiskers indicate
1.5 × the interquartile range. Normative predictions are printed in gray (dotted, solid, and
dashed lines). Conditional probability is the best predictor.
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3.2 Results and discussion
There is no statistically significant difference between the two between-
participant conditions. Therefore, the subsequent analysis is conducted on
the pooled data. Experiment 2 replicates the results of Experiment 1: the
data are consistent with the conditional event interpretation and inconsis-
tent with the material conditional interpretation of indicative conditionals
(see Table 3). Moreover, negated reflexivity (item #2) rules out the narrow
scope reading of the material conditional. The conjunction interpretation
is ruled out by reflexivity (item #4), the paradox of the material conditional
(item #12), and the results of the probabilistic truth table task (items #7–#10).
Table 4: Scoring of the items #1–#4 and items #11–#12 (N2 = 40, 6 tasks, min = 0, max =
6). The conditional event obtains the highest score.
Scoring the data in the six tasks reveals that the mean consistency of
the responses with the conditional event was the highest one out of the
four interpretations (see Table 4). This reflects again that the conditional
event is the best predictor for the conditional event responses.
4. Concluding remarks
Mental probability logic (Pfeifer and Kleiter 2005b; 2009), the sup-
positional theory of conditional reasoning (Evans and Over 2004), and the
probabilistic approach by Oaksford and Chater (2009) are examples of
recent psychological theories that argue for the conditional event inter-
pretation of indicative conditionals. This study is in line with this research
and provides new evidence for the conditional event interpretation.
This paper investigates Aristotle’s Thesis, reflexivity and negated
reflexivity, for the first time empirically. Moreover, the second experiment




⋅⊃⋅ narrow 3.0 0.9
⋅∧⋅ 2.6 0.9
⋅⊃⋅ wide 2.4 0.8
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resolves scope ambiguities of the negation of conditionals. Neither people
without training in logic (Experiment 2) nor people who just learned the
truth tables and the material conditional (Experiment 1) interpret condi-
tionals as material conditionals. The modal response pattern in all tasks
corresponds to the conditional event interpretation of conditionals.
The truth functions of the material conditional and the conjunction
correspond to the truth conditions of the explicit and the implicit mental
models, respectively, of basic conditionals. According to the theory of
mental models the core meaning of indicative conditionals is the material
conditional (Johnson-Laird and Byrne 2002). The present data do not
support this approach.
The tasks on Aristotle’s theses differ in several respects to previous
studies on conditional reasoning. First, the argument form is an inference
from the empty premise set. In the abstract version, the belief in the
negated conditional may be established by reasoning about a sentence in
the box (i.e., the conclusion) only. In the concrete versions, the informa-
tion communicated in the instructions before the box does not belong to
the premise set. This information explains the relationship between the cat
and the dog in this scenario. Thus, the logical form corresponds to an
inference from the empty premise set as well. Second, Aristotle’s thesis
consists of only one propositional variable (A). However, the logical form
is complex, since it is composed of two negations and one conditional.
Wason’s selection task, the tasks related to conditional elimination infer-
ences (like the suppression tasks, modus ponens, modus tollens, etc.), and
the variants of truth table tasks are not inferences from the empty premise
set and usually involve two propositional variables.
The narrow and the wide scope readings of the negation of a condi-
tional If A, then B are well defined for material conditionals (A ⊃ ¬B and
¬(A ⊃ B), respectively). The negation of a conditional event B|A, however,
is well defined for the narrow scope reading only (¬B|A). One might propose
that negating a conditional event means that one is completely uncertain
about B|A. Using imprecise probabilities, this could mean that the P(B|A)
is probabilistically uninformative, i.e., 0 ≤ P(B|A) ≤ 1 is coherent.
Assigning the unit interval expresses a situation of complete ignorance
about B|A. However, the present data do not support this hypothesis: for
almost all participants Aristotle’s thesis is probabilistically informative.
The data of both experiments show that the acceptability/asserta-
bility conditions of A → B are consistent with P(B|A) but inconsistent with
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P(A ⊃ B). Some philosophers (e.g., Lewis 1976, Grice 1975) claim that con-
ditionals are truth functional and that A → B is acceptable/assertable iff (i)
P(A ⊃ B) is high, and (ii) P(A ⊃ B|A) is high (and close to P(A ⊃ B)). On
the first sight, this could be a way to save the material conditional inter-
pretation of indicative conditionals. This is not the case: Jackson (1987,
31) notes that condition (i) and (ii) imply that P(B|A) is high.
Connexive logicians investigate a branch of nonclassical logic where
a standard logical vocabulary is used but certain non-theorems of classical
logic like AT #1 and AT #2 are theorems (McCall 1966, Angell 2002).
An implication that satisfies Aristotle’s theses and the Boethius’ theses
((A → B) → ¬(A → ¬B) and (A → ¬B) → ¬ (A → B)) and where →
cannot be understood as a biconditional (i.e., (A → B) → (B → A)) is not
a theorem) is called a connexive implication (Wansing 2010).
Aristotle’s thesis provides an important empirical watershed between the
conditional event and the material conditional interpretation of indica-tive
conditionals. Other empirically interesting argument forms that allow for
investigating different interpretations of conditionals include the paradoxes
of the material conditional (Pfeifer and Kleiter 2011) and (non)monotonic
argument forms (Pfeifer and Kleiter 2005a; 2009; 2010). The results point
from different angles in the same direction: people’s intuitions on the meaning
of conditionals converge on the conditional event interpretation.
The present paper provides a new formalization of Aristotle’s thesis in
probability logical terms. Its main empirical result is that coherent con-
ditional probabilities are natural building blocks for modeling indicative
conditionals. I am convinced that “armchair philosophy” and careful ex-
perimental work can fruitfully interact. On the one hand, formal philosophy
provides tools to make psychological hypotheses precise: without a proper
formalism many fruitful hypotheses cannot even be formulated. On the
other hand, experimental studies can empirically validate philosophical
theories. Empirical investigations provide important external quality
criteria for logical theories which are beyond the purely formal ones (like
soundness or completeness). The present study illustrates how the domain
of experimental philosophy is extended to conditionals.7
Niki Pfeifer
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy,
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
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NOTES
1. Of all 52 cards only four ones are aces. If the first card is an ace, three aces are left
for drawing a second ace out of the 51 remaining cards. Thus, P(Jones’s second card is an
ace | Jones’s first card is an ace)=3/51 ≅ 0.06.
2. Let “A” denote the antecedent and “B” denote the consequent of the conditional.
P(A ⊃ B) = 1 – P(A ∧ ¬B) = 1 – (4/52 × 48/51) = 205/221 ≅ 0.93.
3. The name “Aristotle’s Thesis” was coined by McCall (1966). Aristotle wrote in his
Prior Analytics “…if B is not great, B itself is great. But this is impossible” (quoted after
Lukasiewicz, 1957, 50).
4. The law of total probability states that P(B) = P(B|A) × P(A) + P(B|¬A) × P(¬A).
As P(¬A) = 1 − P(A), the only unknown value is P(B|¬A). If P(B|¬A) = 0, then
P(B) = P(B|A) × P(A) (which is the tightest coherent lower probability bound of the con-
clusion). If P(B|¬A) = 1, then P(B) = P(B|A) × P(A) + 1 − P(A) (which is the tightest
coherent upper probability bound of the conclusion).
5. The participants were asked informally in the lecture hall how they understood the
task material and how they solved the task.
6. I thank Igor Douven for this point.
7. The author thanks Igor Douven for hosting fruitful research stays at his Formal
Epistemology Project at the University of Leuven. This work is financially supported by
the FWF-project P20209 “Mental probability logic,” the DFG grant PF 740/2–1, and the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
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Abstract
Probabilistic models have started to replace classical logic as the standard reference paradigm
in human deductive reasoning. Mental probability logic emphasizes general principles where
human reasoning deviates from classical logic, but agrees with a probabilistic approach (like
nonmonotonicity or the conditional event interpretation of conditionals).
This contribution consists of two parts. In the first part we discuss general features of reason-
ing systems including consequence relations, how uncertainty may enter argument forms, proba-
bility intervals, and probabilistic informativeness. These concepts are of central importance for
the psychological task analysis. In the second part we report new experimental data on the para-
doxes of the material conditional, the probabilistic modus ponens, the complement task, and
data on the probabilistic truth table task. The results of the experiments provide evidence for the
hypothesis that people represent indicative conditionals by conditional probability assertions.
1 Introduction
The title of this contribution appears paradoxical. Deduction is truth preserving and not uncer-
tain. The alleged paradox is clarified in the following sections.
A descriptive theory of human reasoning needs a normative theory in the background. The
normative background provides rationality norms and specifies the correct answer to a reasoning
task relative to these norms. It serves to provide the language and the inference rules to solve
the problem. Moreover, it stimulates psychological hypotheses and guides the construction of
experimental tasks. The shift from classical logic to alternative normative systems leads to new
experimental paradigms. The choice of an appropriate normative framework is a fundamental
problem and needs careful consideration before running psychological experiments. If the nor-
mative framework is ignored in the process of psychological model building, then one runs into
the danger of not knowing what one investigates: in the worst case, the resulting experimental
data become uninterpretable.
The research on human reasoning is a process that proceeds by asking questions and setting
goals, by designing experiments and selecting experimental tasks, and by interpreting the results
within a theoretical framework. All these steps are related to a normative paradigm. For many
years it was taken for granted that classical logic is the appropriate normative paradigm for
research on human reasoning. Modern logic and mathematical computer science, however, have
developed many systems to describe reasoning tasks, properties of knowledge representation, and
inference. Today there are many systems of “rational” reasoning. It is reasonable to consider some
of these logical systems while asking questions and setting goals, while designing experiments and
selecting experimental tasks, and while interpreting the results within a theoretical framework.
Probability logics provide one class of such systems. The present contribution argues that the
coherence based probability logic is a fruitful normative frame for investigating human reasoning.
Before we illustrate the application of probability logic to psychology, we discuss some theoretical
notions that are important for human reasoning research.
Where do classical logic and probability logic differ and where not? First, what is common
to both.
• Propositions (or events) are true or false. They have Boolean truth values.
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State of Material Conjunction Conditional
the world conditional event
A B A ⊃ B A ∧B B|A
s1 true true true true true
s2 true false false false false
s3 false true true false undetermined
s4 false false true false undetermined
Table 1: Truth tables of three prominent psychological interpretations of the indicative “if—, then—
”. Only rows s3 and s4 distinguish between the three interpretations.
• Inferences from premises to conclusions are deductive. Probability logic investigates argu-
ment forms like modus ponens and modus tollens, or various kinds of syllogisms in an
analogous way as in classical logic.
Major differences concern the following points:
• In probability logic propositions are assigned degrees of belief. The degrees of belief are sub-
jective probabilities. Subjective probabilities are coherent descriptions of partial knowledge
states.
• Probability assessments should be coherent. A probability assessment is coherent if it cannot
lead to bets with sure loss. There are different kinds of coherence.
• Probabilistic inference transmits probabilities from the premises to the conclusions. The
inference itself is deductive and not probabilistic. It follows the rules of mathematics, like
solving systems of linear equations or linear programming.
• There are a number of rather general properties in which both systems differ. Classical
logic is monotone, probability logic is defeasible and nonmonotone. Classical logic is truth
functional, a property that does not apply to probability logic. Systems witch such meta-
properties are investigated in artificial intelligence to mimic human reasoning. They are of
special interest for psychological modeling.
During the last years several probabilistic models of human reasoning were proposed (Oaksford
& Chater, 1998, 2007a; Evans & Over, 2004). These models do of course have many features
in common with the present approach. One common feature is that the probabilities of condi-
tionals, P(If A, then B), are interpreted as conditional probabilities, P (B|A), as opposed to the
probability of material conditionals, P (A ⊃ B). Table 1 presents three prominent psychological
interpretations of the indicative “if—, then—”. The interpretation as a conditional event received
compelling empirical support (e.g., Liu, Lo, & Wu, 1996; Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003; Over &
Evans, 2003; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). The dominant experimental paradigm for investigating
the understanding of uncertain indicative conditionals is the probabilistic truth table task. We
proposed an alternative experimental paradigm by studying probabilistic argument forms. Our
own approach is called “mental probability logic” (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005a, 2005b, in pressb, in
pressa) and differs from other probabilistic approaches with respect to the following points:
• Our commitment to subjective probability and coherence is in the tradition of de Finetti
(Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002). In combination with recent developments in computer science
(like description logics (Baader, Calvanese, McGuinness, Nardi, & Patel-Schneider, 2007)),
the coherence approach leads to powerful systems of knowledge representation and inference
(Gilio, 2002; Biazzo, Gilio, Lukasiewicz, & Sanfilippo, 2005; Lukasiewicz, 2005, 2008).
• In our approach it often occurs that the conclusions of an argument obtain lower and upper
probabilities and not point probabilities. We investigate interval probabilities.
• In our approach the consequence relation itself is deductive and not probabilistic.
The present contribution consists of two parts. In the first part we discuss a selection of logical
features of reasoning systems that are of central importance for the psychological task analysis.
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In the second part we report experimental data on the paradoxes of the material conditional, the
probabilistic modus ponens, the complement task, and data on the probabilistic truth table
task.
2 General features of reasoning systems
Human thinking and reasoning may lead to outstanding and fascinating achievements. Take as an
example the proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem. It took more than 350 years to come up with a proof
(Wiles, 1995) of the famous conjecture that Euler or Poincaré could not solve. We think that any
reasonable theory of human reasoning should strive to explain how we solve difficult problems.
Solving difficult problems requires a minimum of systematicity. Considering various normative
background systems one should be careful to chose a system that does not exclude smart solutions
right from the beginning. While evaluating formal systems for their appropriateness for psycho-
logical modeling, one should look out for “competent” and rich systems. Description logic is one
such family of systems (Baader et al., 2007). It has replaced semantic networks for knowledge
representation, it has many extensions (probabilistic, possibilistic, autoepistemic, etc.); so it is
a rich system. There is software for real-world applications to build ontologies.1 In our view it
is important to look at principles developed in such fields to learn more also about features and
constraints of human reasoning.
Features that cannot be expressed in classical logic include procedural mechanisms, defaults,
closed world reasoning, assumptions about missing information, non-truth functionality, non-
monotonicity, defeasible reasoning (in a wide sense), uncertainty, probability, vagueness, and
fuzziness.
Several disciplines investigate knowledge representation and reasoning. Psychology is only
one of them. During the last fifty years logicians and computer scientists have developed a large
repertoire of logics and formal systems of reasoning (Van Harmelen, Lifschitz, & Porter, 2008),
recently especially in connection with the semantic web projects. Usually these systems are
“non-classical”, that is they are extensions of classical logic or they explicitly violate principles
of classical logic. A typical example is nonmonotonic reasoning.
During the last few years these non-classical systems have had a strong influence on which
questions and experimental tasks are investigated. Extensions of classical logic include causal
reasoning, autoepistemic reasoning, epistemic logic, dynamic logic, deontic logic, temporal logic,
fuzzy logic, possibilistic logic, and—last but not least—probability logic.
3 Deduction and Uncertainty
One of the basic concepts of classical logic is validity (“cl-validity” for short). Cl-validity guaran-
tees that the truth of the premises propagates to the conclusion. As an example of an argument
that is valid according to classical logic, consider the following instance of the modus ponens:
P1 If shape X is a triangle, then shape X is blue.
P2 Shape X is a triangle.
cl-valid
C Shape X is blue.
P1 and P2 denote the premises and C denotes the conclusion. The horizontal line denotes
the consequence relation. If the conditional in P1 (If A, then B) is formalized as a material
conditional, A ⊃ B, then this argument is cl-valid, since C is true under all interpretations that
assign true to both P1 and P2.
Cl-validity is a meta-property of arguments, and not of the conclusion of arguments. However,
if all premises are true and if an argument is cl-valid, then the conclusion must be true. If at
least one premise is false, then classical logic does not tell us whether the conclusion is true or
false. This distinction between the two questions—(i) is an argument cl-valid?, and (ii) is the
conclusion true if all premises are true?—leads to two classes of experimental tasks.
1For example protégé, see http://protege.stanford.edu/.
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modus ponens denying the antecedent
affirmative negated affirmative negated
P1: A ⊃ B A ⊃ B A ⊃ B A ⊃ B
P2: A A ¬A ¬A
C B ¬B ¬B B
cl-valid: yes no no no
V (C) true false undetermined undetermined
Table 2: modus ponens, denying the antecedent, and their respective affirmative and negated
versions. P1 andP2 denote the premises and C denotes the conclusion. A andB denote propositions.
⊃ and ¬ denote the material conditional and negation, respectively, and are defined as usual. cl-valid
denotes classical logical validity. V denotes the logical valuation-function V under all interpretations
that assign true to each premise. If the antecedent, A, of the conditional premise is false, then the
truth value of the conclusion is not determined. (Adapted from Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2007, p. 347.)
The first class of experimental tasks requires the judgment of cl-validity. These tasks require
a choice between two options: the argument is (i) cl-valid or (ii) not cl-valid. Cl-validity is a
meta-property of the (form of the) whole argument.
The second class of experimental tasks requires a judgment concerning the conclusion of an
argument. In such tasks the participants are instructed to assume that each premise is true and
to decide whether the conclusion is (i) true, (ii) false, or (iii) whether one cannot decide whether
the conclusion is true or false. This task requires a choice between three options. Option (iii) is of
central importance but unfortunately not always made available for the participants (especially
in the “possibilities” form of the truth table tasks, which is often used by proponents of the
mental model theory). Normatively, if the argument is not cl-valid, then the truth value of the
conclusion is undetermined (for example denying the antecedent) or necessarily false (if, for
example, the conclusion of modus ponens is negated). The normative relationships between
both classes of tasks are explained in Table 2.
Cl-validity is a complex and abstract concept. It is a meta-property of arguments. To judge
whether an argument is cl-valid is a rather artificial task which is hardly ever performed in
everyday life. People usually do not evaluate abstract meta-properties of arguments. Rather,
people focus on the conclusion. This does not mean that we think that people are always prone
to belief biases2. Rather, people are typically concerned with the problem of evaluating a concrete
conclusion in the light of the given evidence. People try to infer the conclusion deductively from
the premises. Moreover we assume that everyday life arguments are almost always uncertain and
defeasible. Conclusions are often retracted in the light of new evidence, and uncertainty is at
least implicitly present in almost all common sense arguments. How does this uncertainty enter
the normative models of everyday life arguments?
We discuss two different ways of introducing uncertainty to argument forms. The first option
is to introduce an uncertain consequence relation between the premises and the conclusion. The
second option is to attach probabilities to the premises and to keep the consequence relation
deductive. Oaksford, Chater, and Larkin (2000) opted for the first option in their analysis of the
four conditional syllogisms (modus ponens, modus tollens, affirming the consequent,
and denying the antecedent). They represent a conditional syllogism by the conditional
probability of the conclusion given the categorical premise, P (conclusion | categorical premise).
This makes the consequence relation uncertain. As an example consider the modus ponens,
P1 If shape X is a triangle, then shape X is blue.
P2 Shape X is a triangle.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . uncertain
C Shape X is blue.
2“Belief bias” denotes the tendency to evaluate an argument just by the believability of the conclusion and to ignore
the premises (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983)).
4
PAPER 3: UNCERTAIN DEDUCTIVE REASONING 62
Oaksford et al. (2000) interpret this argument as the conditional probability of C given P2,
P (Shape X is blue. | Shape X is a triangle.). The conditional premise (P1) does not enter the
model. This analysis does not preserve the original propositional structures of the arguments.
Liu (2003) and Oaksford and Chater (2007b) modified this model such that the conclusion is
conditionalized on the conditional (P1) and on the categorical premise (P2).
The normative treatment of the uncertain consequence relation beyond the four popular con-
ditional syllogisms, however, is challenging. Adam’s p-validity (Adams, 1975) is an example of
qualitatively uncertain consequence relations. Systems of nonmonotonic reasoning provide other
examples (Antoniou, 1997). The definition of satisfactory consequence relations that are quanti-
tatively uncertain is an open problem.
We next turn to our approach. Because of its normative frame (probability logic based on
coherence) we call it “mental probability logic” (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005b, in pressb, in pressa).
In our approach the consequence relation is deductive and the conclusion is uncertain. As an
example consider the probabilistic modus ponens:
P1 P (Shape X is blue. | Shape X is a triangle.) = x
P2 P (Shape X is a triangle.) = y
deductively valid
C xy ≤ P (Shape X is blue.) ≤ xy + 1− y
The argument form contains two binary variables. A complete probabilistic assessment requires
three probabilities, say x, y, and z of three logically independent events. The premises of the
probabilistic modus ponens specify only two probability values, x and y. The coherent proba-
bility of the conclusion is imprecise. It is constrained by a lower and an upper bound. In P1 the
conditional is interpreted as a conditional event, “Shape X is blue. | Shape X is a triangle.”. If
the conditional in P1 is interpreted as a material conditional, “Shape X is a triangle. ⊃ Shape
X is blue.”, then the probability propagation rule is different:
P1′ P (Shape X is a triangle. ⊃ Shape X is blue.) = x
P2 P (Shape X is a triangle.) = y
deductively valid
C max{0, x+ y − 1} ≤ P (Shape X is blue.) ≤ x
The difference between the material conditional and the conditional event is that the truth
value of the conditional event is undetermined if the antecedent of the conditional is false (see
Table 1). This affects, of course, the probability propagation rules. Probability logic provides the
language to represent and reason from different interpretations of the premises.
How people interpret conditionals is debated in the literature. We discuss two prominent
positions. The first position favors the material conditional interpretation. The second position
favors the conditional event interpretation. Mental model theory takes the first position (Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 2002). The theory postulates that people represent indicative conditionals either
as implicit mental models or as explicit mental models. To be precise, this is postulated only for
those conditionals that are as independent as possible from context or background knowledge.
According to the mental model theory, the truth conditions of the implicit mental model coincide
with the truth conditions of the conjunction, ∧. The truth conditions of the explicit mental
model coincide with the truth conditions of the material conditional, ⊃. For the truth conditions
see Table 1. Explicit mental models have a higher working memory demand and are harder to
process than implicit mental models. Therefore, the theory predicts that people usually form
more implicit mental models than explicit ones.
Barrouillet and Lecas (1999) instructed participants to list possible truth-table cases that are
consistent with an indicative “if—, then—”. The results are consistent with the material condi-
tional interpretation, and are treated as strong evidence for the mental model theory. However,
these results are ambiguous since they are consistent with the conditional event interpretation as
well. Normatively, both interpretations differ only in the truth table cases s3 and s4, where the
material conditional is true but the conditional event is undetermined (see Table 1). The truth
table cases that are “possible” are consistent with both the truth table cases that are true and
those that are undetermined. Therefore, this version of a truth table task cannot differentiate
5
PAPER 3: UNCERTAIN DEDUCTIVE REASONING 63
among the material conditional and the conditional event interpretation of the indicative “if—,
then—”.
The second position postulates that people interpret indicative conditionals as a conditional
event. A specialty of our approach is, that the conditional event, B|A, is basic in mental prob-
ability logic. Probabilities are assigned directly to the conditional event. This is psychologically
plausible and reduces the working memory demand: one does not need to process the joint
(P (A ∧B)) and the marginal (P (A)) probabilities.
Many empirical studies support the conditional event interpretation of conditionals (Evans et
al., 2003; Over & Evans, 2003; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). These studies use an experimental
paradigm that investigates complete probabilistic knowledge. Probabilistic truth table tasks
present (or ask for) the probabilities of all truth table cases. One version of the probabilistic
truth table task presents the probabilities of A ∧ B, A ∧ ¬B, ¬A ∧ B, and of ¬A ∧ ¬B to the
participants. The participants infer the probability of a conditional. Since complete probabilistic
knowledge is provided, the probabilities of conjunctions, material conditionals, and conditional
events are point values. Another version of the probabilistic truth table task provides the point
probability of a conditional and the participants rate the probabilities of all four truth table cases.
Again, this results in a task that consists of inferences about complete probabilistic knowledge.
Our approach uses an alternative experimental paradigm. We investigate selected argument
forms and present incomplete probabilistic knowledge in the premises. In our modus ponens
tasks, for example, we present only two probabilities to the participants: P (B|A) and P (A). As
explained above, the probability of the conclusion, P (B), is an interval probability and not a point
probability. If P (B|¬A) were also given, then the probability of the conclusion would be a point
value. P (B|¬A), however, would be an additional premise and the resulting task would not map
the modus ponens any more. Therefore, we investigate incomplete probabilistic knowledge.
We observed good agreement between the responses and the coherent probability intervals of
the probabilistic modus ponens (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2007, in pressb). How the participants
understand conditionals can be concluded from the inferences they draw.
An important problem of probabilistic argument forms is whether the coherent probability of
the conclusion is constrained by the premises. If the coherent probability of the conclusion of an
argument form is not necessarily equal to the unit interval, [0, 1], then we call this argument form
“probabilistically informative”. We call an argument form “probabilistically non-informative” if
the assignment of the unit interval to its conclusion is coherent for all probability assessments of
the premises (Pfeifer & Kleiter, in pressb). If an argument is probabilistically non-informative,
then one cannot infer anything about the probability of the conclusion (except that it is between
zero and one). Whether an argument is probabilistically informative can depend upon how the
conditional is interpreted. We discuss this fact by two of the so-called “paradoxes of the material
conditional”:
paradox 1: from B infer A ⊃ B .
paradox 2: from ¬A infer A ⊃ B .
Both paradox 1 and paradox 2 are cl-valid. There is nothing paradoxical about this. How-
ever, the paradoxes arise if indicative natural language conditionals are interpreted as material
conditionals. Consider, for example, the following instances:
Instance of paradox 1:
From It is raining. infer If I’m happy, then it is raining. .
Instance of paradox 2:
From I’m not happy. infer If I’m happy, then it is raining. .
Such examples are well known in the history of logic (Lewis, 1918). Obviously both inferences
are odd, but cl-valid if the conclusion is interpreted as a material conditional. Table 3 presents
the paradoxes, and three probability logical interpretations of the “if—, then—”. The proba-
bility of the conclusion is constrained under the material conditional interpretation and under
the conjunction interpretation. Under the conditional event interpretation, however, the unit
interval, [0, 1], is coherent for all probability assessments of the premise. Thus, the paradoxes are
probabilistically non-informative if the conditional is interpreted as a conditional event. If the
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Probabilistically
Premise Conclusion informative
P1: (a) B |= A ⊃ B
(b) P (B) = x |= x ≤ P (A ⊃ B) ≤ 1 yes
(c) P (B) = x |= 0 ≤ P (A ∧B) ≤ x yes
(d) P (B) = x |= 0 ≤ P (B|A) ≤ 1 no
P2: (a) ¬A |= A ⊃ B
(b) P (¬A) = x |= x ≤ P (A ⊃ B) ≤ 1 yes
(c) P (¬A) = x |= 0 ≤ P (A ∧B) ≤ 1− x yes
(d) P (¬A) = x |= 0 ≤ P (B|A) ≤ 1 no
NP1: (a) B 2 A ⊃ ¬B
(b) P (B) = x |= 1− x ≤ P (A ⊃ ¬B) ≤ 1 yes
(c) P (B) = x |= 0 ≤ P (A ∧ ¬B) ≤ 1− x yes
(d) P (B) = x |= 0 ≤ P (¬B|A) ≤ 1 no
NP2: (a) ¬A |= A ⊃ ¬B
(b) P (¬A) = x |= x ≤ P (A ⊃ ¬B) ≤ 1 yes
(c) P (¬A) = x |= 0 ≤ P (A ∧ ¬B) ≤ 1− x yes
(d) P (¬A) = x |= 0 ≤ P (¬B|A) ≤ 1 no
Table 3: Two paradoxes of the material conditional (P1 and P2) and their respective negated
versions (NP1 and NP2). For each paradox four interpretations are given: (a) classical logic, and
the three probability logical interpretations of the “if—, then—” (b) as a material conditional,
(c) as a conjunction, and (d) as a conditional event.“|=” denotes deductive validity, “2” denotes
“not deductively valid”. Only under the conditional event interpretation (d) the paradoxes are
probabilistically non-informative, and therefore not paradoxical.
conditional is interpreted as a material conditional or as a conjunction, then the paradoxes are
probabilistically informative (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2006). Under the conditional event interpretation,
however, the paradoxical nature of these argument forms disappears.
If the antecedent of the conditional in the respective conclusion is negated, we call the re-
sulting argument forms the “negated versions” of the paradoxes (see Table 3). Both paradoxes
and their negated versions provide different probability logical predictions on the three popular
interpretations of the natural language “if—, then—”. According to the mental model theory
most participants will make inferences that correspond to the predictions of the conjunction in-
terpretation (implicit mental model) or to the material conditional interpretation (explicit mental
model) of the “if—, then—” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Mental probability logic predicts
that most participants make inferences that correspond to the predictions of the conditional event
interpretation of the “if—, then—”. We investigate these predictions in the following sections.
4 Experiment 1: Two paradoxes of the material condi-
tional
4.1 Introduction and Method
Experiment 1 investigates paradox 1 and paradox 2, and their respective negated versions, see
Table 3. Between each paradox task we presented modus ponens tasks. The respective negated
versions of these argument forms were presented in the second half of the experiment.
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4.1.1 Participants
Thirty-two students of the University of Salzburg were payed five ¤ each for their participation
in the experiment (mean age: 23 years, 21 female, 11 male participants). Psychology students,
mathematics students and students with a background in logic were not included in the sample.
To ensure an atmosphere for thinking and reasoning, each participant was tested individually in
an experimental room in the department of psychology. The participants were instructed to take
their time and to think carefully about each problem.
4.1.2 Material
paradox 1 ( From B infer If A, then B ) and paradox 2 ( From ¬A infer If A, then B
; see Table 3) were translated into cover-stories. As an example consider the following problem,
which contains an instance of paradox 1:
Simon works in a factory that produces playing cards. He is responsible for what is printed
on the cards.
On each card, there is a shape (triangle, square, . . . ) of a certain color (green, blue, . . . ),
like:
• green triangle, green square, green circle, . . .
• blue triangle, blue square, . . .
• red triangle, . . .
Imagine that a card got stuck in the printing machine. Simon cannot see what is printed on
this card. Since Simon observed the card production during the whole day, he is
A 90% certain: There is a square on this card.
Considering A , how certain can Simon be that the following sentence is true?
If there is a red shape on this card, then there is a square on this card.
The premise is to the right of “ A ” and the box contains the conditional in the
conclusion. We were careful to ensure that the conditionals are as independent as possible
from background knowledge. According to the mental model theory, the truth conditions
of such conditionals coincide either with those of the conjunction or with those of the
material conditional (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).
First the participants decided whether the inference is probabilistically informative or
not. If they judged it not to be, then they continued to the next problem. If the argument
was identified as probabilistically informative, then the participants rated their degree of
belief in the conclusion. This two-step procedure was phrased as follows:
Considering A , can Simon infer—at all—how certain he can be that the sentence in the
box is true?
 NO, Simon cannot infer his certainty, since anything between 0% and 100% is possible.
 YES, Simon can infer his certainty.
In case you ticked YES, please fill in
Simon can be certain from at least % to at most
% that the sentence in the box is true.
0 100
%
The thirty-two participants were randomly assigned to two conditions. In the first
condition we presented five instances of paradox 1 (n1 = 16) and in the second condi-
tion we presented five instances of paradox 2 (n2 = 15, one participant was excluded
from the data analysis because of misunderstandings of the instructions). The versions
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differed in the uncertainties attached to the premises. The uncertainties were: “60%”,
“70%”, “90%”, “pretty sure” (German original: ziemlich sicher), and “absolutely cer-
tain” (absolut sicher). Between each paradox we presented a modus ponens task. The
uncertainty of the categorical premise ( P (A) ) of the modus ponens tasks was kept
constant at 100%. The uncertainties of the conditional premise ( P (if A, then B) )
were: “90%”, “70%”, “80%”, “pretty sure”, and “absolutely certain”. After the ten
tasks just described, we presented the same tasks in the same order again, with the
difference that the B term in the conclusions was negated. In the negated modus po-
nens tasks the conclusion had the form ¬B (rather than B), and in both versions of the
negated paradoxes the conditional had the form If A, then ¬B (rather than If A, then
B).
4.2 Results
Averaging across subjects and items, more than 80% of the responses identified the
modus ponens correctly as probabilistically informative (see Table 4). Of all those par-
ticipants who inferred correctly that the modus ponens is probabilistically informative,
all participants—except one—inferred correctly that it is “absolutely certain”/“pretty
sure” that the conclusion is true. In the negated modus ponens tasks, all participants—
except two—inferred correctly that it is “absolutely certain”/“pretty sure” that the con-
clusion is not true. In these tasks most participants understand that complementary
probabilities should add up to one. The good performance in our modus ponens tasks
corresponds to the high endorsement rates of the non-probabilistic modus ponens tasks
reported in the literature (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993).
The majority of the participants (more than 70% on the average) inferred that all
versions of the paradoxes are not probabilistically informative (see Table 4). This speaks
for the conditional event interpretation of the conditional. According to the mental
model theory, most participants should make probabilistically informative inferences.
Their inferences should conform to the conjunction (implicit mental model) or to the
material conditional interpretation (explicit mental model). These predictions are not
confirmed by the data.
To our knowledge, this is the first experiment on these two paradoxes of the mate-
rial conditional. The high percentage of probabilistically non-informative responses is
remarkable from a pragmatic point of view: they are obviously not influenced by conver-
sational implicatures that would call for informative inferences. Rather, the participants
seem to interpret the conditional as a conditional event and therefore understand that
one cannot infer anything.
In another experiment we investigated the following argument form, which is called
“monotonicity” or “premise strengthening”: From If A, then B infer If A and C, then B .
This argument form is another well known paradox of the material conditional. The re-
sults are in line with the present data: we observed wide and practically non-informative
interval responses (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2003).
5 Experiment 2
5.1 Introduction and method
In the following sections we report selected parts of a study which consisted of thirty
seven different tasks. One main purpose of Experiment 2 was to attempt to replicate
the results on the paradoxes of Experiment 1. We report these tasks and focus on other
9
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Affirmative argument forms
P60 P70 P90 Pps Pac MP90 MP70 MP80 MPps MPac
P1 63 81 69 69 69 63 88 81 75 94
P2 73 73 73 80 67 73 73 87 80 93
Negated argument forms
P60 P70 P90 Pps Pac MP90 MP70 MP80 MPps MPac
P1 75 69 63 75 44 81 88 88 69 88
P2 87 87 87 67 67 80 87 73 93 93
Table 4: Percentages of probabilistic non-informativeness responses in the Paradox (P) tasks, and of
probabilistic informativeness responses in the Modus Ponens (MP) tasks. P1: paradox 1 (n1 = 16),
P2: paradox 2 (n2 = 15). The indices denote the percentages presented in the premises, “ac”
denotes “absolutely certain”, “ps” denotes “pretty sure”. The indices of the modus ponens tasks
denote the percentages presented in the conditional premise.
Response First P1 Second P1 First NP1 Second NP1
non-informative 13 15 13 12
conclusion is true 3 2 0 1
conclusion is false 3 2 6 6
Table 5: Response frequencies of the two affirmative paradox 1 tasks (P1) and the two negated
paradox 1 tasks (NP1) of Experiment 2 (n3 = 19).
tasks that investigate the representation of conditionals as well. Moreover, we present
new data on the probabilistic truth table task.
5.1.1 Participants
Forty students of the University of Salzburg were payed five ¤ each. They were divided
into two groups of twenty participants each. Most tasks of group I investigated affirmative
arguments and most tasks of group II included negations. The participants were tested
individually in an experimental room. One participant was not included in the data
analysis because he misunderstood the instructions. As in Experiment 1, the participants
were instructed to take their time and to think carefully about each problem.
5.2 Material and results
The two paradoxes In Experiment 2 we investigated the two paradoxes of the ma-
terial conditional (see Table 3). The thematic content of all tasks and the response
modalities were the same as in Experiment 1. The uncertainty in each premise was
formulated verbally as “pretty sure” (ziemlich sicher).
The nineteen participants of group I solved paradox 1 twice and the negated version
of paradox 1 twice (see Table 3). Between each paradox task, we presented tasks that
investigate different argument forms. Table 5 presents the response frequencies of the
affirmative and of the negated paradox 1 tasks.
The majority (63%-79%) of the participants understand that paradox 1 and the
negated version of paradox 1 are probabilistically non-informative. This speaks for
the conditional probability interpretation of the “if—, then—”. The data replicate the
findings of Experiment 1.
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Response First P2 Second P2 First NP2 Second NP2
non-informative 15 18 18 18
conclusion is true 1 1 0 1
conclusion is false 4 1 2 1
Table 6: Response frequencies of the two affirmative paradox 2 tasks (P1) and the two negated
paradox 2 tasks (NP2) of Experiment 2 (n4 = 20).
The participants of group II (n4 = 20) solved paradox 2 twice and the negated
version of paradox 2 twice (see Table 3). Between each paradox task, we presented
again other tasks. Table 6 presents the response frequencies of the affirmative and of the
negated paradox 2 tasks.
Almost all participants (75%-90%) understand that paradox 2 and the negated ver-
sion of paradox 2 are probabilistically non-informative. This speaks for the conditional
probability interpretation of the “if—, then—”. The data replicate the findings of Ex-
periment 1.
The complement tasks The paradoxes are probabilistically non-informative, if the
conditional is interpreted as a conditional event. They are probabilistically informative
under the material conditional interpretation. There are argument forms in which the
rôle of the probabilistic informativeness of the different interpretations is interchanged.
In the following argument form, the conditional event interpretation is probabilistically
informative but the material conditional interpretation is practically non-informative (a
wide interval between a value close to zero and one).
From If A, then B infer If A, then ¬B .
Lets call this argument form “complement”. If the uncertain “if—then—” of the com-
plement is interpreted as a conditional event, then the resulting argument form is
probabilistically informative:
From P (B|A) = x infer (¬B|A) = 1− x .
If, however, the conditional is interpreted as a material conditional, then the comple-
ment is formalized as:
From P (A ⊃ B) = x infer 1− x ≤ P (A ⊃ ¬B) ≤ 1 .
Thus, if the conditional is interpreted as a material conditional and if the probability of
the premise is sufficiently high, then the conclusion is practically non-informative, since
the probability of the conclusion is anywhere between a very low value and one.3
If the conditional of the complement is interpreted as a conjunction, then it is
formalized as:
From P (A ∧B) = x infer 0 ≤ P (A ∧ ¬B) ≤ 1− x .
If the conditional is interpreted as a conjunction (implicit mental model) and if the
probability of the premise is sufficiently high, then the probability of the conclusion is
close to zero.
3This argument form is strictly speaking probabilistically informative, since it is not the case that for all probability
assignments of the premise, the coherent probability of the conclusion is necessarily between zero and one. Therefore
we say that this argument form is “practically non-informative”.
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The predictions concerning the complement task are straightforward. If the partic-
ipants interpret the conditional as a material conditional, they should give a probabilis-
tically non-informative response. The presented complement task does not distinguish
between the conditional event interpretation and the conjunction interpretation. (If the
probability of the premise would have been lower, then it could differentiate among all
three interpretations.)
In Experiment 2, we presented the complement as the first task to all participants
(n3 + n4 = 39). Twenty-eight participants responded by ticking the box “pretty sure”
that the conclusion is false. This corresponds to the conditional event interpretation
and to the conjunction interpretation. Nine participants opted for the probabilistic non-
informativeness, which corresponds to the material conditional interpretation.
We included also a task that investigates the negated complement. The negated
version of the complement corresponds to the trivial inference: from if A, then B infer
if A, then B (the double negation is eliminated). All participants responded correctly
that they are pretty certain that the conclusion is true.
The probabilistic truth table tasks All participants of Experiment 2 (n3+n4 = 39)
solved four probabilistic truth table tasks. This task serves to investigate the represen-
tation of uncertain conditionals. The difference to the other tasks is that the probabilis-
tic truth table task investigates reasoning about complete probabilistic knowledge. We
adapted the tasks from Evans et al. (2003). The participants were instructed to imagine
a pack of 120 cards. They were informed that the cards are either red or blue and have
have either a circle or a square printed on them. They were asked to assume that in total
there are:
40 red and circle,
40 red and square,
20 blue and circle, and
20 blue and square cards.
The participants were instructed to imagine that the pack is shuffled and that a card is
drawn randomly. This makes the random process explicit. Then, they rated the following
four assertions about the randomly drawn card:
(1) If the card is blue, then there is a circle on it.
(2) If there is a square on the card, then it is red.
(3) If the card is not red, then there is not a square on it.
(4) If there is a not a circle on the card, then it is not blue.
For the ratings we provided scales with the labels “absolutely certain not the case”
(German original: stimmt absolut sicher nicht) and “absolutely certain the case” (stimmt
absolut sicher).
The most important qualitative predictions are as follows. (1) and (3) are equivalent,
as are (2) and (4). If the participants interpret the “if—then—” as a material conditional,
all four assertions should obtain the same rating. If the participants interpret the “if—
then—” as a conditional event or as a conjunction, then (1) and (3) should obtain a lower
rating than (2) and (4), respectively. For differentiating between the conditional event
and the conjunction interpretation, the ratings must be compared with the normative
values. The quantitative predictions are summarized in Table 7. The predictions accord-
ing to the conditional event interpretation are higher than the predictions according to
the conjunction interpretation.
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Conditional Predictions Responses
P (· ⊃ ·) P (· ∧ ·) P (·|·) Mean (SD)
If blue, then circle .83 .17 .50 .46 (.18)
If square, then red .83 .33 .67 .71 (.15)
If not red, then not square .83 .17 .50 .44 (.22)
If not circle, then not blue .83 .33 .67 .66 (.23)
Table 7: Predicted probabilities and mean observed values in the four probabilistic truth table tasks
of Experiment 2 (n = 39). The predicted probabilities are the normative probabilities according
to the material conditional (· ⊃ ·), conjunction (· ∧ ·), and according to the conditional event (·|·)
interpretation of uncertain indicative conditionals.
We counted the ratings as equal if they remained in a 15% interval. Only two of the
thirty-nine participants responded with equal ratings for all four assertions. This is clear
evidence against the material conditional interpretation of indicative conditionals. Thirty
participants rate the assertions (2) and (4) uniformly higher than both assertions (1) and
(3). This pattern is predicted by both, the conjunction interpretation and the conditional
event interpretation. Twenty-five participants responded by giving both (i) equal ratings
between the assertions (1) and (3), and (ii) equal ratings between the assertions (2) and
(4) (within a 15% interval). This shows that most participants really understood that
the respective assertions are equivalent.
We divided the distance between the left pole of the rating scale (“absolutely certain
not the case”) and the participants’ markings by the total length (63mm) of the response
scale. This procedure scales the response values from zero to one. Table 7 presents
the mean response values and the normative probabilities of the material conditional,
conjunction, and conditional event interpretation of the “if—, then—”. Boxplots of the
data are given in Figure 1. The mean and the median of the responses are close to the
predictions of the conditional event interpretation. Therefore, conditional probability is
the best predictor of the empirical values. We observed fewer responses that are consistent
with the conjunction interpretation than reported in the literature (see, e.g., Evans et al.,
2003; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). A reason could be that we maximized the distances
between the three predictions, and the coherent value of the conjunction interpretation
is quite far away form the coherent value of the conditional event interpretation.
Moreover, we measured the distances between each response and each of the three
normative predictions. The least distances provide another way of comparing the quality
of the three predictions. A prediction “wins” if it has the least distance to the response
value compared with the other predictions. Table 8 presents the frequencies of the “win-
ning” predictors. The conditional event interpretation received the highest frequencies.
Again, the conditional event is the best predictor of the empirical values.
6 Discussion
The paradoxes of the material conditional are often used as one of the principal argu-
ments for why one should not interpret indicative conditionals, “if A, then B”, as material
conditionals, A ⊃ B. However, to our knowledge the paradoxes have not been investi-
gated empirically yet. This contribution reports two first experiments on the paradoxes
of the material conditional. One main result is that the great majority of participants
do not endorse the paradoxes. We proposed coherence based probability logic as a norma-
tive framework for the psychology of reasoning. Within this framework we formulated
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Figure 1: Boxplots of the probabilistic truth table tasks. The boxes contain 50% of the responses and
the median (thick line). The whiskers indicate 1.5 × the interquartile range. The three normative
predictions are in gray. Conditional probability is the best predictor.
Conditional Winning predictor Ties
P (· ⊃ ·) P (· ∧ ·) P (·|·)
If blue, then circle 2 7 30 0
If square, then red 9 4 22 4
If not red, then not square 3 9 27 0
If not circle, then not blue 12 8 18 1
Table 8: Frequencies of least distances to the normative predictors (“winning predictor”; n3 + n4 =
39). “Ties” denotes the number of participates that responded by values that lie exactly between
two predictors. Ties were observed only between P (· ⊃ ·) and P (·|·).
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three psychologically prominent interpretations of the “if—, then—”, and explained why
most people do not endorse the paradoxes: most people interpret the “if—, then—” as
a conditional event and they seem to understand that the paradoxes are probabilistically
non-informative. Pragmatic reasons may play important rôles in human reasoning in
general, but for the paradoxes probabilistic non-informativeness fully explains why most
people do not endorse these argument forms. We provided further empirical support for
the conditional event interpretation by the results of the probabilistic truth table task,
which endorses Jonathan Evans’ support of the conditional probability interpretation of
uncertain conditionals (Evans & Over, 2004; Evans, 2007). We explained why all this
evidence rejects central predictions of the mental model theory.
We started from a strong assumption, namely that there is just one logical system
that fits all subjects, all tasks, all situations and, moreover, all their combinatorial inter-
actions. This assumption is too strong. There are, for example, two subjects who give
exactly equal ratings to all four truth table tasks. This is what the material conditional
of classical logic predicts. Most subjects, though, follow the predictions of probability
logic. It is plausible to assume that there are not only systematic individual differences
but that even one and the same subject has access to several different “logics” of reason-
ing. Human thinking can be excellent in switching strategies, in simplifying constraints,
or in re-representing a problem structure. We have tried to identify and discuss one
dominating system, probability logic.
Finding moderator variables that tell us who in which situation is using which kind
of “logic” to make which inference is difficult. The large number of variables, the small
effect sizes, and the realization of appropriate experimental conditions for motivated
“real” thinking (and not just giving the next best guess answers) make empirical research
difficult and require considerable efforts.
Is our position not a kind of logicism? Do we not say that to come up with a the-
ory of human reasoning, we need to identify the formal system that best fits human
performance?
Logic and mathematical computer science provide the best theories on reasoning, not
about human reasoning, of course. But they provide languages, properties, and systems
to describe tasks, knowledge and belief, and inferences that the psychology of reasoning
cannot ignore.
Ignoring modern logics leads to the use of a common sense amateur logic. There is no
way out, either (i) explicitly exploiting the modern pluralistic approaches to logic, or (ii)
relying on classical logic, or (iii) implicitly using self-baked logic. For about one hundred
years parts of classical logic served as the favorite reference system to select experimental
tasks and to build models. Typical examples are syllogisms, the Wason’s card selection
task, or the modus ponens, modus tollens, affirming the consequent, and the
denying the antecedent tasks. The research questions had been centered around the
logic of syllogisms (a highly specific subset of predicate logic going back to Aristotle and
the middle ages), a special form of the conditional (the so-called material conditional),
and just four forms of conditional syllogisms with two premises. Only recently systems
that differ from classical logic were considered for psychological modeling (and for a re-
analysis of the classical tasks). We are not saying that cognitive representations and
processes are unimportant. Quite the contrary, cognitive representations and processes
are of course central to psychological theory building. We have severe doubts, however,
that it is a good research strategy to attempt to describe representations and processes
on the background of an old-fashioned amateur logic. Moreover—and again—logic and
mathematical computer science offer a rich repertoire of knowledge representation lan-
guages and systems. Several well-known representational systems in psychology were
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imported from computer science. Semantic networks, neural networks, production sys-
tems, or more recently, Bayesian networks are typical examples.
References
Adams, E. W. (1975). The logic of conditionals. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Antoniou, G. (1997). Nonmonotonic reasoning. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Baader, F., Calvanese, D., McGuinness, D. L., Nardi, D., & Patel-Schneider, P. F. (Eds.).
(2007). The description logic handbook: Theory, implementation, and applications.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barrouillet, P., & Lecas, J.-F. (1999). Mental models in conditional reasoning and
working memory. Thinking and Reasoning , 5 (4), 289-302.
Biazzo, V., Gilio, A., Lukasiewicz, T., & Sanfilippo, G. (2005). Probabilistic logic
under coherence: Complexity and algorithms. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial
Intelligence, 45 (1-2), 35-81.
Coletti, G., & Scozzafava, R. (2002). Probabilistic logic in a coherent setting. Dordrecht:
Kluwer.
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and
judgement. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Evans, J. St. B. T., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic
and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory and Cognition, 11 , 295-306.
Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J., & Over, D. E. (2003). Conditionals and condi-
tional probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 29 (2), 321-355.
Evans, J. St. B. T., Newstead, S. E., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1993). Human reasoning. Hove:
Erlbaum.
Evans, J. St. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gilio, A. (2002). Probabilistic reasoning under coherence in System P. Annals of
Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 34 , 5-34.
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: A theory of meaning,
pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review , 109 (4), 646-678.
Lewis, C. I. (1918). A survey of symbolic logic. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Liu, I.-M. (2003). Conditional reasoning and conditionalization. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29 (4), 694-709.
Liu, I.-M., Lo, K.-C., & Wu, J.-T. (1996). A probabilistic interpretation of ‘If—Then’.
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49 (A), 828-844.
Lukasiewicz, T. (2005). Weak nonmonotonic probabilistic logics. Artificial Intelligence,
168 , 119-161.
Lukasiewicz, T. (2008). Expressive probabilistic description logics. Artificial Intelligence,
172 (6-7), 852 - 883.
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (Eds.). (1998). Rational models of cognition. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2007a). Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to
human reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2007b). Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to
human reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Larkin, J. (2000). Probabilities and polarity biases in
conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 26 , 883-899.
16
PAPER 3: UNCERTAIN DEDUCTIVE REASONING 74
Oberauer, K., & Wilhelm, O. (2003). The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional prob-
abilities, mental models and personal utilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29 , 680-693.
Over, D. E., & Evans, J. St. B. T. (2003). The probability of conditionals: The psycho-
logical evidence. Mind & Language, 18 , 340-358.
Pfeifer, N., & Kleiter, G. D. (2003). Nonmonotonicity and human probabilistic reasoning.
In Proceedings of the 6th workshop on uncertainty processing (p. 221-234). Hejnice:
September 24–27th , 2003.
Pfeifer, N., & Kleiter, G. D. (2005a). Coherence and nonmonotonicity in human reason-
ing. Synthese, 146 (1-2), 93-109.
Pfeifer, N., & Kleiter, G. D. (2005b). Towards a mental probability logic. Psychologica
Belgica, 45 (1), 71-99.
Pfeifer, N., & Kleiter, G. D. (2006). Inference in conditional probability logic. Kyber-
netika, 42 , 391-404.
Pfeifer, N., & Kleiter, G. D. (2007, 16 - 19 July). Human reasoning with imprecise
probabilities: Modus ponens and Denying the antecedent. In G. De Cooman,
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Since Störring’s [63] pioneering experiments on syllogistic reasoning at the
beginning of last century, experimental psychology has investigated deduc-
tive reasoning in the framework of classical logic. The most prominent
examples are the theories of mental models [27] and mental rules [8, 59]. A
fragment of the model theory of classical logic is central to mental models.
Likewise, a fragment of the proof theory of classical logic is central to men-
tal rules. In this tradition, classical logic is considered as the “surest guide”
towards a competence model for the psychology of reasoning [38]. Not only
did classical logic guide the psychological theories, but it also determined
the experimental methodology, and the evaluation of human performance.
In the last decade the situation has changed. At present, approaches
that extend, or go beyond, classical logic introduce new frameworks in the
field. Examples are nonmonotonic reasoning, possibility theory [3], logic
programming [61, 62], probabilistic approaches [41, 11, 43, 42, 37, 36, 19,
46, 47, 44] ... [links to other chapters in the book].
The present chapter describes a probabilistic framework of human rea-
soning. It is based on probability logic. While there are several approaches
to probability logic, we adopt the coherence based approach [13, 23]. We
assume that rules similar to the principles of probability logic are basic
rules of the human inference engine. We therefore call our approach “men-
tal probability logic” [51]. Conditionals are of special importance in the
approach. Their interpretation is different from the interpretation in other
approaches. We conceive conditionals as non-truth functional, as uncertain,
and as nonmonotonic. They allow for exceptions. Below, we call such condi-
tionals “nonmonotonic conditionals”. We note that causal, counterfactual,
deontic, or pragmatic conditionals [5] are not in the scope of this chapter,
because their logical forms require formalisms that go beyond the scope of
the present framework. Causal conditionals require logical operators for in-
tervention, counterfactuals and deontic conditionals require possible worlds
1
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semantics, and pragmatic conditionals require a theory of the context of
their uttering.
Many investigations on cognitive processes report errors, fallacies, or
biases. Well known are perceptual illusions, biases in judgment under un-
certainty, or errors in deductive reasoning. While these phenomena may
be startling and stimulating in the scientific process, they do not lead to
theories that explain human performance in a systematic way. Collecting
slips of the tongue does not lead to a theory of speaking. Such phenomena
should be integrated in a systematic theory and not studied in isolation.
Psycholinguists distinguish performance and competence [12]. Compe-
tence describes what functions a cognitive system can compute [39, 40].
Human reasoning can solve complex problems and perform sophisticated
inferences. When developing a theory of reasoning one should have an ex-
planation of these processes in mind. Such an explanation requires a compe-
tence theory on the on the computational level. In the long run, we want to
develop a psychological theory that accounts for both competence and per-
formance. At the competence level, a systematic formal theory is required.
The formal theory provides the rationality standards and provides tools for
computational descriptions of the human reasoning competency. At the per-
formance level a specification of the cognitive representations and processes
is required. The explanation of typical reasoning, good and bad inferences
requires a theory of how representations are formed and manipulated.
On the competence level, classical logic provided a rich systematic frame-
work. Nonmonotonic reasoning systems, like system p [32, 1, 23], provide
a more promising framework. For several reasons classical logic alone is a
Procrustean framework [40, 42, 51, 52]. The two most important reasons
are the monotonicity property (i) and the if–then relation (ii).
(i) Monotonicity is a meta-property of classical logic. It states that
adding premises to a valid argument can only increase the set of conclu-
sions. Monotonicity does not allow to retract conclusions in the light of new
evidence. In everyday life, however, we often retract conclusions when we
face new evidence. Moreover, experiments on the suppression of conditional
inferences show that human subjects withdraw conclusions when new ev-
idence is presented [9, 10, 6, 7, 16, 57]. Thus, the monotonicity principle
is psychologically implausible. We discuss a coherence based semantic for
nonmonotonic reasoning and empirical results below.
(ii) The conditional in classical logic is the material conditional. Table
1 lists its truth conditions. The material conditional, A ⊃ B, is true if, and
only if, it is not the case that the antecedent, A, is true and the consequent,
B, is false.
While the material conditional is extremely useful in formal fields like
mathematics (derivations, proofs), it has severe drawbacks in the formaliza-
tion of common sense conditionals. In common sense reasoning, conditionals
are inherently uncertain, as they hold only “probably”, “normally”, or “usu-
2
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State of Material Betting
world conditional interpretation
A B A ⊃ B B|A
t t t win
t f f lose
f t t money back
f f t money back
Table 1: Truth table of the material conditional, and the betting interpre-
tation of the conditional event, B|A. “A” and “B” denote propositions. “t”
and “f” denote “true” and “false”, respectively.
ally”. A few exceptions do not invalidate the conditional. Nonmonotonic
conditionals express uncertain relations between the if and the then part
of a conditional assertion. The nonmonotonic conditional is interpreted as
a “high” conditional probability assertion,
If A normally B if, and only if,
the probability of B given A, P (B|A), is “high” .
Here, the probability function, P (·), is a one-place function and the condi-
tional event, B|A, is its argument. The conditional event, B|A, is distinct
from the material conditional of logic, A ⊃ B. In the following paragraphs
we argue why the core of the if–then corresponds to the conditional event
and why it does not correspond to the material conditional.
The material conditional leads to counterintuitive consequences, known
as the paradoxes of the material conditional. Below, we discuss an empirical
study on one of these paradoxes (premise strengthening1). We do not
want to import the paradoxes of the material conditional into the mental
probability logic. This is one reason why we interpret the non-probabilistic
conditional as a conditional event, B|A [1, 52]. The paradoxes arise because
of the truth-functionality of the material conditional, which will be discussed
in the next paragraph.
The truth value of the material conditional is determined for all four
possible combinations of truth values of the antecedent and the consequent
(see Table 1). Therefore, the material conditional is truth functional. In the
1premise strengthening is an argument with one premise (first box) and one con-
clusion (second box): from A ⊃ B infer (A ∧ C) ⊃ B . Can the conditional in the
conclusion be false if the premise is true? If A ∧ C is false, then the conditional is true
(because false antecedents make the material conditional true). If A ∧ C is true, the con-
ditional is true (because of the premise). Thus, it cannot be the case that the premise is
true and the conclusion is false at the same time. Therefore, premise strengthening is
logically valid.
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long history of logic,2 the truth functionality of the material conditional was
criticized several times, especially for those cases in which the antecedent is
false. It is counter the intuition to call a conditional true if its antecedent
is false. premise strengthening, for example, is logically valid because
(per definition) the material conditional is true if its antecedent is false.
Ramsey [58] and de Finetti [14, 15] pointed out that the truth value of
the conditional event, B|A, is indeterminate if the conditioning event, A,
is false. In a betting interpretation this corresponds to the case in which a
bet is annulled if the conditioning event does not happen. If you bet, for
example, that
team X wins
on the condition that
team X plays against team Y ,
then the stakes are payed back in the case that the game is cancelled (team
X does not play against team Y; see Table 1). If the conditioning event
does not happen, the conditional event is not true. The conditional event
is indeterminate if the conditioning event is false. Thus, the vertical stroke
| in the conditional event is not truth functional. Therefore, the paradoxes
of the material conditional do not arise.
The conditional event is a genuine conditional. It cannot be constructed
by Boolean operators like negation (¬, “not”), disjunction (∨, “or”), or
conjunction (∧, “and”). The material conditional, however, is not a genuine
conditional. The definition of the material conditional depends upon which
Boolean operator is considered to be basic. A ⊃ B can be defined, for
example, by negation and disjunction, negated conjunction, or by intuitively
indigestible definientia.3 None of these definientia are conditionals, but they
are logically equivalent to the material conditional. A genuine conditional
(like the nonmonotonic conditional) cannot be expressed by something that
goes completely beyond if–then formulations. Therefore, we prefer genuine
conditionals to non-genuine conditionals.
We see that the conditional probability interpretation of nonmonotonic
conditionals has at least three theoretical advantages compared with the
material conditional interpretation: (i) probability accounts for uncertainty
and nonmonotonicity, (ii) conditional events are genuine conditionals and
(iii) conditional events are free of the paradoxes of the material conditional.
What is the empirical status of the conditional probability interpretation?
The next section gives a brief overview on recent probabilistic approaches
to human conditional reasoning.
2The roots of the material conditional go back to Philon of Megara. He lived around
the 4th and 3rd century BC [31].
3For example, A ⊃ B is definable by negation and disjunction ¬A∨B, by the negated
conjunction ¬(A∧¬B), and by the intuitively indigestible definiens ((A ↓ A) ↓ B) ↓ ((A ↓
A) ↓ B) as well, where “A ↓ B” is read as “neither A, nor B” (¬(A ∨B)).
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Postulated interpretation of the uncertain “if A, then B”
P (A ⊃ B) P (B|A)
Probabilistic extension
of the mental model theory
Johnson-Laird et al. [29, 28]
Probabilistic relation between
premise(s) and conclusion
Chater, Oaksford, et al. [43, 42]
Liu et al. [37]
Empirical Result:
P (B|A) best predictor
for “if A, then B”
Evans, Over et al. [19, 46, 47]





Pfeifer & Kleiter [49, 50, 51, 53, 55]
Figure 1: Probabilistic approaches to human conditional reasoning and se-
lected exemplar studies. P (A ⊃ B) denotes the probability of the material
conditional. P (B|A) denotes the conditional probability.
2 Probabilistic approaches to human conditional
reasoning
There is a long tradition of probabilistic approaches to human judgment
and decision making. The judgment/decision tasks were associated with
inductive reasoning. Therefore the heavy use of probability theory. In the
traditional psychology of reasoning, however, the tasks were associated with
deductive reasoning. Therefore the heavy use of classical logic. Recently,
both traditions began to merge [30]. In the early nineties of the last century,
Chater and Oaksford introduced probabilistic models to the field of deduc-
tive reasoning [40, 41, 11, 43, 42]. The probabilistic approach to deductive
reasoning claims that even “purely logical” tasks are solved as if they were
tasks belonging to probability theory. The Wason Selection Task, for exam-
ple, is solved as if the human subjects would maximize information gain [41].
Syllogisms are solved as if the subjects would process Bayesian probabilities
[11]. And argument forms like the modus ponens or the modus tollens
are solved as if the subjects were experts in probability logic [55, 56]. Dur-
ing the last five years, the interest in probabilistic approaches to human
deductive reasoning increased rapidly. Recent probabilistic approaches to
human deductive reasoning can roughly be classified by (i) the postulated
interpretation of the if–then and (ii) the postulated relation between the
premise(s) and the conclusion (see Figure 1).
The truth conditions of the if–then in the mental model theory coincide
with the material conditional (left branch of Figure 1). If the subjects “fully
flesh out” all truth table cases of the if–then, then P (if–then) is equal to
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the probability of the material conditional (see [28, 21] for a discussion).
On the right hand side of Figure 1 is the conditional probability inter-
pretation (the if–then is interpreted as a conditional event). We note that
the numerical probabilities of the material conditional, P (A ⊃ B), and of
the corresponding conditional probability, P (B|A), can differ substantially.
Dorn [17] gives a compelling example. Consider a fair die with six sides.
Let A be the next throw of the die will come up a 5, and let B be the next
throw of the die will come up an even number. By the way, if A, then B is
here intuitively implausible. A denotes one out of the six possible outcomes,
thus P (A) = 1/6. B denotes three out of the six possible outcomes, thus
P (B) = 1/2. Summing up the probabilities of those truth table cases that
make A ⊃ B true (see Table 1), gives P (A ⊃ B) = 5/6. P (B|A) is deter-
mined only if a 5 comes up (if a 5 does not comes up, A is false). If A is
true, then B is false (because 5 is not an even number), hence P (B|A) = 0.
P (B|A) = 0 reflects the fact that here if A, then B is intuitively implau-
sible.
As the values of P (A ⊃ B) and of P (B|A) can differ substantially, you
might ask, which of both interpretations predicts the human understanding
of if–then better? Studies on human understanding of if–then do not
endorse the probability of the material conditional interpretation. Rather,
conditional probability seems to be the best predictor for human under-
standing of if–then [37, 19, 46, 47, 44]. We take this result as an important
building block for a competence theory of human reasoning. In the following
sections, we discuss human inference from conditional premises.
3 Coherence based probability logic
One of the best known principles in probability logic is Adams’ concept of
p-validity [1, 2]. An argument is p-valid, if and only if, the uncertainty of
the conclusion of the argument cannot exceed the sum of the uncertainties
of its premises. The uncertainty u(A) is defined by the 1-complement of
the corresponding probability, u(A) = 1− P (A). If an argument is p-valid,
then the corresponding non-probabilistic argument is logically valid. Logical
validity, however, does not guarantee p-validity.
In terms of interval probability, the lower probability of a p-valid con-
clusion is not sensitive (i) to the specific logical form of the premises and (ii)
to the order of the probabilities of the premises. The two properties hold
for unconditional events only and reflect the fact that in this case the events
are truth functional. Only the lower bounds of the conclusions of those ar-
guments that contain conditional events can be sensitive to the structure of
the premises and to the specific pattern of the probability assessment.
If human subjects interpret the if–then as a material conditional, then
their probability responses in p-valid arguments should be insensitive (i) to
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the logical form of the premises and (ii) to permutations of the probabilities
of the premises. There is, however, strong evidence that human subjects are
sensitive to structure and assignment.
We think that the investigation of lower and upper probabilities is impor-
tant for the psychology of reasoning. We investigate structure, assignment,
and inference in probabilistic argument forms. If the probability of the con-
clusion is constrained by the probabilities of the premise(s), the inference is
called “probabilistically informative”. If the assignment of the unit interval,
[0, 1], to the conclusion is coherent under all assessments of the premise(s),
the inference is called “probabilistically not informative”. In this case the
premises do not constrain the probability of the conclusion. As a trivial
example, assume you know that P (A) = .7. Based on this premise, you can
only infer that P (B) ∈ [0, 1]. This is probabilistically not informative.
While logical validity is a necessary condition for p-validity, logical va-
lidity is not a necessary condition for probabilistic informativeness. The
non-probabilistic forms of the denying the antecedent4 and affirm-
ing the consequent5 are not logically valid, but the probabilistic ver-
sions are probabilistically informative (but not p-valid). Moreover, premise
strengthening, hypothetical syllogism6, and contraposition7 are
logically valid, but neither probabilistically informative nor p-valid.
If the premises of a probabilistically informative argument are certain
(probabilities equal to 1), and if the argument is logically valid, then its con-
clusion is certain. If the premises of a probabilistically informative argument
are certain, and if the argument is not logically valid, then the probability
of its conclusion may be anywhere in the unit interval. If all premises are
given for sure, then the logically invalid arguments make also probabilisti-
cally no sense. Classical logic is thus a “limiting case” for probabilistically
informative arguments.
This special role of classical logic is an important reason why we do
not want to exclude classical logic from our approach. In everyday life,
however, premises are usually not given for sure. In these cases classical logic
does not provide an appropriate theoretical frame. Probabilistic versions of
argument forms and the relationships between logical validity, probabilistic
informativeness, and p-validity are investigated in [52, 56].
In psychology, the most often investigated argument forms containing
conditionals are the conditional syllogisms modus ponens and modus tol-
lens, and the related logical fallacies denying the antecedent and af-
firming the consequent. Each of the four argument forms consists of
the conditional premise if A, then B, one categorical premise, and a con-
4from if A then B and not-A infer not-B
5from if A then B and B infer A
6from if A then B and if B then C infer if A then C
7from if A then B infer if not-B then not-A
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clusion. In the original probabilistic approach of Oaksford, Chater & Larkin
[43] the probability of the conclusion of a conditional syllogism is equal to
the conditional probability of the conclusion given the categorical premise.
As an example consider the modus ponens,
from
Premises︷ ︸︸ ︷







P (B|A) predicts the endorsement of the modus ponens. The conditional
premise, if A, then B, is ignored in the model. The original model was
modified [36, 42] such that the conclusion is conditionalized on the categor-
ical and on the conditional premise. In this approach, the inference-relation
between the premise(s) and the conclusion is uncertain (see Figure 1).
Our approach follows a different intuition (see Figure 1). We assume a
coherent probability assessment of the premise(s) and the inference problem
consists in deriving deductively the (interval-)probability of the conclusion.
Elementary probability theory provides rules how to deduce the probability
of a target event (the conclusion) from the probabilities of a number of other
events (the premise(s)). In general, we consider as premises a triple con-
sisting of (i) a given set of arbitrary conditional events, A1|B1, . . . , An|Bn,
(ii) the associated probability assessment p1, . . . , pn, and (iii) a (possibly
empty) set of logical relations between the events.8 The conclusion is a fur-
ther conditional event An+1|Bn+1. The inference problem is solved when
P (An+1|Bn+1) is determined. Bayes’ Theorem, for example, finds the prob-
ability of a conditional event, A|B, when the probabilities of three other
events, A, B|A, and B|¬A, are given. Bayes’ Theorem may then be written
as an inference rule
from P (A) = x and P (B|A) = y and P (B|¬A) = z
infer P (A|B) = xy/(xy + (1− x)z) ,
where the first box contains the premises (the assessment is assumed to be
coherent) and the second box contains the conclusion.
To evaluate the rationality of human inferences, we investigate to what
extent humans infer coherent probability assessments from a given set of
premises. A probability assessment is coherent if it does not admit one or
more bets with sure loss (often called a “Dutch book”). Compared with the
criterion of maximizing expected utility (traditionally used in the judgment
and decision making literature), coherence is much weaker. Coherence is one
of the key concepts in the theory of subjective probability. It was introduced
8Unconditional events are treated as special cases of conditional events. An uncondi-
tional event, A, is defined as the conditional event A given logical truth, A|verum. The
according probabilities are identical, P (A) =def. P (A|verum). “P (A)” is a shortcut for
“P (A|verum)”.
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by de Finetti [14, 15]. More recent work includes [64, 33, 13, 23]. Coherence
provides an adequate normative foundation for the mental probability logic
and has many psychologically plausible advantages compared with classical
concepts of probability:
• Coherence is in the tradition of subjective probability theory in which
probabilities are conceived as degrees of belief. Degrees of belief are
coherent descriptions of partial knowledge states. For the mental prob-
ability logic framework, the interpretation of probability as degrees of
belief is naturally more appropriate than “relative frequency” inter-
pretations of probability (for example, Reichenbach, or von Mises).
Relative frequency interpretations of probability are about “objective
entities” in the outside world. Mental probability logic, however, in-
vestigates epistemic states of uncertainty.
• The framework of coherence does not require to start from a com-
plete Boolean algebra. Complete algebras are psychologically unreal-
istic since they can neither be unfolded in the working memory nor
be stored in the long term memory. Humans try to keep the memory
load as small as possible and try to process only relevant information.
Only the information contained in the premises is relevant for drawing
inferences. Additional probabilities constitute additional premises.
• Conditional probability, P (B|A), is a primitive notion. The probabil-
ity value is assigned directly to the conditional event, B|A, as a whole
[13]. The conditioning event A must not be a logical contradiction,
but P (A) can be equal to zero. The method of assigning the prob-
ability values directly to the conditional event, B|A, contrasts with
the classical approach to probability, where conditional probability is
defined by the fraction of the “joint”, P (A ∧B), and the “marginal”,
P (A), probabilities, where P (A) 6= 0. It is psychologically plausible
that subjects usually assign the uncertainty directly to the conditional
(and not by building fractions).
• Because of lack of knowledge (time, effort), it may be impossible for a
person to assign precise probabilities to an event. Imprecise probabil-
ity assessments my be expressed by interval-valued probabilities or by
second order probability distributions [54].
These advantages explain why we take coherence and not the classical con-
cept of probability as the normative basis for the mental probability logic.
The subsequent sections summarize selected empirical work, and we discuss
to which extent coherence based probability logic describes actual human
inferences. Studies on the conditional syllogisms are reported in [55, 56].
Studies on the nonmonotonic system p rules, and argument forms that
9
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A ¬A
B ¬B B ¬B
y 1− y
x [0, 1]
Figure 2: Derivation of the probabilistic modus ponens. The probabil-
ities of the premises are given, P (B|A) = x and P (A) = y (the bold
branches on the left). The lower and the upper probability bounds of
the conclusion, P (B), are derived by the theorem of total probability,
P (B) = P (A)P (B|A) + P (¬A)P (B|¬A). P (B|¬A) is unknown and can
take any value in [0, 1]. P (B) = xy if P (B|¬A) = 0, and P (B) = xy+1− y
if P (B|¬A) = 1. Therefore, xy ≤ P (B) ≤ xy + 1− y.
are monotonic counterparts of the system p rules (hypothetical syl-
logism, premise strengthening, and contraposition) are reported in
[49, 50, 53].
3.1 Example 1: The nonmonotonic conditional in the modus
ponens
3.1.1 Formal background
The logical form of the modus ponens is
from A ⊃ B and A infer B ,
where A and B denote propositions and ⊃ denotes the material conditional.
The modus ponens is logically valid. The conditional probability version
of the modus ponens is
from P (B|A) = x and P (A) = y infer P (B) ∈ [z′, z′′] ,
where the probability value of the conditional premise is equal to x and the
probability value of the categorical premise is equal to y. The probability
of the conclusion (B) is in the probability interval from at least z′ to at
most z′′, [z′, z′′]. The derivation of the coherent probability interval of the
conclusion of the modus ponens is explained in Figure 2. The lower bound
z′ is equal to the product xy and the upper bound z′′ is equal to xy+1− y.
Thus, the probability of the conclusion is constrained by the probabilities of
the premises. This argument form is also p-valid.
The uncertainty of the premises may be expressed by interval-valued
probabilities. A person may specify, for example, that an event A has at
least probability x. The modus ponens with interval probabilities in the
premises has the form
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from P (B|A) ∈ [x′, x′′] and P (A) ∈ [y′, y′′]
infer P (B) ∈ [x′y′, 1− y′ + x′′y′] ,
where x′ and x′′ are the lower and upper bounds of the conditional premise,
and y′ and y′′ are the lower and upper bounds of the categorical premise,
respectively. If a person knows a lot about the propositions in the premises,
then she will assess tight intervals. If her knowledge is vague and ambiguous,
then she will assess wide intervals.
Imprecise probabilities are sometimes criticized by the following argu-
ment. It is paradox to say that, if a person is not able to assess one precise
point probability, she may overcome the difficulty by assessing now two pre-
cise probabilities. We only partially agree with this argument. In everyday
life intervals are very often used to communicate imprecision. We would
prefer to represent degrees of belief by distributions which are “smeared”
across the whole zero-one range. Statistics uses second order probability
density functions to describe knowledge about uncertain quantities. This
complicates the formal models considerably though. In the present context
it seems reasonable to consider interval probabilities as approximations to
confidence intervals. It is possible, however, to replace “probability logic”
by a “statistical logic” which investigates logical argument forms with prob-
ability distributions. We described first steps in [54]. An advantage of such
an approach is the possibility to update the distributions in the light of ob-
servational data like frequencies or averages. Bayesian statistics offers a rich
theoretical background.
3.1.2 Empirical investigation of the modus ponens
In our experiments, we try to construct cover-stories that have a neutral
content, that is as independent as possible from the background knowledge
of the subjects. Moreover, we take care that only the information explic-
itly contained in the argument enters the task. The modus ponens, for
example, involves only two premises. Accordingly, the probabilistic version
of the modus ponens contains only two probabilities, P (B|A) and P (A).
We translated the probabilistic modus ponens into several cover-stories, of
the following kind [55]:
Claudia works at the blood donation services. She investigates to which
blood group the donated blood belongs and whether the donated blood is
Rhesus-positive.
Claudia is 60% certain: If the donated blood belongs to the
blood group A, then the donated blood is Rhesus-positive.
Claudia is 75% certain: A recent donated blood belongs to the
blood group A.
How certain should Claudia be that this recent donated blood is Rhesus-
positive?
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The cover-stories contained the probabilities of the premises. The task of
the participants was to infer from the premises the probability(-interval) of
the conclusion. In all experiments we paid special attention to encourage
the participants to engage in reasoning and to avoid quick guessing. The
participants were students of the Salzburg University. They were tested
individually in a quiet room in the department. They were asked to take
enough time.
Introductory examples explained that the solution can be a point value,
or an interval. The response modality was formulated accordingly. It was
up to the participants to give point or interval value responses. In each
experimental condition the content of the cover story remained constant,
the percentages were varied.
In themodus ponens tasks with certain premises (100% in both premises),
all participants solved the task correctly and responded “100%” (N = 45,
[55, Experiment 1 and 2]). In the tasks with uncertain premises we observed
that the participants inferred probabilities that were close to the normative
values. This result mirrors the endorsement rate of 89–100% reported for
the classical form of the modus ponens [20]. In one experiment the partic-
ipants also evaluated the negated conclusion, ¬B, from the same premises
(n = 30, [55, Experiment 2]). Again, in the tasks with certain premises
all participants inferred correctly “0%”. These results indicate three things.
First, the participants do not adopt a simple matching strategy. Second, the
participants are perfect in the “certain modus ponens” and the respective
task with the negated conclusion. Third, the reliability of our experimental
conditions is high. The results agree with the literature. Human subjects
are perfectly competent to make modus ponens inferences if the premises
are certain.
In the modus ponens tasks with uncertain premises about 70% of the
responses were interval responses (averaged over different tasks). Figure
3 presents results of the modus ponens [55, data from Experiment 2].
Each interval response belongs to one of the following six categories: (i) the
response is coherent (the lower and the upper probabilities are both in the
coherent interval), (ii) only the lower bound response is coherent, (iii) only
the upper bound response is coherent, (iv) the interval response is too low,
(v) the interval response is too high, and (vi) too wide interval responses.
The majority of the interval responses falls into the coherent category (i).
We evaluated the agreement of the responses and the normative values
by χ2-values. The χ2-values were calculated with the help of (i) the actual
number of responses falling into the normatively correct intervals and (ii) the
expected number, which was determined by the size (range) of the normative
intervals (guessing assumption). High χ2 values in the predicted direction
(a high value in the opposite direction did not occur) indicate more than
expected coherent responses. Compared with modus tollens, affirm-
ing the consequent, and denying the antecedent, the by far best
12






























Figure 3: Frequencies of interval responses in the modus ponens condition
with uncertain premises (n = 30). In the left column the premises were
P (B|A) = .7 and P (A) = .9, and in the right column the premises were
P (B|A) = .7 and P (A) = .5. Each participant inferred P (B) (first row)
and P (¬B) (second row) from the premises. The majority of the interval
responses are coherent.
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agreement with the coherent intervals is observed for the modus ponens
[56].
To explain the difficulty of an inference task, Evans [18] proposed two
important properties of the tasks, directionality and negativity. A task is for-
ward/backward directed, if it requires inference from the antecedent/consequent
to the consequent/antecedent. A task is positive/negative if it does/does not
involve negation. Positive forward tasks are easy. Negative backward tasks
are difficult. These are well known findings in the literature. In [56] we
propose first steps for a systematic explanation of these effects. Inferring
the probability of the conclusion from the premises of the backward tasks
requires to build fractions, which is difficult in general. The negative tasks
require the building of complements, which means further steps in the rea-
soning processes. The modus ponens is therefore easy, because it is the
most elementary positive forward task.
A third property, that may contribute to the good agreement of the
actual responses and the normative lower probabilities, is the fact that nor-
matively the lower probabilities of the conclusions are just the product of
the two probabilities in the premises. The conclusion must always be con-
siderably less than the smaller one of the two premise probabilities. The
participants may have a good understanding of this fact. For first steps
towards a process model based on propositional graphs see [56].
We next turn to a critical test of human probabilistic reasoning. If the
probability of A is x, then the probability of its negation is the 1-complement
P (¬A) = 1 − x. What is the complement of a probability interval? It is
given by the following equivalence
P (A) ∈ [x′, x′′] if, and only if P (¬A) ∈ [1− x′′, 1− x′] .
This property is called conjugacy. Conjugacy is a necessary condition for
coherence [64]. Are humans able to infer the interval complements for nega-
tions? We observed that in the modus ponens problems a surprisingly high
number of lower and upper probabilities agreed perfectly with the conjugacy
property [55].
4 Coherence based semantic for nonmonotonic rea-
soning
Nonmonotonic reasoning is a branch of artificial intelligence that, among
many other branches, investigates the formalization of common sense rea-
soning. It investigates inferences that allow to retract conclusions in the light
of new evidence. There are many systems of nonmonotonic reasoning [22].
system p is a set of inference rules that satisfy basic rationality postulates
of nonmonotonic reasoning [1, 32].9 system p is of particular significance,
9The “p” in “system p” stands for the preferential model semantics proposed in [32].
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since it is broadly accepted in the nonmonotonic reasoning community. The
principles of system p are also discussed in several other systems, weaker
ones [26] and stronger ones [34, 24, 60].
The role of the conditional in system p is of special interest in the
present context. As explained above, nonmonotonic conditionals are con-
ditionals that allow for exceptions. Nonmonotonic conditionals occur in
phrases like “birds can normally fly” or just “birds can fly”. Their de-
feasibility is often not stated explicitly. Nonmonotonic conditionals play
an essential role in each inference rule of system p. system p determines
which inferences about nonmonotonic conditionals are acceptable and which
ones are not acceptable. Only weakened versions of the monotonic inferences
(premise strengthening, hypothetical syllogism, etc.) are accept-
able. system p satisfies two desirable properties: (i) system p is “weak”
(or cautious) enough in the sense that the undesirable monotonicity prin-
ciple does not hold, and (ii) system p is “strong” enough to draw default
conclusions, with the possibility left to withdraw them in the light of new
evidence. These two properties are violated in classical logic.
If conditionals are represented by conditional events with associated
probabilities, then the principles of system p allow an interpretation in
probability theory. Gilio [23] has developed a probability semantic for non-
monotonic reasoning, which is based on coherence. Coherent conditional
probabilities represent nonmonotonic conditionals. The degree of normality
is represented by the associated conditional probability. Gilio has shown
for each rule of system p how the (interval-)probability of the conclusion
is constrained by the premises. All the rules of system p are probabilisti-
cally informative. All the rules of system p are p-valid [1]. Furthermore, if
all probabilities in the premises are equal to 1, then the probability of the
conclusion is equal to 1. If the nonmonotonic conditional is replaced by the
material conditional, then the rules of system p are logically valid.
We explain how nonmonotonic inferences are cast into a probabilistic
format by the standard example of nonmonotonic reasoning, namely the
Tweety problem:
Tweety is a bird, and as you know that birds can normally fly,
you conclude by default that Tweety can fly. When you learn
that Tweety is a penguin, common sense tells you to retract your
default conclusion that Tweety can fly.
The probabilistic version of the Tweety example runs as follows:
Premise 1: P [Fly(x)|Bird(x)] = .95. (Birds can normally fly.)
Premise 2: Bird(Tweety). (Tweety is a bird.)
Conclusion 1: P [Fly(Tweety)] = .95. (Tweety can normally fly.)
Premise 1 and 2 are the initial premises, Conclusion 1 is the default conclu-
sion. This inference is justified by the probabilistic modus ponens. Premise
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3–5 introduce new evidence. Conclusion 2 is the new (default) conclusion,
after the revision in the light of the new evidence:
Premise 3: Penguin(Tweety). (Tweety is a penguin.)
Premise 4: P [Fly(x)|Penguin(x)] = .01. (Penguins normally can’t fly.)
Premise 5: P [Bird(x)|Penguin(x)] = .99. (Penguins are normally birds.)
Conclusion 2: P [Fly(Tweety) | Bird(Tweety) ∧ Penguin(Tweety)] ∈ [0, .01].
(If Tweety is a bird and a penguin, normally Tweety can’t fly.)
The inference from Premise 1–5 to Conclusion 2 is justified by the cautious
monotonicity rule of system p (from A normally B and A normally C
infer A ∧B normally C ; see [23]). Premise 4 and Premise 5 are instantia-
tions of the premises and Conclusion 2 is an instance of the conclusion of the
cautious monotonicity. cautious monotonicity is a cautious version
of premise strengthening. Both are discussed in the next section.
4.1 Example 2: Nonmonotonic conditionals and premise strength-
ening
4.1.1 Formal background
premise strengthening is logically valid, since A ⊃ C logically implies
(A ∧ B) ⊃ C. For nonmonotonic [32], counterfactual [35], and causal con-
ditionals, however, premise strengthening is not valid. Consider the
following inference involving nonmonotonic conditionals:
if the bird Tweety is frightened, normally Tweety flies away.
Therefore: if the bird Tweety is frightened and if Tweety is a
penguin, normally Tweety flies away.
Replacing the nonmonotonic conditionals (if–normally) by counterfactual
conditionals (if–were—then–would be), or by causal conditionals (–
causes that–), shows that premise strengthening is counterintuitive.
premise strengthening is probabilistically not informative,
from P (C|A) = x infer P (C|A ∧B) ∈ [0, 1] .
system p contains a cautious version of the premise strengthening,
namely the cautious monotonicity, which is probabilistically informative
[23],
from P (C|A) = x and P (B|A) = y
infer P (C|A ∧B) ∈ [max{0, (x + y − 1)/y},min{x/y, 1}] .
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4.1.2 Empirical investigation of monotonicity
In [49] we divided forty participants into two groups. Twenty participants
received fourteen cautious monotonicity tasks and twenty participants
received fourteen premise strengthening tasks. The premises and the
conclusions of the tasks map the corresponding inference rule (see the pre-
vious section). The content of the cover-stories was the same in both con-
ditions. We varied the percentages in the premises within both conditions.
If the participants understand the probabilistic non-informativeness of the
premise strengthening, they should infer wide and non-informative in-
tervals.
In the cautious monotonicity condition, about 63% of the responses
were interval responses (averaged over different tasks). In the premise
strengthening condition, 69% of the responses were interval responses.
Figure 4 presents the frequencies of the lower and of the upper bound re-
sponses. The interval responses are clearly larger in the premise strength-
ening condition than in the cautious monotonicity condition. In both
conditions the lower and the upper bound responses are quite close to the
normative values.
In the premise strengthening condition, more than half of the partic-
ipants responded by lower bounds ≤ 1%. More than half of the participants
responded by upper bounds that are equal to the values presented in the
premises of the tasks. On the average, 27% of the participants responded by
intervals with both lower bounds ≤ 1% and upper bounds ≥ 91% (n1 = 20,
14 tasks). Most participants understood that the lower bound can be prac-
tically zero. Most participants used a matching heuristic for inferring the
upper bound. Apparently, most participants correctly inferred the lower
bound of the conclusion but did not continue to search the upper bound.
If the conditional were interpreted as a material conditional, then premise
strengthening would be probabilistically informative [52]. Psychologi-
cally, the following prediction follows: most subjects infer P (A ∧B ⊃ C) ∈
[x, 1] from P (A ⊃ C) = x. Most participants, however, responded by lower
bounds close to zero and by upper bounds close to x. Thus, most partici-
pants did not interpreted the conditional as a material conditional.
In the cautious monotonicity condition, the correlation between the
mean lower bound responses and the normative lower bounds over all four-
teen tasks was very high (r = 0.92). Subjects are sensitive to the probabilis-
tic non-informativeness of premise strengthening—at least concerning
the lower bound. Subjects are cautious with monotonicity.
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Figure 4: Frequencies of the lower and upper bound responses of Task 1
in the premise strengthening condition (upper row; n1 = 20) and in
the cautious monotonicity condition (lower row; n2 = 19) [49]. Most
responses are close to the normative lower and upper bounds (dashed lines),
respectively.
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4.2 Example 3: Nonmonotonic conditionals and hypotheti-
cal syllogism
The hypothetical syllogism is logically valid, since A ⊃ B and B ⊃ C
logically imply A ⊃ C. Thus, the material conditional is transitive. The
nonmonotonic conditional, however, is not transitive. The probabilistic ver-
sion of the hypothetical syllogism is probabilistically not informative,
from P (C|B) = x and P (B|A) = y infer P (C|A) ∈ [0, 1] .
The hypothetical syllogism is not contained in the nonmonotonic sys-
tem p and adding it would make system p monotonic. However, a weaker
version of the hypothetical syllogism is contained in system p, namely
the cut rule (“cut” is a shortcut for “cumulative transitivity”),
from P (C|A ∧B) = x and P (B|A) = y
infer P (C|A) ∈ [xy , xy + 1− y] .
The cut is a conditional version of the modus ponens. The reason is clear
by comparing the probability propagation rules of both argument forms and
by dropping the conditioning event A.
We observed that the participants in the hypothetical syllogism
condition did not understand the probabilistic non-informativeness. They
inferred informative intervals close to the coherent values of the cut prob-
lems. We explain this result as follows [49]. Adams [1] stressed the proba-
bilistic invalidity of the hypothetical syllogism. He suggested to inter-
pret its occurrence in common sense reasoning as an instantiation of cut.
Bennett [4] justified Adams’ suggestion in terms of conversational implica-
tures [25]. If a speaker first utters a premise of the form A normally B
and then utters as the second premise B normally C, the speaker actually
means by the second premise a sentence of the form (A and B) normally C.
The speaker does not mention “A and” to the addressat because A and is
already conversationally implied and “clear” from the context. Suppose we
speak (as we did in [49, Experiment 2 and 3]) about cars on a big parking
lot that are blue, and suppose we then add that
You know with 91% certainty: if a car is blue, then the car has
grey tire-caps ,
you probably assume that we are speaking about the blue cars that are on
the big parking lot, even if we do not mention this explicitly.
This interpretation explains why participants do not infer wide intervals.
If the conversational implicature hypothesis is correct, then the participants
actually interpret the hypothetical syllogism tasks as instances of the
cut rule.
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Another rule of system p is the right weakening rule, which is prob-
abilistically informative and, like cut, a cautious version of the hypothet-
ical syllogism,
from P (B|A) = x and B ⊃ C is logically true
infer P (C|A) ∈ [x, 1] .
Practically all participants inferred correctly the lower bound in the right
weakening tasks [49]. The percentage of participants that inferred cor-
rectly “100%” as the upper bound varied between 50% and 75%.
4.3 Example 4: Nonmonotonic conditionals and contraposi-
tion
4.3.1 Formal background
contraposition belongs to the class of inferences often called “immediate”
or “direct” inferences. contraposition is an inference from one conditional
premise to a conditional conclusion. contraposition denotes the logical
equivalence of A ⊃ B and ¬B ⊃ ¬A. Because of this equivalence we call
the corresponding argument forms “contraposition”:
from A ⊃ B infer ¬B ⊃ ¬A ,
and
from ¬B ⊃ ¬A infer A ⊃ B .
If the conditional is interpreted as a material conditional, then P (A ⊃ B) =
P (¬B ⊃ ¬A). Thus, the corresponding probabilistic argument form assigns
exactly the same probability value to the conclusion as given in the premise.
If, however, the conditional is interpreted as a conditional probability, then
P (B|A) is not necessarily equal to P (¬A|¬B). The corresponding proba-
bilistic argument forms are
from P (B|A) = x infer P (¬A|¬B) ∈ [0, 1]
and
from P (¬A|¬B) = x infer P (B|A) ∈ [0, 1] ,
for all probability values x. We see here a clear watershed between argu-
ment forms containing the material conditional and argument forms con-
taining the conditional event. If the subjects interpret the conditional as a
material conditional then a simple matching strategy is the best strategy for
contraposition problems. If the subjects interpret the conditional as a
conditional event, however, the argument is probabilistically not informative
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Probabilistic Mental models Conditional
contraposition fully explicit implicit probability
P (if A, then B) = x P (A ⊃ B) = x P (A ∧B) = x P (B|A) = x
P (if ¬B, then ¬A) =? P (¬B ⊃ ¬A) = x P (¬B ∧ ¬A) ∈ [0, 1− x] P (¬A|¬B) ∈ [0, 1]
Table 2: Probabilistic contraposition in the mental model theory and in
the conditional probability interpretation. The first row corresponds to the
premise and the second row corresponds to the conclusion. For simplicity,
the “mental footnote” is ignored. The probability of the premise is given
(x), and the subject infers the probability of the conclusion. Mental model
theory predicts that the premise constrains the probability of the conclusion.
Mental probability logic predicts that contraposition is probabilistically
not informative.
and any assessment of the conclusion is coherent. Thus, the material con-
ditional interpretation predicts matching, and the conditional probability
interpretation predicts non-informative probability intervals.
The mental model theory [29, 28] postulates that the core meaning of
a conditional corresponds to the material conditional. Usually, human sub-
jects represent a conditional by an implicit mental model. An implicit mental
model consists of a mental model of the conjunction of the antecedent and
the consequent, plus a “mental footnote” which represents the two truth
table cases where the antecedent is false (¬A ∧B and ¬A ∧ ¬B). All three
truth table cases are just those in which A ⊃ B is true (see Table 1). Thus,
if A, then B is represented by
A ∧B
. . .
where “. . . ” represents the mental footnote. Because of the mental footnote,
the whole representation is called the “implicit mental model” of the condi-
tional. Under some circumstances, subjects “flesh out” the implicit mental
model by replacing the mental footnote by representations of ¬A ∧ B and
of ¬A∧¬B. The resulting mental model is called “fully explicit”. Fully ex-
plicit mental models require much more working memory load than implicit
mental models. Therefore the mental model theory claims that conditionals
are represented usually by implicit and not by explicit mental models.
In general, the probability of the implicit mental model of if A, then B
is equal to P (A∧B)+P (. . .). We assume that the probabilistic assessment
of the truth table cases is coherent. The mental model theory assumes
that the subjects focus on P (A ∧ B). For simplicity, we assume that the
probability of the “mental footnote”, P (. . .), is ignored by the subject. Thus,
we make no special assumptions about P (. . .). If the subjects form implicit
mental models, and if P (. . .) is ignored, then the contraposition inference
consists of inferring P (¬A ∧ ¬B) from P (A ∧ B). If P (A ∧ B) = x, then
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P (¬A∧¬B) ∈ [0, 1− x], because the truth table cases must add up to one.
The probability of the fully explicit mental model is equal to P (A∧B)+
P (¬A∧B)+P (¬A∧¬B). The probability of the fully explicit mental model
corresponds to the probability of the material conditional. Table 2 presents
the implicit and the fully explicit mental models of the contraposition.
contraposition is probabilistically informative in the mental model the-
ory. contraposition is probabilistically not informative in the mental
probability logic (because of the conditional probability interpretation of
the if–then). The next section investigates these claims empirically.
4.3.2 Empirical results of the contraposition
We presented (among other tasks) both forms of contraposition to the
participants [53]. In the contraposition task with the negations in the
premise, 58% of the participants inferred both lower bounds ≤ 7% and
upper bounds ≥ 93% (n1 = 40). These wide interval responses indicate un-
derstanding of the probabilistic non-informativeness of the argument. In the
contraposition task with the negations in the conclusion, the respective
percentage was 40% (n2 = 40).
Practically all of the participants who did not infer such wide inter-
vals responded either by point values close to zero, or by point values that
are close to one hundred. We believe that these participants stop to infer
probabilities as soon as they see one extreme bound of the interval of the
conclusion and take this as the probability of the conclusion. Apparently,
they understand that the one extreme pole of the unit interval is a coherent
assessment of the conclusion and neglect to continue to search for the other
one.
In the contraposition task with the negations in the premise, only
three of the forty participants reproduced the value presented in the premise.
In the contraposition task with the negations in the conclusion, ten of the
forty participants reproduced the value presented in the premise. Over all
conditions only thirteen of the eighty participants responded by reproducing
the percentage contained in the premise. Thus only 16% of the participants
conform with the probability of the material conditional interpretation (fully
explicit mental model). As noted above, it is not clear whether these partici-
pants actually interpret the conditional as a material conditional or whether
they simply apply a matching strategy. Nevertheless, this is strong evidence
against the material conditional interpretation.
In the contraposition task with the negations in the premise, only
four of the forty participants responded by the [0%, 7%] interval, which
corresponds to the implicit mental model. In the contraposition task
with the negations in the conclusion, none of the responses corresponds to
the implicit mental model. Overall, only 10% of the interval responses of
the participants correspond to the implicit mental model.
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The results challenge two predictions of the mental model theory. First,
the broad majority of the interval responses should be explained by implicit
and explicit mental models. Second, more implicit mental models should
be observed than explicit mental models. Our data do not support these
predictions.
Finally as a technical remark, contraposition implies the monotonic-
ity property of classical logic. Since most participants understand that con-
traposition is probabilistically not informative their reasoning can be in-
terpreted as nonmonotonically and not as monotonic.
5 Concluding remarks
We described a probabilistic approach to human conditional reasoning. Non-
monotonic conditionals were investigated in the framework of probability
logic. We selected a special probability logic which is based on coherence. It
combines logic and subjective probability theory. Probability logic tells us
how to infer deductively the coherent (lower and upper) probability of the
conclusion from the premises. The structure of the inference task is ana-
lyzed in a rigorous way: everything known is made explicit in the premises.
We make only one implicit assumption, namely that the assessment of the
premises must be coherent. The cover-stories of our tasks were designed
to map the structure of the probability logical arguments. We took special
care that the content of the cover-stories is neutral and that they don’t evoke
uncontrolled background knowledge in the subjects.
In some recent studies on the conditional, the experimenter provided
the subjects the probabilities of all possible states (rows in the truth table,
elementary events, constituents) in the sample space. This corresponds to a
complete knowledge of the joint probability distribution. Logical argument
forms, though, contain only a few premises, and their probabilistic versions
contain correspondingly only a few probabilities (marginal and conditional
probabilities). When the probabilities of all possible states are known, the
inference task is substantially different from its original logical argument
form. As an example, assume the following assessment of all possible states
in the sample space:
P (A ∧B) = .5, P (A ∧ ¬B) = .1, P (¬A ∧B) = .2, P (¬A ∧ ¬B) = .2
This assessment describes a situation of complete probabilistic knowledge.
In this situation, the premises of the modus ponens are P (A) = .60 and
P (B|A) = .83, and the conclusion is P (B) = .70. If, however, the truth
table cases are unknown, and all we know is that P (A) = .60 and that
P (B|A) = .83, then we are in a situation of incomplete probabilistic knowl-
edge. Then we get an interval in the conclusion, P (B) ∈ [.50, .90] (see Figure
2). This example shows the necessity to work with interval probabilities.
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Since situations of complete probabilistic knowledge are seldom in everyday
life, experimenters should also focus on reasoning from incomplete proba-
bilistic knowledge. Interval probabilities are psychologically highly plausible
and we presented empirical evidence that they are actually used when of-
fered as a response mode. We observed that subjects are especially good in
inferring the lower probability bound of the conclusion of the probabilistic
modus ponens.
The four conditional inferences (modus ponens, etc.) are prominent in
psychology and were investigated several times. We investigated argument
forms that go beyond those four conditional inferences. premise strength-
ening, contraposition, and hypothetical syllogism and the rules of
system p are conditional argument forms. They involve more general prop-
erties of conditionals. The material conditional is transitive and monotonic.
The nonmonotonic conditional is neither transitive nor monotonic.
We observed that many subjects understand the probabilistic non-informativeness
of premise strengthening and of contraposition. The interval re-
sponses in the corresponding system p rules were close to the normative val-
ues. Subjects seem not to understand the probabilistic non-informativeness
of hypothetical syllogism. We explained this result by conversational
implicatures. Subjects interpret the hypothetical syllogism problems
as instances of the cut rule, which is a corresponding system p rule. For
some inference rules of system p on may speculate that they are at the core
of the human inference engine (especially the left logical equivalence
and the right weakening rules, see [50, 48]).
In our experiments, we presented the uncertainty of the premises in
terms of percentages. We wanted to avoid verbal paraphrases. Phrases like
“probably” are ambiguous. The subject must infer the meaning of such
phrases. Inferences to an interpretation of verbal paraphrases bias the ex-
periment, since different participants may infer different meanings. By pre-
senting percentages in the premises, the degree of uncertainty is controlled
in the experiment. The investigation of reasoning to an interpretation is
important for the understanding of how subjects form representations. In
our studies, however, we were concerned with reasoning from an interpre-
tation, which refers to how subjects manipulate representations from fixed
interpretations. The importance of the distinction between reasoning to an
interpretation and reasoning from an interpretation is stressed by Stenning
and van Lambalgen [61, 62]. Future work will investigate cognitive repre-
sentations and processing of the probabilities.
While we were primarily concerned with reasoning from fixed premises,
our studies also provide insight into how humans interpret the if–then. The
contraposition problem, for example, provides a clear watershed between
the probability of the material conditional interpretation and the conditional
probability interpretation. Our data clearly favor the conditional probability
interpretation of the if–then. This result adds to the results of Over, Evans
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& Elqayam [45]. Moreover, we showed how predictions of the probabilistic
extension of the mental model theory can be expressed in the language of
probability logic. These predictions were not corroborated.
We investigated probabilistic inference problems that mirror central prop-
erties of nonmonotonic reasoning and properties of monotone logics. We
have not yet investigated withdrawing conclusions in the light of new evi-
dence, but our data corroborate broadly some basic rationality postulates of
nonmonotonic reasoning. Future empirical work will be devoted to weaker
and stronger systems than system p. Moreover, we plan to use computer
controlled experiments, take reaction times, and investigate the revision of
default conclusions.
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Abstract
We take coherence based probability logic as the basic reference theory to model human deductive reasoning. The conditional and
probabilistic argument forms are explored. We give a brief overview of recent developments of combining logic and probability
in psychology. A study on conditional inferences illustrates our approach. First steps towards a process model of conditional
inferences conclude the paper.
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To empirically investigate human deductive inference one needs a description of what deductive inference is all
about. Such a description specifies what the human mind should compute, which conclusions should be considered
rational and which ones not. From Aristotle until the end of the twentieth century, classical logic was the standard
reference in psychology. The emerging logical pluralism and the many new paradigms developed in computer science
cast doubts upon the general appropriateness of classical logic as the standard frame in the psychology of thinking
and reasoning. Recently, a strong trend in psychology emerged to consider probability to be relevant even in tasks in
which uncertainties are not explicitly mentioned.
The present contribution takes probability logic based on the coherence approach of subjective probability as the
basic reference theory. It gives a brief overview of the recent developments of combining logic and probability to
build normative and descriptive models of human deductive reasoning. It explains the reasons why we think that
the coherence approach offers advantages for psychological model building. We also describe results of our own
experimental studies.
Coherence is a key concept in subjective probability theory. In the betting interpretation, coherence guarantees the
avoidance of sure losses (often called a “Dutch book”). From a psychological perspective, the coherence approach
provides several advantages. Most importantly, the coherence approach is based on the subjective interpretation of
probabilities. Subjective probabilities are degrees of belief and are conceived as coherent descriptions of incomplete
knowledge states. While human reasoning may be more or less coherent, it in any case involves degrees of belief and
descriptions of incomplete knowledge states. It would be an unwise research strategy to take a reference theory that is
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far away from cognitive science, for instance, an approach to probability developed for thermodynamics or quantum
physics.
The coherence approach to probability offers conceptions that are not available in other approaches. Examples
are the renouncement of full algebras of events, the special conception of conditional probability, the treatment of
single events, the expression of imprecise probabilities, the closeness to Bayesian statistics, and, last but not least, the
availability of probability semantics for logical systems such as SYSTEM P.
There are at least two scientific communities in which coherence is basic. The “Italian community” and the “im-
precise probability community”. De Finetti [9] is the root of both. Much of the recent work on the coherence approach
is summarized in [6,22]. The standard reference of imprecise probability is [38]. In recent years the Italian commu-
nity has connected its approach to possibility theory and other systems of uncertainty representation. The imprecise
approach has been extended to statistical modeling, conditional independence models, and several other fields of
uncertainty processing.
1. Conditional
Recently, several psychologists have followed the proposal of Adams [1,2], Popper [34], Rényi [37], and others
and interpret the indicative conditional IF H , THEN E as a conditional event, E|H (with the according probability
P(E|H)), and not as a material conditional, H ⊃ E (with the according probability P(H ⊃ E)). The “mental model”
theory may be an exception [5,19].
Interpreting the probability of the IF–THEN as the probability of the material implication leads to the paradoxes
of the material implication. This is not the case if the IF–THEN is interpreted as a conditional event. For instance,
the paradoxical argument form ¬H ∴ IF H , THEN E can be probabilistically interpreted as P(¬H) = x ∴ P(H ⊃
E) ∈ [x,1], where 0 6 x 6 1. Here the conclusion is constrained by the premise. If the IF–THEN is interpreted as a
conditional event, however, only P(E|H) ∈ [0,1] follows. The conclusion is not constrained by the premise. This
is an advantage of the conditional probability interpretation, since the premises of a counterintuitive argument form
should provide no information about its conclusion. Moreover, the probability values of P(H ⊃ E) and P(E|H) can
differ substantially. Dorn [10] considers a compelling example. Let H be THE NEXT THROW OF THE DIE WILL COME
UP A 5, and let E be THE NEXT THROW OF THE DIE WILL COME UP AN EVEN NUMBER. For a fair die P(H) = 1/6
and P(E) = 1/2. Then, P(H ⊃ E) = 5/6, whereas P(E|H) = 0.
Introducing a conditional as a conditional event is special in the coherence approach. First, while usually—for ex-
ample in the Kolmogorov approach—conditional probabilities are defined by absolute probabilities, in the coherence
approach conditional events are basic. “In classical approaches, a conditional probability P(E|H) is not introduced
as a direct notion, and so there is no meaning given to E|H itself” [8]. If conditional probabilities are “defined” by
absolute probabilities, then there is no conditional entity per se, and also no non-probabilistic IF–THEN. A conditional
event is not an ordered pair (E,H), with H 6= ∅, where ∅ is the impossible event [6, p. 63]. Assigning probability val-
ues directly to the conditional event is psychologically highly plausible: a person does not need to know and process
the “joint” and “marginal” probabilities to come up with a conditional probability assessment (where “conditional =
joint/marginal”).
Second, as in the coherence approach conditional events are basic, we may reflect upon the behavior of their truth
values. They require special attention. What are the truth values of a conditional event E|H ? If H is true the answer
is straightforward,
|E | H | =
{
1 if E = 1 and H = 1
0 if E = 0 and H = 1.
Here 0 and 1 are the indicator values corresponding to the truth values FALSE and TRUE. What is the truth value of
E|H when H is false? For this case de Finetti proposed a third truth value “undetermined”. A similar proposal was
made by Ramsey in 1929 [36, footnote, p. 155].1
1 In 1926 Ramsey already introduced “the degree of belief in p given q” [35, p. 82]. He noted that “this does not mean the degree of belief in
‘If p then q’ [material implication], or that in ‘p entails q’ ”. This is a misprint we found in several reprints of the article; “p” should be replaced
by “q”, and vice versa.
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“If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their
stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q; . . . We can say they are fixing their degrees of belief in q
given p. If p turns out false, these degrees of belief are rendered void.”
In terms of bets, one neither wins nor loses if the conditioning event turns out to be false. The bet is annulled
and the ticket prize is payed back. A consequence of such a conception is that conditioning cannot be expressed
by operators like negation, conjunction, and disjunction. There is no logical operator of conditioning [17]. This is a
fundamental property that distinguishes | from ⊃. The vertical stroke operator, |, is not truth-functional, while the
material implication, ⊃, is truth-functional.
When conditional events are considered to be primitive, then probability axioms should be introduced for condi-
tional events. An elegant method to introduce and justify axioms of conditional events was proposed by Coletti and
Scozzafava [6,8]. We first give the axioms and then their justification.
Definition 1 (Conditional probability). Let C = G ×B0 be a set of conditional events {E|H } such that G is a Boolean
algebra and B ⊆ G is closed with respect to (finite) logical sums, with B0 = B \ {∅}. A function P : C 7→ [0,1] is a
conditional probability iff the following three axioms are satisfied
A1 P(H |H) = 1, for every H ∈ B0, or (equivalently) P(E|H) = P(E ∧ H |H),
A2 P(·|H) is a (finitely additive) probability on G for any given H ∈ B0,
A3 P(E ∧ A|H) = P(E|H)P (A|E ∧ H) for any A,E ∈ G,H,E ∧ H ∈ B0.
In the present context we interpret the “E|H ” as IF H , THEN E. Axiom A2 specifies that, for a fixed antecedent,
the probabilities of the consequents follow the rules of finite additive probability. Axiom A3 is a “multiplicative chain”
rule for conjunctions.





1 if E ∧ H





= 1 · IE∧H + 0 · I¬E∧H + p(E|H) · I¬H .
I denotes the indicator of the according event. The three values 1, 0, and p(E|H) correspond to “win”, “lose”, “get






where x1 = 1, x2 = 0, x3 = p(E|H), and E1 = E ∧H , E2 = ¬E ∧H , and E3 = ¬H . Let X and Y be two such three-
term random variables. In the same way as two events can be combined by a logical operator to obtain a third event,
say, A⊕B = C, in the same way the two random variables, say X and Y , can be combined by a numerical operator +
to obtain a third random variable, X + Y = Z. What happens when two three-term random variables are added to
obtain a third one? When done without specific constraints the result does not remain in the family of numbers that
represents the set of conditional events. The operation may lead to a number that does not represent any event. When
we consider, however, only conditional events with a fixed conditioning event and when we further consider only
mutually exclusive conditioned events, E ∧ A = ∅ (so that also E ∧ A ∧ H = ∅), the function (1) is additive. In the
domain of conditional events this corresponds to the disjunction of E|H and A|H . The disjunction operator “∨” for
E and A given H thus corresponds to the addition operator “+” for the corresponding random variables. The same
can be done for the conjunction operator “∧” and the (then corresponding) multiplication operator “×”, for events
such as in axiom A3.
There is a connection between coherent conditional probability and possibility distributions [4,7]. A possibility
distribution may be conceived as a standardized likelihood. The likelihood is a function of the conditioning events,
P(E|Hi), where Hi is the variable. Likelihoods are not probabilities. Operators on possibilities typically involve
maxima for disjunctions, Π(A ∨ B) = max{Π(A),Π(B)}, and t-norms for conjunctions. Sometimes human subjects
seem to confuse the “direction” of conditioning (e.g., in the well known Linda task). Standardized likelihoods might
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be candidates to model such cases in a “rational” way. Moreover, human max or min responses are hard to distinguish
from superficial “matching” responses. In psychology “matching” means to restate numbers or other material already
contained in the description of a problem, as the “solution” of the problem.
2. Properties of probabilistic argument forms
The lower and upper probabilities of elementary arguments are obtained by the method of cases together with some
algebra, those of complex arguments by linear programming. An alternative method is used in the “Check Coherence”
software [3]. Here are two examples of elementary arguments.
Example 1 (MODUS PONENS). The non-probabilistic MODUS PONENS infers B from the set of premises {(IF A,
THEN B), A}. In the probabilistic version, the probabilities P(B|A) = y and P(A) = x are given, P(B) is sought.
By the theorem of total probability we have P(B) = P(A)P (B|A) + P(¬A)P (B|¬A). The lower probability of B ,
P(B) = z′, is obtained by (case 1) assuming P(B|¬A) = 0, so that z′ = xy. The upper probability is obtained by
(case 2) assuming P(B|¬A) = 1, so that z′′ = xy + (1 − x)1 = 1− x(1 − y).
Example 2 (MODUS TOLLENS). The non-probabilistic MODUS TOLLENS infers ¬A from {(IF A, THEN B), ¬B}. Let
P(A) = x,P (B|A) = y, P(B) = z, and P(B|¬A) = q; in the probabilistic version y and 1 − z are given, (1 − x)′
and (1 − x)′′ are sought. By the theorem of total probability we have z = xy + (1 − x)q . Solving for 1 − x we get
1 − x = 1 − (z − q)/(y − q) = (y − z)/(y − q). We distinguish three cases. (a) q = z leads to the upper probability
(1− x)′′ = 1, (b) q = 0 leads to the lower probability (1− x)′ = 1− z/y, and (c) q = 1 leads to the lower probability
(1− x)′ = (z − y)/(1 − y). The lower probability is thus max{1− z/y, (z − y)/(1 − y)}.
The numerical solutions of complex problems may be found by linear programming. Let us consider an inference
problem with n variables and m premises. The probability vector of the premises is denoted by p = (p1,p2, . . . , pm).
We build a coefficient matrix V with m + 1 rows, one row for each premise and one additional row containing 1s
only. Each column is associated with one of the combinatorially possible 0/1 patterns of the n variables. In the case
of logical independence there are r = 2n such patterns. In the case of logical dependence there are fewer cases (or
constituents; for how to obtain the constituents see, e.g., [14,15]). The vij values, i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , r , are
equal to the (generalized) indicator values that premise i obtains under the truth values of the constituent j . The values
are either 0, 1, or a conditional probability (for conditional events with negated conditioning events). The values are
determined according to Eq. (1).
The matrix V together with the vector p builds a system of m + 1 linear equations with r unknowns.
v11π1 + v12π2 + · · · + v1rπr = p1
v21π1 + v22π2 + · · · + v2rπr = p2
· · · + · · · + · · · + · · · = · · ·
vm1π1 + vm2π2 + · · · + vmrπr = pm
(3)π1 + π2 + · · · + πr = 1
The (π1,π2, . . . , πr) are the unknown probabilities of the constituents. The sum of these probabilities is 1. If the
number of premises is less than r − 1, then the linear system has no exact solution. Next we introduce the conclusion.
It is represented by the objective function
(4)w1π1 + w2π2 + · · · + wrπr ,
where the coefficients w1,w2, . . . ,wr are determined by Eq. (1).
Example 3 (MODUS TOLLENS). The upper part of Table 1 shows the four constituents for two variables. The lower
part gives the two premises of the MODUS TOLLENS and the coefficients of the linear system. The lower and upper
probabilities of the conclusion ¬A with the coefficients (1,1,0,0) are the minimum and maximum, respectively, of
the objective function p3 = 1 · π1 + 1 · π2.
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Table 1
MODUS TOLLENS. The upper part contains the constituents,
the lower part the coefficient matrix V
A 0 0 1 1
B 0 1 0 1
B|A p1 p1 0 1 p1
¬B 1 0 1 0 p2
1 1 1 1 1
With the help of linear programming the lower and the upper values of the function are determined. If the proba-
bilities of the premises are given in the form of intervals only, then the lower and upper probabilities of the conclusion
are found by fractional programming, which requires several linear programming steps in succession [22].
An important property of arguments is the presence or absence of various kinds of logical and functional depen-
dencies in sets of events. We first consider unconditional events. Logical independence is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Logical independence). Let {E1, . . . ,Em} be a set of m unconditional events. If all 2
m atoms are possible
conjunctions, then the set of events is logically independent. Otherwise they are dependent.
We note that logical independence and dependence refer to a set of events. The mutual independence of two events
is a special case.
We next consider the case of conditional events. To define logical independence for conditional events we follow
[15].
Definition 3 (Logical independence of conditional events). A set of m conditional events is logically independent, if
the number of constituents is 3m.
The constituents are constructed by the combinations of the (Ei ∧ Hi) ∨ (¬Ei ∧ Hi) ∨ ¬Hi , i = 1, . . . ,m. For
details we refer to [14,15].
We next consider linear dependence/independence. Let Vm+2 be the coefficient matrix of the premises together
with the conclusion.
Theorem 1 (Linear dependence). If the rank r(Vm + 1) = k and the rank r(Vm+2) = k + 1, then the premises and
the conclusion are linearly independent. If r(Vm + 1) = r(Vm+2), then the conclusion is linearly dependent on the
premises.
The rank determines the number of dimensions of a linear space.
Closely related to the dependence/independence properties is de Finetti’s Fundamental Theorem [9, p. 112].
Theorem 2 (Fundamental Theorem). Given the probabilities P(E1), P(E2), . . . ,P (Em) of a finite number of events,
the probability of a further event Em+1,
P(Em+1) is
{
precise if Em+1 is linearly dependent on {E1,E2, . . . ,Em},
∈ [0,1] if Em+1 is logically independent on {E1,E2, . . . ,Em},
∈ [p′,p′′] if Em+1 is logically dependent on {E1,E2, . . . ,Em},
where p′ and p′′ are lower and upper probabilities.
The first case (linear dependence) is a special case of logical dependence in which p′ = p′′. Practically all theorems
of elementary probability theory belong to the first case. In the second case we say an argument is probabilistically
non-informative.
As two corollaries we obtain (compare also Fig. 1):
Corollary 1 (Partial independence from below). If the set of atoms in which the indicator of the conclusion is 0 is
logically independent, then p′ = 0.
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Fig. 1. Classification of probabilistic argument forms. l and u denote whether the lower or upper probability bound of the conclusion, respectively,
is constrained by the premise(s). The circle on the left contains argument forms that are logically valid in their non-probabilistic version. The
intersection of the bold circles contains the p-valid argument forms. All regions are non-empty, see Table 2 for examples.
Corollary 2 (Partial independence from above). If the set of atoms in which the indicator of the conclusion is 1 is
logically independent, then p′′ = 1.
One of the best known principles in probability logic is Adams’ concept of p-validity [1,2]:
Definition 4 (Adams’ Hauptsatz). The uncertainty of the conclusion of a valid inference cannot exceed the sum of the
uncertainties of its premises.
The uncertainty u(A) is defined by the 1-complement of the corresponding probability, u(A) = 1 − P(A). It may
be shown that for unconditional events Adams’ Hauptsatz becomes
Corollary 3. Let E1,E2, . . . ,Em be a set of unconditional events with probabilities p1,p2, . . . , pm. The probability












The corollary shows that the lower probability is not sensitive (i) to the specific logical form of the premises and
(ii) to the order of the probabilities p1, . . . , pm. The two properties hold for unconditional events only and reflect the
fact that in this case the events are truth functional. Only the lower bounds of the conclusions of those arguments that
contain conditional events can be sensitive to the structure of the premises and to the specific pattern of the probability
assessment. Algebraically this is associated with the matrix V which, in the case of conditionals, does not only contain
0s and 1s, but a pattern of real-valued probabilities.
Material implication is truth functional. If human subjects would interpret IF–THEN as material implication their
probability responses in p-valid arguments should be insensitive to the logical form of the premises and to permu-
tations of the probabilities of the premises. There is, however, strong evidence that human subjects are sensitive to
structure and assignment. We consider this as one of the strongest arguments against the interpretation of the IF–THEN
as a material implication.
3. Combining logic and probability in psychology
Recent probabilistic approaches to human deductive reasoning may be classified according to the interpretation of
the IF–THEN and according to the relation between the premise(s) and the conclusion. One of the most influential
psychological theories of human reasoning is the mental model theory [19]. The theory was extended to human proba-
bilistic reasoning [16,20]. The core meaning of the uncertain IF–THEN is postulated to correspond to the probability of
the material implication, P(H ⊃ E). In recent studies on the meaning of the IF–THEN [13,24,27,28], the participants
had either to infer the probabilities of the four truth table cases (E ∧ H , E ∧ ¬H , ¬E ∧ H , and ¬E ∧ ¬H ) from the
probability of the IF–THEN (i), or the participants had to infer the probability of the IF–THEN from the probabilities
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Table 2
Probability logical argument forms. The logical operators are defined as usual, “|H” denotes classical logical truth. The axioms of SYSTEM P are
marked by “∗”, derived rules are marked by “†”. Derivations of the probability propagation rules of SYSTEM P are in [14], for the other argument
forms see [31]. “v” denotes logical validity of the non-probabilistic version of the argument form. “l” and “u” denote whether the lower or the
upper probability bound of the conclusion, respectively, is constrained by the probabilities of the premises. “p” denotes whether the argument form
is p-valid
Name Probabilistic version of the argument form v l u p
LEFT LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE∗ |H (E1 ≡ E2),P (E3|E1) = x ∴ P(E3|E2) = x y y y y
PROOF BY CASES† P(E2|E1) = x,P (E2|¬E1) = y ∴ P(E2) ∈ [min{x, y},max{x, y}] y y y y
RIGHT WEAKENING∗ P(E1|E3) = x, |H (E1 ⊃ E2) ∴ P(E2|E3) ∈ [x,1] y y n y
MODUS PONENS† P(E2|E1) = x,P (E1) = y ∴ P(E2) ∈ [xy,1 − y + xy] y y y y
CUT∗ P(E2|E1 ∧ E3) = x,P (E1|E3) = y ∴ P(E2|E3) ∈ [xy,1 − y + xy] y y y y
AND† P(E2|E1) = x,P (E3|E1) = y ∴ P(E2 ∧ E3|E1) ∈ [max{0, x + y − 1},min{x, y}] y y y y
MODUS TOLLENS† P(E2|E1) = x,P (¬E2) = y ∴ P(¬E1) ∈ [max{(1 − x − y)/(1 − x), (x + y − 1)/x},1] y y n y
CAUTIOUS MONOTONICITY∗ P(E2|E1) = x,P (E3|E1) = y ∴ P(E3|E1 ∧ E2) ∈ [max{0, (x + y − 1)/x},min{y/x,1}] y y y y
OR∗ P(E3|E1) = x,P (E3|E2) = y ∴ P(E3|E1 ∨ E2) ∈ [xy/(x + y − xy), (x + y − 2xy)/(1 − xy)] y y y y
DENYING THE ANTECEDENT P(E2|E1) = x,P (¬E1) = y ∴ P(¬E2) ∈ [(1 − x)(1 − y),1 − x(1 − y)] n y y n
AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT P(E2|E1) = x,P (E2) = y ∴ P(E1) ∈ [0,min{y/x, (1 − y)/(1 − x)}] n n y n
TRANSITIVITY P(E2|E1) = x,P (E3|E2) = y ∴ P(E3|E1) ∈ [0,1] y n n n
CONTRAPOSITION P(E2|E1) = x ∴ P(¬E1|¬E2) ∈ [0,1];P(¬E1|¬E2) = x ∴ P(E2|E1) ∈ [0,1] y n n n
MONOTONICITY P(E3|E1) = x ∴ P(E3|E1 ∧ E2) ∈ [0,1] y n n n
of the four truth table cases (ii). The interpretation of the P(IF H, THEN E) is then easily computed, as the proba-
bilities of all truth table cases are given. The main result was that most subjects interpret the P(IF H, THEN E) as a
conditional probability, P(E|H), and not as a probability of the material implication, P(H ⊃ E).
There are at least two ways in which probabilities may enter argument forms. The relation between the premises
and the conclusion can be probabilistic (i), or, the inference relation is deductive but some or all premises and the
conclusion may be probabilistically valuated (ii). Oaksford, Chater, and Larkin [26] (see also [25]) proposed that the
endorsement rate of the conditional inferences is directly proportional to the conditional probability of the conclusion
given the categorical premise. The MODUS PONENS, e.g., is evaluated by P(E|H), where “H ” denotes the categorical
premise, and “E” denotes the conclusion. Liu [23] proposed to conditionalize on both, the categorical premise, and
the conditional premise. Thus, in both approaches [23,25,26] the relation between the premises and the conclusion is
probabilistic and not deductive.
In probability logic a probability is attached to some or all premises and the probability of the conclusion is
derived by mathematical methods. Thus, the relation between the premises and the conclusion is deductive and not
probabilistic. In the coherence approach we consider a set of premises E1, . . . ,Em and a conclusion Em+1 and assume
that there exists a coherent probability assessment p1, . . . , pm for the premises. The probability of the conclusion,
pm+1, is derived deductively from the premises. The events (propositions) may be conditional or unconditional. Our
own work follows this approach.
Table 2 lists probabilistic versions of well known argument forms. We investigated empirically [29,30,32] a coher-
ence based probabilistic semantics [14] of the basic non-monotonic reasoning SYSTEM P [21]. The rules of SYSTEM
P are p-valid [1,2]. A necessary condition for p-validity is that the non-probabilistic versions of the rules are logically
valid. Logical validity, however, does not guarantee p-validity. TRANSITIVITY, e.g., is logically valid but not p-valid.
We call an argument form “probabilistically informative” if the coherent probability interval of its conclusion is not
necessarily equal to the unit interval [0,1]. An inference rule is probabilistically non-informative, if the assignment of
the unit interval to its conclusion is necessarily coherent. All p-valid arguments are probabilistically informative (see
the classification in Fig. 1).
We empirically investigated rules of SYSTEM P and rules that clearly violate SYSTEM P (see Table 2). We also
investigated the probabilistic versions of classical argument forms, like the MODUS PONENS. In the psychology of
reasoning classical argument forms were often investigated experimentally. It is interesting to compare results of the
probabilistic and the more traditional non-probabilistic argument forms. We give a brief overview of our investigations
on SYSTEM P and describe an example study in more detail below.
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We translated the non-monotonic inference rules of SYSTEM P into cover-stories. The cover-stories contained the
probabilities of the premises. The task of the participants was to infer the probability(-interval) of the conclusions.
In all experiments we payed special attention to create an atmosphere of reasoning and to avoid quick guessing. The
participants were students of our university. They were tested individually in a quiet room in the department. They
were asked to take enough time.
Practically all responses in the LEFT LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE (see Table 2) and in the RIGHT WEAKENING con-
ditions were coherent. For the AND, CAUTIOUS CUT, and the CAUTIOUS MONOTONICITY tasks, more than half
of the interval responses were coherent. Moreover, we investigated argument forms that clearly violate SYSTEM P,
namely MONOTONICITY, CONTRAPOSITION, and TRANSITIVITY. These argument forms are probabilistically non-
informative. Except for TRANSITIVITY, most participants understood that these argument forms are probabilistically
non-informative and they inferred wide intervals. We explain the results in the TRANSITIVITY tasks by conversational
implicatures. Adams [1] stressed the probabilistic invalidity of the TRANSITIVITY and suggested to interpret TRAN-
SITIVITY in common sense arguments as CUT. If a speaker first utters a premise of the form IF E1, THEN E2 and then
utters as the second premise IF E2, THEN E3, the speaker actually means by the second premise IF E1 AND E2, THEN
E3. The speaker does not mention “E1 AND” to the addressee because E1 AND is already conversationally implied
and “clear” from the context. Thus, we analyzed the data of the TRANSITIVITY tasks as CUT and observed analogue
patterns as in the CUT tasks.
Of special interest are the tasks in which all premises are certain. This is the case in those tasks in which the
probabilities of the premises are equal to 1. These tasks serve as “control conditions” as they are comparable to the
respective non-probabilistic argument forms. In the tasks with certain premises, practically all participants endorse the
SYSTEM P rules. The high endorsement rates are comparable to the endorsement rates of the non-probabilistic version
of the MODUS PONENS (89–100%; [11]). In the MONOTONICITY task with certain premises the interval responses are
large, which means that many participants understand the probabilistic non-informativeness of the MONOTONICITY
argument form even in this special condition. In the case of TRANSITIVITY the mean lower bounds are very high. As
discussed above, participants might interpret the TRANSITIVITY tasks as CUT tasks.
As an example, we describe a study on the probabilistic versions of the argument form MODUS PONENS (MP),
MODUS TOLLENS (MT), DENYING THE ANTECEDENT (DA), and AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT (AC). The non-
probabilistic MP and MT are logically valid. The non-probabilistic DA and AC are not logically valid. The probabilistic
MP and MT are p-valid. The probabilistic DA and AC are not p-valid. We were especially interested to compare the af-
firmative and the negated versions of these argument forms (i.e., negated conclusions). The four affirmative argument
forms (MP, DA, MT, AC) and their negated versions (NMP, NDA, NMT, NAC) are shown in Table 6. The non-probabilistic
versions of these argument forms were extensively investigated empirically [11,12]. The non-probabilistic MP is ac-
tually endorsed by 89–100%, the MT by 41–81%, the DA by 17–73%, and the non-probabilistic AC is endorsed by
23–75% of the participants [11].
One hundred and twenty students participated in our study on the probabilistic versions. Thirty participants were
assigned to each of the four conditions MP and NMP, DA and NDA, MT and NMT, and AC and NAC. Each participant
solved three affirmative and three negated arguments. As an example, a MP task had the following form:
Imagine the following situation. Around Christmas time a certain ski-resort is very busy. This region is very popular
among sportsmen, like skiers, snow-boarders, and sledge-riders. Every hour a cable-car brings the sportsmen to the
top. About this cable-car we know:
Exactly 70% of the skiers wear red caps.
Exactly 90% of the sportsmen are skiers.
Imagine all the sportsmen in this cable car. How many of these sportsmen wear a red cap?
Participants could respond either by a point value or by two interval values. All tasks had a similar structure. Table 3
lists the probabilities presented in the premises, the normative lower and upper bounds, and the participants’ mean
lower and upper bound responses for the tasks.
In the MP tasks with certain premises (100% in both premises) all thirty participants solved the task correctly and
responded “100%”. Likewise, all participants solved the negated version of the MODUS PONENS (NMP) correctly and
responded “0%”. This indicates two things. First, the participants are perfect in the “certain MP” and “certain NMP”.
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Table 3
Mean lower (LBR) and mean upper bound responses (UBR). P1 and P2 denote the probabilities presented in the premises. CLB and CUB denote the
normative/coherent bounds. The data of the upper half of the table are taken from [33]
P1 P2 CLB CUB LBR UBR CLB CUB LBR UBR
MODUS PONENS NEGATED MODUS PONENS
1 1 1 1 1 1 .00 .00 .00 .00
.7 .9 .63 .73 .62 .69 .27 .37 .35 .42
.7 .5 .35 .85 .43 .55 .15 .65 .41 .54
DENYING THE ANTECEDENT NEG. DENYING THE ANTECEDENT
1 1 .00 1 .37 .85 .00 1 .01 .53
.7 .2 .20 .44 .19 .42 .56 .80 .52 .76
.7 .5 .15 .65 .25 .59 .35 .85 .33 .65
MODUS TOLLENS NEGATED MODUS TOLLENS
1 1 1 1 .73 .82 .00 .00 .18 .33
.7 .9 .86 1 .46 .72 .00 .14 .20 .41
.7 .5 .29 1 .36 .66 .00 .71 .27 .57
AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT NEG. AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT
1 1 .00 1 .36 .97 .00 1 .04 .64
.7 .9 .00 .33 .43 .86 .67 1 .10 .48
.7 .5 .00 .71 .34 .77 .29 1 .13 .56
Table 4
Deviance of the number of observed responses falling into the coherent intervals from the expect number assuming a random interval generator.
High χ2 values indicate more than expected coherent responses. If there are too few cases in the coherent interval the χ2 values are marked by (–)
P1 .70 .70 .70 .70 .70 .70 .70 .70
P2 .90 .50 .90 .50 .20 .50 .20 .50
MP NMP DA NDA
χ2 120.33 13.07 85.33 9.60 10.76 .60 6.42 .60
MT NMT AC NAC
χ2 1.72 (–).01 13.88 .98 (–)10.00 (–).92 (–)8.10 (–)11.11
Second, the reliability of our experimental conditions is high. The results agree with the literature. Human subjects
are perfectly competent to make MP inferences.
The relation between the number of responses falling into the normatively correct interval and the size of the
normative interval is used as a measure of the agreement of the responses and the normative values. We use a simple
χ2 value to express the agreement, χ2 = (f − e)2/e, with f = number of participants inferring coherent values, and
e = expected number of participants assuming a random response generator. Let the normative interval be [l, u]. In
step one the random number generator selects a lower response rl greater than l with probability 1 − l. In step two it
selects a number greater than rl and less than u with probability (u − rl)/(1 − rl). For our purposes it is sufficient to
approximate rl roughly by l. Combining step one and step two by multiplying the two probabilities simplifies to u− l
so that e = N · (u − l) where N denotes the number of participants in an experimental condition. Table 4 reports the
χ2 values for the various tasks for the probabilistic premises.
The by far best agreement with the coherent intervals is obtained for the MP and the NMP. There is a significant
deviance from normative intervals in the AC and NAC. Data shows that in the first AC task the participants give
incoherent responses with too high values and in the NAC with too low values. Matching is one possible explanation,
but omitting a negation step in the solution process (see below) is an alternative explanation.
In the DA tasks with “100%” in both premises, fourteen of the thirty participants responded correctly with the
unit interval or an interval with a lower boundary very close to zero, [6 1,100]%. Practically half of the participants
understood that only a non-informative interval can be inferred if each premise is certain.
All participants inferred a probability (interval) of a conclusion C, P(C) ∈ [z′C, z
′′
C], and the probability of the
associated negated conclusion, P(¬C) ∈ [z′
¬C, z
′′
¬C]. To test the conjugacy principle of the interval responses, we
PAPER 5: COHERENCE BASED PROBABILITY LOGIC 114
N. Pfeifer, G.D. Kleiter / Journal of Applied Logic 7 (2009) 206–217 215
Table 5
Percentages of participants satisfying the conjugacy principle in the MODUS PONENS, DENYING THE ANTECEDENT, MODUS TOLLENS, and the
AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENT conditions (±2% tolerance, n = 30 in each condition)
(P1,P2) (1,1) (.7, .9) (.7, .5) (.7, .2) (P1,P2) (1,1) (.7, .9) (.7, .5)
MP 100 53 50 MT 67 43 30
DA 67 30 0 AC 77 23 27
checked for each participant whether both z′C + z
′′




C = 1 are satisfied. Table 5 shows the number of
participants that exactly satisfy the conjugacy principle in the four tasks and their negated forms. In the MP with 70%
and 90% in the premises, for example, 16 of the thirty participants satisfied both conjugacy conditions. Participants
with perfect conjugacy show a remarkable sensitivity with respect to the 1-complements in the context of negation.
4. First steps towards a process model of conditional inferences
Evans [12] gives two task features that explain several of the effects observed in classical argument forms, direc-
tionality and negativity. The MODUS PONENS is a forward task. The MODUS TOLLENS is a backward task. The MP
is a forward argument because it requires an inference from the antecedent to the consequent. The MT is a backward
argument because it requires an inverse inference, from the consequent to the antecedent. Directionality is best illus-
trated by a propositional graph. A propositional graph is a directed graph. The verteces represent propositions and the
edges between two verteces represent conditionals. We attach probabilities to the edges. The absolute probability of a
proposition is represented by an arc without a parent.
Fig. 2 shows a diagram for two affirmative propositions and their negations. The four possible IF–THEN condi-
tionals are represented by the four arcs A
y




−→ B , and ¬A
1−q
−→ ¬B . x, y, z, and q denote the
probabilities P(A), P(B|A), P(B), and P(B|¬A), respectively. Dashed arrows are used when the absolute or the
conditional probabilities refer to negated propositions. The propositional graph represents the problem space for a





and the conclusion is represented by
z
−→ B . The inference consists in the removal of the vertex A. Fig. 3 shows the
diagrams for the premises of the MP, MT, and the AC.
Non-probabilistic and probabilistic studies have shown that the MT is more difficult than the MP. How can differ-
ences like these be explained with the propositional graphs?
We observed that the participants in our experiments were clearly better in lower than upper probability responses.
Normatively the lower probability of the conclusion of the MP, z′, is the product of the two premise probabilities,
P(A)P (B|A) (see Figs. 2 and 3). A process model assumes that human subjects understand that in MP the conclusion
is, in any case, less probable than any of its premises and that the lower probability is obtained by taking 100x% of
y or 100y% of x. In multiplicative forward chaining, current running results are obtained from iteratively taking a
proportion of the last running results. Such an operation is easy to perform intuitively with degrees of belief. Backward
processing is sometimes non-informative. In the AC the lower probability is zero. Such results cannot be obtained by
“cascaded inference” as in forward inference, see Fig. 3.
We further suppose that negations make inferences difficult so that human subjects prefer to think in terms of affir-
mative propositions. In an inference graph this requires taking a “detour” and switching from negations to affirmations
Fig. 2. Probability diagram for the basic argument forms of Table 6. P(A) = x, P(¬A) = 1 − x, P(B|A) = y, P(¬B|A) = 1 − y, P(B|¬A) =
q ∈ [0,1], P(¬B|¬A) = 1− q , P(B) = z, P(¬B) = 1 − z.
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Fig. 3. Left MP, middle MT, right AC. P(A) = x, P(¬A) = 1 − x, P(B|A) = y, P(¬B|A) = 1 − y, P(B|¬A) = q ∈ [0,1], P(¬B|¬A) = 1 − q ,
P(B) = z, P(¬B) = 1 − z.
Table 6
MP and negated MP (NMP), DA and negated DA (NDA), MT and negated MT (NMT), AC and negated AC (NAC), the two premises P1 and P2, the
conclusion C, P(B|A) = y, P(A) = x and P(B) = z, P(¬A) = 1 − x, P(¬B) = 1− z. Compare Fig. 2
P1 P2 ∴ C p′ p′′
MP IF A, THEN B A B xy 1− x(1− y)
NMP IF A, THEN B A ¬B x(1 − y) 1− xy
DA IF A, THEN B ¬A ¬B (1 − x)(1 − y) 1− (1 − x)y
NDA IF A, THEN B ¬A B (1 − x)y 1− (1 − x)(1 − y)
MT IF A, THEN B ¬B ¬A max{1 − zy ,
z−y
1−y } 1
NMT IF A, THEN B ¬B A 0 1− max{1 − zy ,
z−y
1−y }
AC IF A, THEN B B A 0 min{1− zy ,
z−y
1−y }
NAC IF A, THEN B B ¬A 1− min{1− zy ,
z−y
1−y } 1
and back. It also requires switching 1-complements of probabilities and lower and upper probabilities. This involves
more cognitive load. It is easy to lose track on such a solution path or to forget to switch back a 1-complement.
Normatively the upper probability is obtained by the conjugacy principle [38]. The upper probability of an event
E is 1 minus the probability of the negation of E, p′′(E) = 1 − p′(¬E). For the upper probability of the MP we
need the probability of ¬B , the negation of the conclusion. This is obtained by taking from the product x(1 − y)
the 1-complement, z′′ = 1 − x(1 − y). A process model assumes that these steps are also involved in an analog form
in human reasoning. It predicts that the upper probability of the MP is more difficult than the lower one because
for its solution more steps are required. The model assumes a strong preference for affirmative propositions. In many
investigations and in different domains it was observed that negated information requires additional processing efforts,
takes more time, leads to more errors, etc. than affirmative information [18].
We distinguish two families of elementary argument forms, the MP and the MT family. Each one has four members.
They are obtained by affirming or negating the categorical antecedent or the conclusion. Table 6 gives the lower and
upper probabilities for each of the 2 × 4 argument forms. The conjugacy principle is reflected in the 1-complements
of the diagonal entries of the successive argument pairs. The upper probability of the MP, e.g., is equal to 1 minus the
lower probability of the NMP. Note the symmetries in the MT family concerning the smaller/greater of two ratios.
The members of the MP family require forward processing, those of the MT family backward processing. Inferences
in the MP family involve multiplication, inferences in the MT family division. In addition, inferences in the MT family
require min/max-decisions. The number and the kind of steps may be used to estimate the difficulty of the argument
forms. Obviously the lower probability of MP is especially easy as it requires only one step. MT requires most steps. In
the NMP the lower probability of ¬B results from the product of the x(1− y). The result is obtained by multiplicative
chaining (Fig. 3), but this time the 1-complement of the given y value is required. The upper probability for the NMP
requires three steps: (i) taking the event-complement of ¬B , which is B , and which is given y, (ii) multiplicative
chaining, and (iii) taking 1-complement.
By bringing probability, logic and psychology together we have tried to improve the understanding of human
reasoning. We have approached the area on several routes simultaneously, including the selection of an appropriate
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normative framework, running experiments, and modeling of cognitive representations and reasoning processes. The
investigation of human reasoning is a highly interdisciplinary endeavor.
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Chapter 4
General conclusion
In this thesis I provided new clarifications and solutions to a number of
central epistemological questions. I proposed coherence based probabil-
ity logic as a fruitful and unified rationality framework for various episte-
mological problems of uncertain inference. Specifically, I proposed a new
measure of argument strength that accounts for the logical structure of the
premise set and that is sensitive to the imprecision and probability of the
conclusion (Section 3.1, p. 25). As mentioned in Section 2.1, future empir-
ical research is needed to investigate the psychological plausibility of the
proposed measure.
The advantage of basing the new measure on a deductive consequence
relation could be exploited in current debates in the philosophy of science.
Specifically, the proposed measure in Section 3.1 can be used as a corner-
stone of a new theory of confirmation. The key idea is that data (i. e., the
premises P) plus background knowledge K confirm a hypothesis (i. e., the
conclusion C), if the P probabilities plus K raise P(C) and simultaneously
decrease the imprecision of P(C).
In the context of argumentation theory, coherence based probability
logic has been shown to be fruitful not only in elaborating a measure of
argument strength, but also in the analysis of fallacies. In Pfeifer (2008) I
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investigate selected reasoning fallacies. Specifically, I argue that the argu-
mentum ad ignorantiam, affirming the consequent, denying the antecedent1 and
the conjunction fallacy are not fallacies per se. Rather, the violation of coher-
ence is a sufficient condition for an argument to be fallacious.
In Section 3.2 (p. 41) I analyze formally the semantics of negated ap-
parently self-contradictory conditionals in the context of Aristotle’s theses
and propose the conditional event interpretation of conditionals as a fruit-
ful and viable alternative to connexive logics (McCall, 1966; Angell, 2002).
Moreover, two experiments on both versions of Aristotle’s Thesis demon-
strate the psychological plausibility of the proposed semantics. The con-
ditional event interpretation fits with common sense and neither the wide
nor the narrow scope reading of the negation of material conditionals are
supported by the empirical data. This provides new and empirical justifi-
cations of the criticism of using material conditionals for formalizing com-
mon sense arguments. While the paradoxes of the material conditional are
popular in the discussions about the semantics of conditionals, Aristotle’s
theses are often ignored. Section 3.2 illustrates the theoretical and empirical
fruitfulness of Aristotle’s thesis for the first time.
A probabilistic interpretation of two paradoxes of the material condi-
tional is presented in Section 3.3 (p. 59). While advocates of the material
conditional often explain the paradoxical nature of the material conditional
away by using pragmatic arguments (e.g., in the sense of Grice (1975)), I
show that pragmatics is not necessary to avoid these paradoxes. The con-
ditional event interpretation of conditionals is free of these paradoxes of
the material conditional and does not employ any pragmatic considera-
tions. Thus, my analysis is much more parsimonious as it is elaborated in
purely semantical terms. Two reported original experiments substantiate
the formal analysis and highlight the empirical plausibility. Future work
1See Section 2.5, p. 23 above.
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is needed to study the case of the paradoxes in the context of additional
probabilistic or logical knowledge.
I am not arguing that all indicative paradoxes are formalizable in purely
probabilistic terms. The irrelevant inference from A to A ∨ B is interpreted
in probability logic as
(1) P(A) = x
(2) P(A ∨ B) ∈ [x, 1] .
If x is a point value and x < 1, then the imprecision of the conclusion (2) is
trivially higher than the premise imprecision (1). This may be interpreted
as a violation of the Gricean maxim of Quantity (Grice, 1975). Moreover,
experimental data taken form a dice task suggest that the majority of peo-
ple’s degree of belief is
P(An even number shows up | Number 2 shows up) = 1
after throwing randomly a fair die. This is a coherent and informative as-
sessment. However, if the conditioned event (i. e., the consequent of the
conditional) is replaced by “Number 2 shows up ∨ Number 4 shows up”,
then the observed modal degree of belief is equal to zero. The zero re-
sponses may be interpreted as an expression that the inference is irrelevant
(Fugard, Pfeifer, & Mayerhofer, 2011). (There was no such possibility in the
response format for expressing this kind of irrelevance.) Further research
is needed to clarify this point formally and empirically. Formal clarifica-
tions may be obtained by adding pragmatic considerations or by imposing
meta-logical conclusion relevance conditions in the sense of Schurz (1991).
Empirical clarifications may be obtained by using improved response for-
mats and by conducting interviews with the participants immediately after
they have solved the tasks.
Section 3.4 (p. 76) investigates how defeasible and nonmonotonic infer-
ences are justified within a probabilistic framework. A series of psycholog-
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ical experiments shows that the cautious and nonmonotonic rules of Sys-
tem P are corroborated by the participants. However, just those argument
forms that imply monotonicity—which are the monotonic counterparts to
selected System P rules—are those that are not corroborated by the partici-
pants. This speaks for the psychological plausibility of the basic rationality
postulates of System P. Formally, coherence based probability logic ade-
quately formalizes the paradigm example of nonmonotonic reasoning in
Section 3.4 (i. e., the Tweety case, see also the updated discussion in Sec-
tion 2.4, page 19 above). While System P has been investigated empirically,
future work is needed to investigate weaker systems than P (e.g., System
O by Hawthorne and Makinson (2007)) and stronger systems than P (e.g.,
System R by Lehmann and Magidor (1992) or System Z by Goldszmidt and
Pearl (1996)).
Section 3.5 (p. 76) studies general properties of uncertain argument
forms and the interrelations among logical validity, Adams’ p-validity
(1975, 1998) and probabilistic informativeness. Moreover, I surveyed a set
of central inference rules of probability logic in the light of these general
properties. I discussed the advantage of using the tightest coherent lower
and upper probability bounds and probabilistic informativeness over the
use of p-validity in formal epistemology and the psychology of reasoning.
The line of research in Section 3.5 should be continued by studying the
impact of relevance and irrelevance assumptions in the premises. This
is especially interesting in the context of imprecise probabilities: While
independence and relevance are symmetric relations in the special case of
precise probabilities, (ir)relevance is not symmetric in the general case of
imprecise probabilities (Cozman & Walley, 2005).
All sections of my thesis advance an empirically informed naturalized
formal epistemology of uncertain reasoning. Moreover, sections 3.1–3.5 in-
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vestigate paradigm examples for extending the current domain of experi-
mental philosophy. Contrary to some of the shallow, often inventory-based
empirical methodologies of current experimental philosophical work, I
make a strong case for properly designed and carefully carried out experi-
ments. Moreover, I advanced the practice of instructing the participants to
evaluate the task comprehensibility and the understandability of the task
material after the experiments. High ranks in these evaluations speak for
the carefully formulated instructions and task materials in the reported ex-
periments.
Further directions of future work include formal and empirical investi-
gations on counterfactual conditionals as well as on causal reasoning and
on abductive reasoning. Moreover, the investigated carrier structure of
probabilities is composed of propositional logical formulæ, enriched with
the conditional event. Thus, extending the proposed coherence based prob-
ability logic towards a formalism dealing with quantifiers is a further di-
rection of future research. Here, Angelo Gilio, Giuseppe Sanfilippo and I
already obtained interesting results in developing a coherence based prob-
ability semantics for Aristotelian syllogisms. Specifically, we probabilized
the frequency semantics I presented in Pfeifer (2006a) and obtained various
probabilistic notions of quantifiers, existential imports, and generalizations
of the traditional square of oppositions (Pfeifer, Sanfilippo, & Gilio, 2010;
Pfeifer, 2011a).
A further frontier of future research involves investigations on the rela-
tions among the coherence approach and other uncertainty measures like
possibility theory, Dempster-Shafer belief functions or fuzzy sets. In a re-
cently granted research project (German Research Foundation; co-applicant:
Gabriele Kern-Isberner) we will study the relations between coherence
based probability logic, conditional structures, and maximum entropy ap-
proaches aiming to establish new rationality norms for conditionals from a
CHAPTER 4. GENERAL CONCLUSION 123
formal and an empirical point of view.
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Appendix A reproduces the characterization theorem of coherence (Coletti &
Scozzafava, 2002, Theorem 4, p. 81). For an informal characterization of coherence
see Chapter 1 on p. 10 above.
Let C be an arbitrary family of conditional events and consider, for every
n ∈N, a finite subfamily
F = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn} ⊆ C ;
we denote by A the set of atoms Ar generated by the (unconditional) events
E1, H1, . . . , En, Hn and by G the algebra spanned by them. For an assessment
on C given by a real function P, the following three statements are equiva-
lent:
1. P is a coherent conditional probability on C ;
2. for every n ∈ N and for every finite subset F ⊆ C there exists a
sequence of compatible systems, with unknowns xαr ≥ 0,
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with α = 0, 1, 2, . . . , k ≤ n, where H00 = H0 = H1 ∨ . . . ∨ Hn and Hα0
denotes, for α ≥ 1, the union of the Hi’s such that ∑r
Ar⊆Hi
xα−1r = 0 ;
3. for every n ∈ N and for every finite subset F ⊆ C there exists
(at least) a class of (coherent) probabilities {PF0 , PF1 , . . . , PFh }, each
probability PFα being defined on a suitable subset Aα ⊆ A0 (with
Aα′ ⊆ Aα′′ for α′ > α′′ and PFα′′ (Ar) = 0 if Ar ∈ Aα′) such that for




PFα (Ar) > 0 ; (A.1)
moreover, for every Ei|Hi ∈ F there exists a unique PFβ satisfying










Proofs of the paradoxes
B.1 Paradox 1
The proof of the probabilistic non-informativeness of PARADOX 1,
From P(B) = 1 infer P(B|A) ∈ [0, 1]
consists of two parts. In part I we show that P(B|A) may be equal to zero
if P(B) = 1, and in part II we show that P(B|A) may be equal to one if
P(B) = 1. Ω denotes the certain event1 and ∀A(P(A) = P(A|Ω)).
Part I: Proof that P(B|A) may be equal to zero if P(B) = 1
the following assessment on the list of conditional events C = {B|Ω, B|A}
coherent?
(0.1) P(B|Ω) = 1
(0.2) P(B|A) = 0
1The certain event is equivalent to the disjunction of all n atoms, Ω⇔ A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An.
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The set of the atoms A0 = {A1, . . . , A4} is generated by the following list
of atoms Ai:
A1 ⇔ A ∧ B
A2 ⇔ A ∧ ¬B
A3 ⇔ ¬A ∧ B
A4 ⇔ ¬A ∧ ¬B
xαi denotes the (unknown) probability value of the atom Ai. The (uncondi-
tional) probability function that assigns xαi to Ai is denoted by Pα(Ai) = x
α
i .
The index α indicates that the probability function and the probability value
are always relative to the respective system (Sα) in the sequence of the sys-





(1) (x01 + x
0
3) = P(B|Ω)(x01 + x02 + x03 + x04)
(2) x01 = P(B|A)(x01 + x02)







(4) ∀i(x0i ≥ 0)
In the next steps we try to transform the information given in (S0) such that
the probability values of the atoms x0i are equal to zero.
(5) x02 + x
0
4 = 0 (1), (0.1)
(6) x01 = 0 (2), (0.2)
(7) x03 = 1 (3), (4− 6)












= 0+10+0+1+0 = 1. Since
x03 is not necessarily equal to zero, we can delete equation (1) and construct
the next system:2
2The condition “if ∑r
Ar⊆Hi
xα−1r = 0, α ≥ 1” is not satisfied because step (7) states that
x03 = 1 (see the second statement of the characterization theorem).





(1′) x11 = P(B|A)(x11 + x12)
(2′) x11 + x
1
2 = 1
(3′) ∀i(x1i ≥ 0)
(4′) x11 = 0 (1
′), (0.1)
(5′) x12 = 1 (2
′), (3′, 4′)






= 00+1 = 0. Therefore, the
assessment (0.1) and (0.2) on C is coherent. The probability assessment (0.1)
and (0.2), however, violates the classical (Kolmogorov) probability axioms.
The classical approach defines conditional probability by the fraction of
unconditional probabilities. If P(B) = 1, then P(B|A) = P(A∧¬B)P(A) =
P(A)
P(A) .
P(B|A) = 1 if P(A) > 0, otherwise P(B|A) is undefined. This violates (0.2).
Part II: Proof that P(B|A) may be equal to one if P(B) = 1
Is the following assessment on the list of conditional events C =
{B|Ω, B|A} coherent?
(0.1) P(B|Ω) = 1
(0.2) P(B|A) = 1
The set of the atoms A0 = {A1, . . . , A4} is generated by the following list
of atoms Ai:
A1 ⇔ A ∧ B
A2 ⇔ A ∧ ¬B
A3 ⇔ ¬A ∧ B
A4 ⇔ ¬A ∧ ¬B
The system (S0) is:





(1) (x01 + x
0
3) = P(B|Ω)(x01 + x02 + x03 + x04)
(2) x01 = P(B|A)(x01 + x02)







(4) ∀i(x0i ≥ 0)
(5) x02 + x
0
4 = 0 (1), (0.1)
(6) x01 + x
0
3 = 1 (3), (4− 6)
A solution for the system (S0) is P0(x01) = P0(x
0
3) = .5 and P0(x
0
2) =




















.5+0 = 1. Therefore, the assessment (0.1) and (0.2) on C is coherent. We
note that in this proof equation (2) is irrelevant.
B.2 Negated Paradox 1
The NEGATED PARADOX 1,
From P(B) = 1 infer P(¬B|A) ∈ [0, 1]
is used by Pfeifer and Kleiter (2011, see Section 3.3 on p. 59) to obtain
a richer set of experimental tasks. The proof of the probabilistic non-
informativeness consists of two parts. In part I we show that P(¬B|A) may
be equal to zero if P(B) = 1, and in part II we show that P(¬B|A) may be
equal to one if P(B) = 1.
Part I: Proof that P(¬B|A) may be equal to zero if P(B) = 1
Let Ω denote the certain event. Is the following assessment on the list of
conditional events C = {B|Ω,¬B|A} coherent?
(0.1) P(B|Ω) = 1
(0.2) P(¬B|A) = 0
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The set of the atoms A0 = {A1, . . . , A4} is generated by the following list
of atoms Ai:
A1 ⇔ A ∧ B
A2 ⇔ A ∧ ¬B
A3 ⇔ ¬A ∧ B
A4 ⇔ ¬A ∧ ¬B





(1) (x01 + x
0
3) = P(B|Ω)(x01 + x02 + x03 + x04)
(2) x02 = P(¬B|A)(x01 + x02)







(4) ∀i(x0i ≥ 0)
(5) x02 + x
0
4 = 0 (1), (0.1)
(6) x02 = 0 (2), (0.2)
(7) x01 + x
0
3 = 1 (3), (4− 6)
A solution for the system (S0) is P0(x01) = P0(x
0
3) = .5 and P0(x
0
2) =


















= 0.5+0 = 0. Therefore, the assessment (0.1) and (0.2) on C is coher-
ent.
Part II: Proof that P(¬B|A) may be equal to one if P(B) = 1
Is the following assessment on the list of conditional events C =
{B|Ω,¬B|A} coherent?
(0.1) P(B|Ω) = 1
(0.2) P(¬B|A) = 1
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The set of the atoms A0 = {A1, . . . , A4} is generated by the following list
of atoms Ai:
A1 ⇔ A ∧ B
A2 ⇔ A ∧ ¬B
A3 ⇔ ¬A ∧ B
A4 ⇔ ¬A ∧ ¬B





(1) (x01 + x
0
3) = P(B|Ω)(x01 + x02 + x03 + x04)
(2) x02 = P(¬B|A)(x01 + x02)







(4) ∀i(x0i ≥ 0)
(5) x02 + x
0
4 = 0 (1), (0.1)
(6) x01 = 0 (2), (0.2)
(7) x03 = 1 (3), (4− 6)












= 0+10+0+1+0 = 1. Since






(1′) x12 = P(¬B|A)(x11 + x12)
(2′) x11 + x
1
2 = 1
(3′) ∀i(x1i ≥ 0)
(4′) x11 = 0 (1
′), (0.1)
(5′) x12 = 1 (2
′), (3′, 4′)






= 10+1 = 1. Therefore,
the assessment (0.1) and (0.2) on C is coherent. This concludes the proof
that the NEGATED PARADOX 1 is probabilistically non-informative under
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the conditional event interpretation of the conditional.
We observe in part II of the probabilistic non-informativeness of the
NEGATED PARADOX 1 a similar situation as in part I of the corresponding
proof of PARADOX 1 (see p. 134f). The probability assessment (0.1) and (0.2)
is coherent, but it violates the classical probability axioms. If P(B) = 1, then
P(¬B|A) = P(A∧¬B)P(A) = 0P(A) . P(B|A) = 0 if P(A) > 0, otherwise P(B|A) is
undefined.
